
THE PROCEEDINGS

of

**The South Carolina
Historical Association**

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Robert Figueira and Stephen Lowe

Editors

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Robert McNair and Lyndon Johnson: The Heritage of the New Deal

Philip G. Grose

On one of my last visits to Governor McNair's farm in Berkeley County, the governor showed my wife and me a photograph of him and President Lyndon Johnson (LBJ). It was taken about forty years ago during a visit by Governor McNair to the White House—probably in the mid 1960s—and it bore President Johnson's distinctive signature.

The picture had lain under a stack of memorabilia in a hallway at the back of the governor's farmhouse and had suffered some weather damage. Mrs. McNair asked my wife, Ginny, if anything could be done to restore the photograph, since it was something that meant a great deal to the governor.

We brought the picture back to Columbia, and thanks to some careful professional work and the miracles of modern technology, the picture was restored to near-mint condition. It was also established that the autograph had been personally done and was not the product of a stamp or machine.

The experience with the LBJ picture left at least two impressions with regard to Governor McNair. First, the relationship and similarities of these two southerners may have been stronger than had been previously realized, and second, that first impression may have been understated in my McNair biography published two years ago. They were both products of the tough economic times of the 1930s.

I would suggest, in fact, that a whole generation of southern political leaders, men who became known as "New South Governors" of the 1960s and 1970s, was actually spawned under the influence of the Depression and the programs of the New Deal of the 1930s. It is customary, I realize, for the "New South" designation to be based largely on the political moderation of those governors, and more specifically, on their policies and practices with regard to race. That is reasonable and sensible for the period. Moving from Orval Faubus to Dale Bumpers in Arkansas, or from John Bell Williams to Bill Winter in Mississippi, or from Lester Maddox to Jimmy Carter in Georgia, or from George Bell Timmerman to Fritz Hollings, Bob McNair and John West in South Carolina is an enormous leap from old South to new South.

In his study, *A Question of Justice*, published in 2003, Gordon Harvey of Auburn University stated that the change in southern politics

was so dramatic that by 1972, every southern state save Alabama had elected moderate governors who avoided racial rhetoric and

advocated progressive policies. But the progressivism of the class of new southern governors in the 1970s was limited largely to their views on race and reform of state governmental structures.¹

Racial moderation and progressivism were clearly the most visible and historically significant transformations taking place across the South as provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 and the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of 1954 were being implemented and enforced. I would suggest, however, that there were other important initiatives underway at that time and that those initiatives could be traced to the influence of the Depression and the New Deal of the 1930s.

If we look at a representative group of the “New South” governors, for example, we find some similarities that go beyond racial moderation. Jimmy Carter and Bob McNair grew up on large farms, but they were surrounded by poor, hard-pressed neighbors. John West grew up on a small, four-horse farm in rural Kershaw County that was managed by his mother after his father died in a school fire. Reuben Askew of Florida was raised by a single mom who had been abandoned by her husband. Dale Bumpers grew up in Charleston, Arkansas, where he said, “Everybody was poor.”

They all listened to the regressive rhetoric of the Depression-era politicians in the South and even as young people, they began to rebel against it. Dale Bumpers remembered hearing a well-known senator say that people had to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Bumpers wrote, “I wanted to stand up and say, ‘Sir, some people don’t have any boots, so they have no straps to pull up.’”²

It was popular, of course, for the entrenched southern establishment to oppose things like the New Deal as being disruptive of the so-called southern way of life. Even before Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1932, newspapers were attacking the modest efforts of President Herbert Hoover to bring relief to the region. The *Houston Post-Dispatch* wrote, “It is not an obligation of government to furnish citizens with employment.” The *Dallas Morning News* said it “has steadfastly set its tin cup and blue goggles trips to Washington for ‘relief’ for Texans.”³ In South Carolina, the 1938 Senate election pitted pro-New Dealer Olin Johnston against anti-New Dealer “Cotton Ed” Smith, and Smith won.

The southern political establishment, besides not liking the idea of government creating jobs, was also worried about the potential benefits for blacks and organized labor in the various New Deal packages. While New Deal programs were designated to be racially segregated, the potential strengthening of working class wages and living standards threatened the old southern aristocratic hierarchy.

But for all the political hubbub about the ideologies against the New Deal, things were quite different down on the dirt farms of the South. There was some

downright pragmatic thinking going on that had very little to do with conservative or liberal philosophies. People like Dale Bumpers were doing their own thinking and were noticing things around them. He was growing up worried about people with no bootstraps to pull up. Bob McNair was seeing the world around him in rural Berkeley County. He later observed

There were the folks who lived in the tenant houses or small shacks. They really had no job and often had only a mule and a farm. They barely pecked out a living or they worked on the farms of others. They survived and that was all.⁴

Jimmy Carter had this recollection:

Someone had to be blamed when the ravages of the Depression years struck and many of the smoldering resentments against Yankees and the federal government were given new life in my childhood. Yet, with the racially segregated social system practically unchallenged, it seemed that blacks and whites accepted each other as partners in their shared poverty.⁵

So some of the roots of some of the racially moderate “New South” governors were really in the hardscrabble segregated world of the Depression-era South. Political and economic interests were fused into one common mission for both races. It was simply a matter of “survival.” When the New Deal programs arrived in the 1930s, therefore, people down on the farms were not viewing them in their broad political contexts. They were being viewed from the perspective of “survival.” Bob McNair said:

The WPA [Works Progress Administration] and the old CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] camps meant so much to our area and other areas like them because the programs put people to work. [They] dug drainage canals and drained swamps and low, flat areas that were mosquito havens. They opened up land for cultivation by creating highly productive lands⁶

Meanwhile, in the days before the New Deal, Lyndon Johnson had arrived in Washington as the secretary to a conservative rancher congressman named Dick Kleberg. Johnson had grown up in the impoverished Hill Country of Texas, and like the New South governors of the 1960s and 1970s, he had seen firsthand the living conditions of his neighbors. Congressman Kleberg spent much of his time away from Washington at his ranch in Texas, and in his absence, his new secretary, Lyndon Johnson, made himself at home.

These were the days of the Herbert Hoover presidency, and his main program to help farmers was called the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, or AAA. It was something that could bring some relief to the poor ranchers and farmers of Johnson's 14th Congressional District in south Texas.

Even as a newcomer to Washington, Johnson was brash, and here is how he operated, according to his biographer Robert A. Caro.

Telephoning an AAA bureaucrat, he would introduce himself as 'Congressman Kleberg—from the Agriculture Committee,' and would ask the bureaucrat to give all the assistance possible to his secretary, Lyndon Johnson. Not long afterward, Secretary Johnson would show up at the bureaucrat's office. . . . He touched every base . . . smiled and chatted with assistants . . . he had entire bureaus willing to help him.⁷

In no time, the sign-ups for the program already exceeded the district's quota. Johnson moved on to become state director of the New Deal's main educational program, the National Youth Administration, and in 1937, he became congressman from Texas' 10th District, which included Austin, and he became one of President Roosevelt's staunchest supporters of New Deal programs. His campaign slogan that year was contained in three words: "Franklin Delano Roosevelt."⁸

These, I would suggest, were the conditions that helped to give birth to the post-World War II phenomenon of "New South" governors. There were other factors, of course, including the experience of World War II itself and the growing demands among fighting men for desegregation and equal treatment.

But I think too often we overlook the influence of the Depression and the New Deal in later political thinking. World War II seems to form a curtain for us, and we lose track of what went on before and of the connection between the 1930s and the 1950s. Political history has also tended to diminish the New Deal and its influence because it was racially segregated and therefore did not seem to stand up to later political and ideological scrutiny. In the 2004 collection of essays entitled *Before Brown*, editor Glenn Feldman of the University of Alabama Birmingham folds that theory into the causes for southern white backlash in the 1970s and the "Southern Strategy" of the presidency of Richard Nixon.⁹

There was, for sure, the so-called New Deal coalition, which David Halberstam described as

an unspoken, unviolated covenant . . . which allowed the essentially conservative South to be an uneasy partner with Northern

liberals. The Southern Democratic machinery would hold its nose and turn out voters for candidates it felt were far too liberal, and in turn, the attorney general of the United States would not turn his powers against Democratic state administrations when they kept their local political franchise lily white.¹⁰

All that ended, of course, with the showdowns between Robert Kennedy and the Democratic governors of Alabama and Mississippi in the early 1960s.

Along the way, I am afraid, we have tended to dismiss the New Deal as being anything useful to our own political and economic experience. We have viewed it as politically regressive, and we have recognized, of course, that it was not all that successful as an experiment in economic recovery. It took World War II to get that job done.

A recent article in the *New Yorker* did suggest, however, that the New Deal was the nation's first experience with the notion of using fiscal stimulus as a key policy weapon in dealing with national economic distress. So it did serve some purpose.¹¹ In fact, I would suggest today that it served a bigger purpose than we seem ready to recognize. For all its flaws and shortcomings, the New Deal paved the way for later initiatives in political reform and fiscal policy that have served well the nation in the post-war era.

My purpose today is not to argue the success or failure of the New Deal or to examine its shortcomings. For whatever may have been the larger political issues of the 1930s, and the historiography that may have taken place since then, I would suggest that there is evidence that the New Deal made a lasting impression on some important southern governors of the 1960s and 1970s.

That evidence would be found in places like Charleston, Arkansas; Plains, Georgia; and Berkeley County, South Carolina. It would be found in congressional districts of Texas where Lyndon Johnson was finding it practical and sensible to use whatever relief programs were available to meet the desperate needs of his constituencies.

What was born in the New Deal era was a southern liberalism that grew out of practicality and desperation. It formed an imperfect model for another imperfect series of programs that were known as the Great Society. It also provided both a model and a blueprint for the gubernatorial initiatives of Robert E. McNair in South Carolina.

By the time of his administration, of course, the racial restraints of the New Deal had given way to the guidelines of the Great Society, which demanded racial fairness and equality of treatment. By then, the political transformation wrought by landmark judicial decisions and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 had taken place.

Between years 1965 and 1967, registration of black voters increased over 50 per cent in the states of the Old Confederacy. In South Carolina, the increase was not quite so dramatic— 37 per cent— but part of that was because black registrations were already at 37 percent in 1965, a high figure for the Deep South at the time. Black voters, in fact, played a significant role in the election of Governor McNair in 1966.

So let us look at South Carolina during that period of time. Governor McNair took office in April, 1965, to complete the term of Governor Donald Russell, who had resigned to become U.S. Senator upon the death of Olin Johnston. While governors Hollings and Russell had brought a great deal of political progressivism to the state in the way of compliance with desegregation court orders, the condition of the state's human service programs was stagnant.

The welfare agency that administered existing programs was archaic. Stories go that when five o'clock in the afternoon arrived, offices shut down, no matter how long the line may have been of those waiting for services. Sorry, come back in the morning. If the agency's money for benefits ran out before the end of the year, the program ceased until a new budget year began. Sorry, come back next year.

When the huge Medicaid program came along, with its great complexity and multitude of programs, the welfare agency was overwhelmed. McNair was able to negotiate a retirement of the long-standing director and replace him with a Baptist preacher who kept the local offices open after five o'clock. A great overhaul of budgets and a renegotiation of existing contracts were required to put Medicaid on a twelve-month operational basis. And then, of course, came the realization that Medicaid spilled over into many agencies in a state where state agencies were known for their insularity. McNair had to create interagency councils to accommodate the multi-dimensional nature of the massive new enterprise.

All of that—as difficult as it may have been—was largely housekeeping to accommodate new governmental operations. The question confronting McNair was how far he would go in dealing with the realities of one of the nation's poorest states and the realities of a state about to undergo the total desegregation of its vastly unequal segregated public schools.

He could have limited himself to the relative safety of housekeeping chores, and to maintaining the civil peace as the desegregation process swept over much of the state's public and economic universes. At that moment in history, however, he chose to craft his own series of initiatives to address the state's difficult economic and political plight. These were embodied in a document known as the Moody Report, because McNair retained consultants who were associated with Moody's Investor Service of New York.¹² Fred Carter, however, the president of Francis Marion Univer-

sity and a long-time political scientist, has called it the “McNair Report” because it reflected what the governor himself believed was needed for South Carolina to get through the 1970s.¹³

It was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969, but two years earlier, one prominent South Carolina journalist had already detected a similarity between the creator of the Great Society and the creator of the Moody Report. In a Sunday column in the *Charlotte Observer*, Jack Bass discussed the similarities in styles of the two men, and the headline over that column read, “Robert McNair: Soft-Sell Version of LBJ.”¹⁴

In many ways, the Moody report was a “Soft-Sell Version” of the Great Society, and before that, the New Deal. For McNair, the big challenge was to try to speed up the process of bringing the state’s grievously unequal school systems into some kind of equity and balance. He knew that total school desegregation would be required within the next few years, and he knew how far the state had to go to make the new unitary system truly fair and productive for both races. He also knew that the state had a flimsy economic base overly dependent on one industry—textiles—and an ailing agricultural economy. To address those—and other issues—McNair and his Moody consultants found in the New Deal model the notion of fiscal stimulus, and the report led to significant public spending on infrastructure issues such as the state’s ports and its highway system.

More noticeable were the innovations in public education, the creation of state-funded public kindergartens, and efforts at various critical stages to reduce dropouts and failures. The merging of two vastly different public school systems would take new and imaginative strategies, and McNair’s “Moody Report” was the vehicle for those strategies. Many of its four hundred pages of recommendations were adopted, either by administrative action or statute, and even those items that provoked racial feelings were passed by the mostly white General Assembly.

Viewed in retrospect, the Moody Report—like the New Deal—was not totally successful. There are still great disparities within the public school system, as evidenced by things such as “The Corridor of Shame” in eastern South Carolina. The state’s economy is still a precarious one. The success or failure of the Moody Report recommendations will be judged by the generations of political, economic and educational leaders.

What is interesting for us to consider today, however, is that this governor, growing up in poverty-stricken Berkeley County, watched the New Deal programs come into his area and put people back to work. When he himself set about thirty years later to address grievous troubles still plaguing his state, it would be the New Deal that provided at least a partial model for his thinking. It showed him that public programs could address human suffering and human need. It showed him that the

investment of public dollars could have a projected payout of better jobs and a better tax base for the state. It showed a lot of people that public leaders did not have to sit back as caretakers and housekeepers to wait for nature to run its course.

That notion carries forward for us today in Great Society programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and in South Carolina, we have a statewide kindergarten and pre-school programs designed to help people of all income levels and backgrounds to get a good start on their educational careers, all initiated by Moody Report recommendations.

The New Deal opened that door for McNair and others like him who became leaders of southern political reform in the 1960s and 1970s.

It is an important notion, and for all its flaws, it is helpful that we not lose sight of the usefulness and influence of the New Deal in our political world today. The New Deal gave us new ways of thinking, and it produced men like Robert E. McNair and Lyndon Johnson, whose friendship and similarities are worth remembering. There is a repaired picture in the late governor's farm house in Berkeley County that commemorates that friendship.

ENDNOTES

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9. Glenn Feldman, *Before Brown: Civil Rights and White Backlash in the Modern South* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 275–76.
10. David Halberstam, *The Children* (New York: Random House, 1998), 300–301.
11. James Surwiecki, "The Stimulus Strategy," *New Yorker Magazine*, February 25, 2008, 29.
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Martha Rutledge Kinloch Singleton: A Slaveholding Widow in Late Antebellum South Carolina

Lindsay Crawford

I cannot allow you to dictate from which friends I shall or shall not receive advice and assistance. As your views and mine of the duties and position of a gardener differ so widely, I shall have no occasion for your services another [sic] year. — Martha Rutledge Kinloch Singleton to Robert Clark

Martha Rutledge Kinloch Singleton wrote these words to one of her overseers on 27 September 1854. In these two sentences, she bluntly demonstrated her authority over her property and over those who worked for her. At this time most plantation mistresses could expect that their husbands—the actual owners of these estates—would handle such matters. Martha, however, did not have that option, for her husband, Matthew, had died in August 1854, leaving her with three small children, a large amount of debt, hundreds of slaves, and thousands of acres of land to manage.¹ On the verge of bankruptcy, Martha had to find a way to survive. Over the next six years, she fought largely on her own to save her home at Kensington Plantation and return it to its former glory. By 1860, Kensington's acreage and slaveholdings had grown considerably, and the plantation was producing an abundance of crops.²

The Scarborough-Hamer Foundation, which maintains and interprets Kensington today, maintains that Martha, or Mattie as her close friends called her, played a major role in restoring the plantation's wealth and grandeur. Nevertheless, she has not heretofore been the subject of any major study. An examination of primary source documents and the available historiography on white Southern plantation women reveals that when faced with circumstances that often devastated many women of high social position, Mattie did not soon remarry or abdicate control of her affairs to male relatives or friends. She was not crushed by grief nor did she become incapable of managing affairs. Mattie also did not fall from the ranks of elite society. Instead, she persevered in taking control of her new responsibilities for the sake of her children's futures.³

This study will present the narrative of Mattie's economic and social survival as a widowed white slaveowner during the 1850s and 1860s. Her story is but part of a wider historical context involving issues of race and gender. As with any microhistorical inquiry, the goal here is a modest one, namely to provide an individual case study that focuses primarily on the first decade of Mattie's widowhood.

Before examining her experiences as an adult, it is important to know something of Mattie's background. Born the eldest child of Mary and Frederick Kinloch on 18 April 1818, she spent most of her childhood at her family's plantations in Georgetown and in Christ Church Parish near Charleston.⁴ Slavery surrounded her and influenced her life from a very young age. Her father owned at least 60 slaves in 1820, and he could have inherited more from his father, Francis Kinloch, who owned 137 slaves in 1824.⁵ She was a well-educated woman, much like her mother, Mary Lowndes Kinloch, and her aunt, Harriet Lowndes Aiken. While details about Mary's education are unknown, it is known that Harriet spoke four languages and played several instruments, all evidence that suggests that Mattie may have received an education of high quality.⁶ In fact, other prominent South Carolina women commented on Mattie's erudite language. In her diary, Mary Chesnut wrote that Mattie used "such clean-cut sentences, every word distinctly enunciated."⁷ In their letters to one another, Eliza Middleton Fisher and Mary Hering Middleton mentioned several times that Mattie spoke and wrote excellent Italian and French.⁸

Following their education, women like Mattie typically attended parties and dances, and made formal visits to family and friends. These social events allowed them to exercise "the graces and social attitudes they had learned to attract suitable men to marry."⁹ Mattie frequently attended social events such as the St. Cecilia Society balls in Charleston. It was possibly at a St. Cecilia Society ball in the early 1840s that Mattie met Matthew Richard Singleton. On 28 February 1844, Episcopalian Bishop Christopher Edwards Gadsden of St. Philips Church in Charleston married them.¹⁰ Early that following year, an invitation for the "Fancy and Masquerade Ball" held at St. Andrew's Hall on 25 February 1845 lists an M.R. Singleton as one of the society's managers.¹¹

After the wedding, Matthew brought Mattie to live at his plantation in the lower Richland district of South Carolina, which the Singleton family at the time referred to as Head Quarters. It is now known as Kensington. When Mattie arrived, she found a large plantation house situated on an extensive plot of land, fifty-four buildings including the mansion, forty slave cabins, thirteen outbuildings, and over two hundred slaves. In ten years, Mattie gave birth to three children: Cleland, Helen, and Richard.¹²

In 1854, she found herself faced with new challenging responsibilities when Matthew died in August. Suddenly her family's future prosperity depended upon her alone. Matthew had named Mattie as the "sole executrix" of his will and left her his entire estate.¹³ He also left her with the care of their three small children (now aged ten, eight, and three), the ownership of at least 281 slaves and five thousand acres of

land (not including their summer home at Flat Rock in North Carolina), and large debts owed to fifty-two creditors throughout the Carolinas. A bad business venture with a Charleston factor had only worsened his financial situation. To pay off these debts, Mattie sold 38 slaves (for \$15,831), furniture (\$2,300), and land (\$1,260).¹⁴

With Matthew's death, she had had every opportunity to refuse the challenge presented to her. Many widows of plantation owners were so overwhelmed with grief after their husbands' deaths that they were unable to probate the wills and manage their properties. Mattie easily could have done as Martha Richardson of Savannah instructed her sister-in-law to do, namely to "sell off the slaves and be done with the trouble."¹⁵ She also could have requested that a close male relative, such as her brother-in-law, Abraham Van Buren, manage the lands and slaves in her place. Mattie chose neither of these options, and instead, she had the will probated that same year before she moved on to rebuilding her fortunes. She appeared in person to settle business affairs and sign receipts, and she handled legal issues with advice and legal counsel from male relatives and friends. Women in similar situations often referred to "their relatives as their greatest sources of practical as well as emotional support,"¹⁶ and often took to living part of each year with family relations. Mattie frequently did so with her mother at Kensington and at Flat Rock, or at her mother's Charleston home at 4 Wragg Street.¹⁷

Some scholars have noted that widows like Mattie were familiar with aspects of farm management, which they had learned from years of watching their husbands. Mattie had the added benefit of Matthew's numerous subscriptions to agricultural publications such as *The Cultivator*, *The Horticulturalist*, and the *American Farmer*. She also knew where she could find supplies. Existing receipts show that Mattie shopped in the same cities as Matthew had done.¹⁸ While a painful experience for many women, widowhood allowed Mattie to participate in the larger world as a manager and consumer. Widowed women could buy and sell slaves, hire and fire overseers, sue and be sued. Most widows remained strictly in managerial positions and did not participate in the most physically demanding jobs. Their management extended over all aspects of the plantation, and according to one recent scholar, they "paid close attention to profits and losses in the field."¹⁹ They also took on the responsibility of punishing slaves, and while women were less likely than men to whip their human chattels, "slaves had little reason to look forward to life under a widow's rule."²⁰ Mattie's slave Jacob Stroyer recalled that when Matthew died many slaves were glad their master was dead; however, afterward Stroyer wrote that he found Mattie "a great deal worse" than Matthew.²¹ Unfortunately, no further information is available regarding why Stroyer felt this way about her.

Mattie illustrates the accuracy of these generalizations concerning the abilities and actions of widowed plantation mistresses. The agricultural census of 1860 shows how she was involved in the plantation's income-producing ventures. She signed the census in her name rather than having an overseer do it, and the figures she provided painted a vastly different image of Kensington than did Matthew's probate records six years before. Between 1854 and 1860, Mattie increased the plantation's cash value from less than \$30,000 to \$100,000. She added sixteen hundred acres of land to her holdings, some of which she received from the state.²² In 1850, the plantation had produced mostly cotton (162,000 pounds) and a minimal amount of other crops. Ten years later, the plantation produced less cotton (150,000 pounds), but more wheat, Indian corn, rice, peas, beans, sweet potatoes, hay, and sorghum. Mattie also increased the number of work animals and decreased the number of less-profitable livestock (such as racehorses).²³ Interestingly, Kensington's agricultural figures in 1860 appear to run contrary to general trends in lower Richland district, an area dominated by agrarian life and home to more than three quarters of the county's taxable wealth during this time.²⁴ Within this area, the total number of animals (horses, mules, sheep, and swine) decreased between 1850 and 1860. Total corn, cotton, and rice production also decreased during this same period. In contrast, with the exception of cotton, Kensington's output of these same products increased.²⁵

Grist- and sawmills were another popular feature in lower Richland district. In 1840, there had been at least forty in operation, and by 1850, the number had decreased to less than thirty-six.²⁶ Matthew Singleton owned one of these mills, and Mattie continued its operation after his death. With help from Wade Hampton III, she sought out William Glaze of Palmetto Iron Works in Columbia to increase her mill's output by switching from water to steam power in 1860. This improvement made her mill one of the first steam-operated ones in lower Richland, and it increased Kensington's value.²⁷

Aside from her involvement in the cultivation of Kensington, Mattie also took part in directing the activities of hundreds of slaves. In 1850, Matthew reported he had 281 slaves, but by the 1860s, Mattie had 465.²⁸ When Matthew died, Mattie sent those slave men and boys who had previously tended the horses into the fields. Jacob Stroyer pleaded with Mattie to allow him to become a carpenter because Matthew had promised to send him into the trade. Mattie agreed to do so, much to the dismay of her overseer William Turner, who argued that giving slaves their choice in work was the worst thing she could do. He felt that his own experience with slaves made him a better judge of what was best for the plantation.²⁹ Despite his objections, Mattie stuck to her original decision and thus cemented her authority in directing her slaves' work.

Dealing with overseers was just as important a task as dealing with slaves. A widow needed considerable help with implementing and defending her authority, and a dependable overseer was enormously helpful if a woman had a great deal of property and many slaves to manage. A lack of evidence makes it hard to determine exactly how Mattie managed her plantation, but she clearly understood the importance of the overseer. This is evident in her paying \$500 to exempt one overseer, Robert Newsome, from conscription into the Confederate army in 1863. Although there are no records that state how many overseers Mattie employed, planters throughout the South generally agreed that all one overseer could manage reasonably was one hundred adult slaves.³⁰ Based upon these generalities, if Mattie had 465 slaves in the 1860s (including roughly 115 slave children), she would have employed three to four overseers.³¹

Mattie had a combination of dutiful and troublesome overseers. Henry Farmer oversaw many projects carried out on her Flat Rock property. He owned a hotel there and did jobs for wealthy families who possessed summer homes. Farmer had worked for Matthew prior to Matthew's death and frequently wrote to Matthew about matters concerning the Singleton property. Farmer's hard work was particularly helpful to Mattie and contributed to her success. For example, in 1856 he wrote from Flat Rock to inform her that her slaves had "split 500 rails and thrashed one hundred and forty bushels of oats." He also offered his advice against hiring more help.³²

Others were not as helpful, as is evident by her disagreement with her gardener Robert Clark in 1854. A month after Matthew's death, Clark wrote to Dr. Mitchell King, a Charleston judge and close friend of the Singletons, asking him to speak with Mattie about a problem he had. After her husband's death, Mattie desired Clark to remain and oversee their Flat Rock property. She also hired Count de Choiseul, the French Consul at Charleston and another part-time Flat Rock resident, to watch over Clark and direct a road-building project. We do not know anything further regarding Mattie's acquaintance with de Choiseul beyond their shared upper-class ambience. In any event, Clark argued to King that de Choiseul had left him with no instructions on how properly to lay out the road to Hendersonville. And when de Choiseul showed Mattie the road, he implied that Clark had not done the job according to his specifications and that Clark had taken it upon himself to widen the road. Upset with the situation, Clark concluded his letter to King by asserting his conditions of service and expressing his opinion regarding who could and could not intervene in his work.³³

Instead of speaking with Mattie about the problem, King chose to pass the letter along to her; in response, Mattie wrote directly to Clark. She explained that Clark

was required to follow de Choiseul's orders, and that he had either misunderstood and not asked for clarification or simply disobeyed those orders. She also chastised him for saying in front of her slaves that he "should not return to the site," and for then remaining absent for some time. She argued that his actions set an example of disrespect for her authority in front of her slaves. In the end, Mattie dismissed Clark, asserting that she could not allow Clark "to dictate from which friends I shall or shall not receive advice and assistance."³⁴

While Mattie dealt with Robert Clark on her own, she relied on help from male family members and friends when it came to legal obstacles. Matthew's death not only made Mattie the executrix of his estate, but it also put her in charge of finalizing the settlement of her father-in-law's estate. In both tasks she relied heavily on James L. Petigru, the prominent lawyer and politician in Charleston, confessing that "I do nothing without his advice."³⁵ In settling other legal issues, such as a land dispute with her neighbor and two cases involving money, Mattie relied on her brother-in-law, Abraham Van Buren, and James Simons, the attorney, militia general, and later speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives.

The Civil War profoundly altered Mattie's world. After six challenging years as a widow she now, like many women, would face the fears and disruptions attendant on that great conflict. Mattie probably feared the bloodshed, and she certainly worried about her son Cleland's safety as he fought as a soldier for the South's cause. A short biographical vignette of Mattie's daughter, Helen, reports that Mattie took her remaining family to Flat Rock for the duration of the war because it seemed a safe haven.³⁶ Walter Edgar relates a family account whereby Mattie remained at Kensington for most of the war and only fled in 1865 when hearing news of the impending arrival of General Sherman's army. According to Jacob Stroyer, Mattie sent some of her horses, mules, cows, and hogs to the swamp to prevent the Union troops from confiscating them. Then she and her mother packed a few necessities before fleeing.³⁷

In the year immediately following the war, Mattie returned and continued to divide her time between Kensington, Charleston, and her Flat Rock home. Specific details concerning Mattie's immediate post-war financial circumstances are unknown. But it is clear that she maintained control of the Kensington mansion, a second house on the same property, and enough land to split between her two sons so that each retained a considerable number of tenant farmers. She probably also retained the Flat Rock property, since she eventually was interred there in a local cemetery. While at Kensington, Mattie carried on her regular routine. Each morning she took her basket of keys and retrieved supplies for the day's meals from the locked storerooms. She made sure her cook served hot meals three times each day, except on Sunday when

the cook attended church and the family ate a cold supper.³⁸ By the late 1860s, her two sons had returned to Kensington to engage in planting and manage tenant farmers. Only then did her direct responsibility for running Kensington plantation end.³⁹

In 1878, she moved with her daughter and son-in-law to a house on the northwest corner of Sumter and Pendleton Streets in Columbia.⁴⁰ She spent her final thirteen years there helping care for her grandchildren and teaching a few children on a regular basis. She died in June 1892 at age seventy-four from typhoid fever, and her children buried her in the graveyard of St. John in the Wilderness Church in Flat Rock. Her newspaper obituary noted:

A Christian gentlewoman passes away . . . [she] lived a life that was beautiful in the extreme. She was a brilliant, sympathetic, and attractive woman, who endeared herself to all with whom she came in contact.⁴¹

Sometimes the process of historical inquiry resembles the assembly of a jigsaw puzzle. Our ongoing task to understand more about the role of slaveholding women in the antebellum South demands broad-ranging analysis based on many individual studies, the individual pieces of a larger picture. Mattie's story is but one of these. A married plantation mistress living in lower Richland district, her life before 1854 had remained fairly typical. She oversaw domestic production and domestic slaves, doted on her children, and socialized with the elite in Charleston and Flat Rock. Upon her husband's death, however, her life became different overnight. Widowhood filled Mattie's life with many troubling experiences, but without remarrying she confronted them in an effort to save her husband's memory and her children's futures. Mattie had the option to allow others to take total control of her plantation and its slaves, but she chose to maintain on a regular basis a knowledgeable management of her affairs there. She made decisions regarding the sale of the plantation's crops, construction of plantation roads, and hiring of extra workers. She knew enough to document the plantation's productivity for the 1860 agricultural census.⁴² The fact that Mattie took on these responsibilities is a testament to her ability, intelligence, and determination. Admittedly, the question whether her widowhood was typical or atypical needs further exploration in other microstudies.⁴³ But Mattie's activities clearly demonstrate that she considered her widowhood not merely as a personal disaster, but instead as an opportunity to assert herself in new challenges and influence the future of her family. Other local plantation women viewed Mattie in a similar light and held her in high regard. As Mary Chesnut once wrote about her, "She is the delight of her friends, the terror of her foes."⁴⁴

NOTES

1. Virginia Eliza Green Singleton, *The Singletons of South Carolina* (Columbia, South Carolina: Singleton Family, 1914), 23; John Hammond Moore, *Columbia and Richland County: a South Carolina Community, 1740–1990* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 176, 177.
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Original Agriculture Schedule 1860*, microfilm edition, schedules for Richland District, South Carolina, 11–12. Hereafter referred to as Bureau of the Census, *Agriculture Schedule 1860*.
3. It only has been within roughly the past twenty years that slaveholding widows have been the subject of any major study. Prior to this, only a few scholars had attempted briefly to assess the role that widowhood played in slaveholding women's lives: Catherine Clinton, *The Plantation Mistress: Woman's World in the Old South* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Jane H. and William H. Pease, *Ladies, Women, and Wenches: Choice and Constraint in Antebellum Charleston and Boston* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). By the mid 1990s, these women became more thoroughly investigated. These more recent studies include: Marlie F. Weiner, *Mistresses and Slaves: Plantation Women in South Carolina, 1830–1880* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); and Kirsten E. Wood, *Masterful Women: Slaveholding Women from the American Revolution Through the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Primary source documentation of Mattie's experiences as a slaveholding widow can be found in Jacob Stroyer, *My Life In The South* (Salem: Salem Observer Book and Job Print, 1885) and various documents found in the family papers located at the South Caroliniana Library, the Historic Charleston Foundation, and in Kenneth Stampp, ed., *Records of Ante-bellum Southern Plantations from the Revolution through the Civil War Series J* (Bethesda, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1990). Microfilm of the Singleton Family Papers is at the Southern Historical Collection University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
4. Charles Hillman, "The Genealogy of the Lowndes Family in South Carolina," *Index to Charles Hillman's Genealogy Pages*, www.hillmanc.fsnet.co.uk/lowndes.htm (accessed 19 July 2008); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population Schedule 1820*, microfilm edition, schedule for Georgetown District, South Carolina, 72; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population Schedule 1820*, microfilm edition, schedule for Charleston District, South Carolina, 107. The Lowndes family tree records Mattie's birth date as 28 April; however, other records list her birth date at 18 April. Church records record her baptism took place on 22 April.
5. Controller General Tax Returns, Series S126061 Individual Tax Returns for 1824, item number 00955 Francis Kinloch. No will for Francis Kinloch exists.
6. Historic Charleston Foundation, "Aiken-Rhett House Audio Tour" (1999).
7. Mary Boykin Chesnut, *A Diary From Dixie*, ed. Ben Williams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 494. Williams's edition was used in this study because his references to Mrs. Singleton were clearer throughout the book. He also individually lists Mrs. Matt Singleton in the index. While many argue that C. Vann Woodward's edition is more authoritative, the references to Mrs. Singleton in that version are not as clear as the ones in Williams's edition. Woodward also does not specifically list Mrs. Matt Singleton in his index, although he does refer to her in

the text on pages 455, 456, and 743. See Mary Boykin Chesnut, *Mary Chesnut's Civil War*, ed. C. Vann Woodward (Hartford: Yale University Press, 1993).

8. Chestnut, *Diary From Dixie*, 494; Elizabeth Cope Harrison, ed., *Best Companions: Letters of Eliza Middleton Fisher and her Mother, Mary Hering Middleton, from Charleston, Philadelphia, and Newport, 1839–1846* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 252, 258. While few of Mattie's own writings exist today, those that survive demonstrate she was well educated. Her grammar, punctuation, penmanship, and sometimes her subject matter all allude to the fact that she received a good education. Mary Chesnut attests to Mattie's mastery of the English language by stating that Mattie used "clean-cut sentences." Mary Hering Middleton wrote to her daughter Eliza Middleton Fisher that Mattie had written their relative, Paolina Middleton, a "well-written note in French."

9. Pease and Pease, *Ladies, Women, and Wenches*, 15–16.

10. St. Philip's Episcopal Church Register, 1823–1940, microfiche 5, "St. Philip's Church, Charleston Records and Registers 1713–1940, Minutes 1756–1774 and 1804–1812," South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston.

11. Invitation, 25 February 1845, folder 11/544/1, "St. Cecilia Society Collection, 1830–2005. (1146.00)," South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston. Matthew was always referred to as "M.R. Singleton" in correspondence to and from him.

12. Walter B. Edgar, *A Training Guide for Kensington* (Eastover, SC: Union Camp Corporation, 1985), 6–7, 28; Union Camp, "Union Camp at Eastover: New Life for a Grand Old Manor" (Eastover, SC: Union Camp Corporation, n.d.), 3; Hillman, "The Genealogy." These outbuildings included barns, corncribs, a cotton warehouse, a saw and grist mill, and a blacksmith shop. In addition to the family's large holdings near Columbia, South Carolina, Matthew and Mattie also owned an extensive house in Flat Rock, North Carolina, where they spent their summers. Regarding the quality of their marriage we unfortunately possess no information.

13. South Carolina Will Transcripts, Richland District, Matthew R. Singleton, Volume 3, Book L, pages 322–23.

14. Stroyer, *My Life*, 30–31; Singleton, *Singletons of South Carolina*, 23; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Slave Schedule 1850*, microfilm edition, schedule for Richland District, 269, 271, 273, 275; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Original agriculture schedule 1850*, microfilm edition, schedule for Richland District, 503–04; Richland District Probate Court Estate Papers, Matthew R. Singleton, Box 58, package 1432, microfilm reel R174, package 1432.

15. Wood, *Masterful Women*, 35.

16. *Ibid.*, 61, 65.

17. City of Charleston, *The Charleston City and General Business Directory for 1855* (Charleston, South Carolina: David M. Gazlay, 1855), 58.

18. Various subscription receipts 1852–1856, Singleton Family Papers from the Southern Historical Collection, Microfilm rolls 35–40, Kenneth Stampp, ed., *Records of Ante-bellum Southern Plantations*. Some of these subscriptions continued until after Matthew died.

19. Wood, *Masterful Women*, 36.

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20. *Ibid.* 4, 7, 11, 36–40, 63.
21. Stroyer, *My Life*, 31. He wrote his memoir with the hope that he could raise money from its sales to further his education. He wanted to devote himself to the betterment of his race.
22. Secretary of State, *Recorded Instruments State Land Grants Columbia Office 1854–1882*, Mrs. Martha R. Singleton, Series S213022, Volumes 89 and 90, pages 246, 247, 251, 252. Under an act of the legislature passed in 1791, lands that became vacant could be given to individuals. Cara Anzilotti asserts that since the colonial times, husbands have found it necessary to place their land in the hands of their wives upon their death. They felt that this was the only way to ensure that culture and social order survived. Colonial South Carolina planters also assigned their wives to manage their property for the benefit of their children. See her “Autonomy and the Female Planter in Colonial South Carolina,” *Journal of Southern History* 63, no. 2 (May 1997): 239–68.
23. Bureau of the Census, *Agriculture Schedule 1860*, 11–12. Above Mattie’s entry is the data for the estate of William Clarkson, her neighbor. Beside his name is a blank row on the first page. Below his name is his manager’s name, and the line beside his manager is filled in with Clarkson’s data. On the second page though, Clarkson’s line is not blank. It appears that the census taker made the mistake on the second page of placing everyone’s actual data one line up. Therefore, the information for Mattie on the second page is actually the information above her line. This theory is corroborated by the fact that Mattie had 465 slaves, and William Clarkson’s estate listed he had 210. Mattie also had 100 more acres planted than Clarkson, and 1,900 more acres of land overall. Finally, the information given for Mattie on the second page does not list her plantation as producing any molasses. However, a receipt from the tax collector dated 19 November 1864 shows she gave 120 gallons of sorghum.
24. Edgar, *Training Guide*, 8.
25. Moore, *Columbia and Richland County*, 171, 174; Bureau of the Census, *Agriculture Schedule 1860*, 11–12. According to Moore, there was a large decrease in the slave population of Richland district between 1850 and 1860. During this decade numerous landowners left the area and the number of farms decreased from 543 to 203. Many were smaller landholders who left either for the city or for the land beyond the mountains. By contrast, Jacob Stroyer wrote that Mattie’s slave population increased between 1854 and 1865.
26. Moore, *Columbia and Richland County*, 171.
27. U.S. Census Bureau, *Industry Schedule 1850*, microfilm edition, schedule for Richland District, 648; William Glaze to Wade Hampton III, May 1860, Stamp, ed., *Records of Ante-bellum Southern Plantations*, microfilm rolls 35–40. The new mill cost Mattie \$2,250, and Glaze stipulated that she would provide all the laborers to complete the project.
28. Bureau of the Census, *Slave Schedule 1850*, 269, 271, 273, 275; Stroyer, *My Life*, 15; “List of My Negroes, 1856,” Richard Singleton papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, folder 8. The South Caroliniana Library has this list filed as belonging to Richard Singleton, but he had died in 1852. Because Matthew was also dead by this time, this list of fifty-nine slaves could belong to Mattie. It mentions “Father’s Negroes who have [mine] for wives.” Frederick Kinloch died in August 1856.
29. Stroyer, *My Life*, 32–40.

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30. Wood, *Masterful Women*, 115–22; William Kauffman Scarborough, *The Overseer: Plantation Management in the Old South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 8, 9, 62. Planters did not employ overseers for their child slaves, and therefore they are not factored in the equation for estimating the number of overseers Mattie likely employed.
31. Stroyer states there were between 80 and 150 slave children on the plantation in the 1860s, which equals an average of 115.
32. Henry Farmer to Martha Singleton, 18 February 1856, Singleton family papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, folder 34. Henry Farmer and his family had moved to Flat Rock from Charleston. He ran the Woodfield Inn and he did work for other vacationers.
33. Robert Clark to Dr. Mitchell King, 20 September 1854, Singleton family papers, folder 32. Kirsten Wood's discussion of this incident on pages 123 and 124 of *Masterful Women* is not completely correct. She referred to Robert by the wrong last name (Carter), not Clark. She also believed the events had taken place at Kensington; however, the road being laid out was to Hendersonville, which is near Flat Rock.
34. Martha Singleton to Robert Clark, 27 September 1854, Singleton family papers, folder 33. Folder 50 of the Singleton family papers contains an undated letter from Robert Clark wherein he responded to Mattie's letter of dismissal. He disparaged her managerial ability to recognize a good overseer when she had one, and he wrote, "If any man ever did his duty I have done it here and Mr. Singleton knew it...."
35. Martha Singleton to unknown factor, 17 May 1857, Singleton family papers, folder 34.
36. Elizabeth Waring McMaster, *The Girls of the Sixties* (Columbia, SC: The State Company, 1937), 81; Edgar, *Training Guide*, 38. According to the National Park Service's online Civil War Soldier's and Sailor's System (<http://www.itd.nps.gov/cwss>; accessed 28 October 2008; listed as C.K. Singleton), Mattie's son Cleland served in the 1st Battalion, South Carolina Infantry. This unit fought in several battles during 1862–1863, including Secessionville, Morris Island, and an assault on Battery Wagner. Cleland and his fellow soldiers in the 1st Battalion were merged into the 27th Regiment of South Carolina in late 1863. This regiment served in South Carolina and Virginia and took part in battles at Cold Harbor, Deep Bottom, and Petersburg, to name but a few. No letters between Cleland and Mattie survive from this period, but due to his participation in a number of bloody battles, Mattie had ample reason to fear for her son's safety. According to the web site for Historic Flat Rock (www.flatrockonline.com; accessed 11 October 2008), Confederate troops were garrisoned at the Farmer Hotel (operated by Henry Farmer) in Flat Rock to protect the local citizens. The Confederate military presence in Flat Rock could have been a factor in Mattie seeking refuge there upon hearing of Sherman's impending arrival in South Carolina.
37. Stroyer, *My Life*, 38; Edgar, *Training Guide*, 38.
38. Edgar, *Training Guide*, 42.
39. Title to Real Estate Martha Singleton to Helen S. Green, 23 June 1879, Singleton family papers, folder 45; Richard Singleton to Cleland Singleton, 8 September 1876, Singleton family papers, folder 43; Mattie gave land to her sons and her daughter in the 1870s.

40. City of Columbia, *Columbia City Directory* (Richmond, Va.: Hill Directory Company, 1891), 81. The address description here may refer to 23 Sumter Street, an address attached to a letter sent from Martha to Harriet Lowndes Aiken.

41. Martha Singleton to Harriet Lowndes Aiken, 23 August 1874, Aiken-Rhett papers, Historic Charleston Foundation, Charleston, South Carolina, folder 3; Martha Singleton to Harriet Lowndes Aiken, 20 November 1884, Aiken-Rhett papers; "Death of Mrs. Singleton," *The State*, 14 June 1892, 8, column 1.

42. Henry Farmer to Martha Singleton, 18 February 1856, Singleton family papers, folder 34. Henry wrote Mattie often to fill her in on what was happening at her Flat Rock home. He frequently reported what work needed to be done, and he asked for her approval. He stated in this same letter that he was sure Mattie would sustain him in his refusal to hire more workers to help with projects in Flat Rock.

43. Other slaveholding widows during this time period include Keziah Brevard and Natalie Sumter. For the former see John Hammond Moore, ed., *A Plantation Mistress on the Eve of the Civil War: the Diary of Keziah Goodwyn Hopkins Brevard, 1860-1861* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992); for the latter see Thomas Tisdale, *A Lady of the High Hills: Natalie Delage Sumter* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2001). They were sufficiently capable in taking care of their property; however, their circumstances were different both regarding the amount of property they had to manage and the duration of their widowhood. Keziah had less property to manage, while Natalie was only a widow for a year before she died. Mattie had more property to manage, she was a widow for an extended period of time, and she had children to raise while attempting to save her plantation.

44. Chesnut, *Diary From Dixie*, 494.

Free Speech in South Carolina: The 1965 Speaker Ban Controversy

Areli A. Keeney

In February 1965, the historian Stringfellow Barr addressed a group of students and faculty at Winthrop College, then a women's college, in Rock Hill, South Carolina. Barr co-founded the Great Books Program at St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, in 1937 and envisioned education as a free form of democratic instruction where "liberal arts were the arts of reading and writing, of speaking and listening, of thinking."¹ At Winthrop, Barr expressed his views on higher education, criticized job training as "higher illiteracy," and denounced American involvement in Vietnam. His speech prompted the General Assembly of South Carolina to propose a House bill and concurrent Senate resolution in March 1965 to ban communist and radical speakers at all state-supported institutions. Barr was not a communist, but he was a reputed radical who supported civil rights at Highlander Folk School in Tennessee and opposed the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The proposed speaker ban ignited a statewide debate that pitted free speech and civil rights advocates against defenders of the status quo and compelled students at the University of South Carolina in Columbia (USC) to protest restrictions on academic freedom.

In many ways the ensuing controversy was a symptom of conflicting visions of the state's future between segregationists, who wanted to preserve the status quo, and moderate reformers, who were willing to risk cultural upheaval to boost the state's sluggish economy and dismal education standards. In 1965, South Carolina stood at a crossroads. It could remain a rural, one-party state, with an indigenous population suspicious of national trends and outside influence; or it could urbanize, attract new businesses to boost the economy, and improve education standards. The state's progressive leaders, such as Governor Donald Russell and Lieutenant Governor John McNair, realized that national criticism of a speaker ban would inhibit their efforts to improve economic and educational deficiencies. The state's rural elites, however, resisted modernization and any change that might disrupt the racial status quo. "Outside agitators," they feared, would undermine tradition, jeopardize their power, and fuel student activism at the states' universities.

During the 1960s, student activism transformed American higher education from a restrictive to an open learning environment and forced administrators to relax *in loco parentis* (the concept that the university took on responsibilities of parental authority).

As the baby boomer generation reached college age, the student population increased rapidly at many state universities; this created an isolated, bureaucratic learning environment, often termed the “multiversity.”² Administrative attempts to restrict students’ access to controversial ideas soon met with rampant dissent. Restrictions on the right of students to organize as political agents at the University of California at Berkeley in 1964, for example, inspired students to organize the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM), which effectively redefined the meaning of free speech. Only a year later, South Carolina’s fight for free speech sparked the advent of liberal student activism at USC. In April 1965, the administration canceled a speech by southern civil rights activist Carl Braden, spurring a small group of students into action to preserve free speech on campus. Their protests demonstrated a commitment to educational diversity and a desire to confront ideas in conflict with societal prejudices. At stake was the role of youth in civil society: to remain passive defenders of the status quo or to become active participants in the struggle for social justice.

Before exploring USC’s battle for academic freedom within the context of the national student movement, it is first necessary to explore how limits on free speech came to dominate the American political landscape and to evolve by 1965. During the most intense period of cold war repression from 1946 to 1956, conservative politicians used anti-communist legislation to suppress free speech and to drive vociferous radicals and liberals underground. These politicians appealed to national security and patriotism to silence critics of American democracy and to validate defenders of the status quo. McCarthyism, a term named for Senator Joseph McCarthy’s “uncovering” of communists but not limited to the senator’s career, attacked leftist politics as un-American and communist-inspired. McCarthy-style scare tactics forced many communists and left-leaning liberals from academia and the Hollywood film industry, diminished open debate over class issues, and crippled progressive reform in the civil rights, labor, and feminist movements.³

Even after the national anti-communist movement had lost momentum, southern segregationists often took advantage of anti-communist propaganda to paint *all* civil rights activists as communists. Racial segregation was not only a political convenience that allowed them to maintain their power, but a way of life they justified as the will of God.⁴ In 1955, newly formed southern white Citizens’ Councils and self-proclaimed patriotic organizations, such as the Charleston, South Carolina-based Grass Roots League (GRL), used HUAC files on investigated communists and civil rights activists to convince their members that the civil rights agenda was part of a communist plot to undermine traditional southern values.⁵ As they saw it, uprooting Jim Crow hegemony was tantamount to overturning American democratic freedom and their way of life.

Southern white Citizens' Councils were not alone in their efforts to dismiss civil rights advocates as communists. During the 1950s, southern legislators and university administrators often imposed infringements on academic freedom to silence proponents of integration. In 1957, for example, South Carolina experienced a severe blow to academic freedom when Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr., an outspoken segregationist and anti-communist, leveled accusations of communism at two traditionally black colleges in Columbia, Allen University and Benedict College.⁶ The conflict began when Timmerman learned that Allen University, a private college affiliated with the Methodist Church, had accepted Hungarian refugee Andre Toth for fall admission and would become the first integrated university in the state.⁷ Unable to interfere legally with a private college, he accused both Benedict and Allen of harboring known communists.⁸ The State Board of Education then rescinded teaching certificates at Allen because the head of the education department was an accused communist.⁹ Although Timmerman merely demonstrated that the accused professors had participated in civil rights demonstrations, the administrations of Allen and Benedict chose not to renew their contracts to avoid further controversy. This infringement on academic freedom and on the right of African Americans to speak freely in favor of civil rights created an accreditation nightmare for both institutions that lasted through the 1960s.¹⁰

In April 1958, Timmerman cited the Allen-Benedict affair as sufficient evidence of communist activity in the state's universities to organize the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in South Carolina (CICA).¹¹ Black political and religious leaders, including John Henry McCray, president of the South Carolina Progressive Democratic Party, protested the committee's formation in 1958 because Timmerman had found no evidence of communist subversion.¹² In his farewell address at Allen University, Edwin Hoffman, accused communist and former professor of history, expressed his fears that CICA would use anti-communist legislation to prevent African Americans from exposing inequities in the system and from acting to secure their democratic rights.¹³

In the face of rigid blockades to the implementation of civil rights legislation, blacks transitioned from trying to effect reform through judicial means to the mass protest strategies that characterized the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The southern sit-in movement, designed to exhibit the personal and emotional side of racial injustice, distressed legislators and university officials alike, particularly when white students became involved.¹⁴ In 1964, for example, students from the University of California at Berkeley participated in Freedom Summer, an African American organizing drive in Mississippi. Because of students' involvement in Freedom Summer,

the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission (SSC), which was designed to root out “subversive” activity, investigated Berkeley’s Free Speech Movement.¹⁵ Restrictions on student political involvement had motivated students to organize FSM to challenge the power structure at Berkeley. Under the leadership of Mario Savio, FSM united students across political spectrums to secure their rights as political actors and to redefine the meaning of free speech. Ultimately, SSC labeled the students’ free speech movement as communist-inspired, a view many southerners shared.

While Berkeley students sought to expand free speech and embrace their rights as citizens of the United States, students at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill (UNC) fought to prevent the state legislature from restricting free speech at all state universities. In 1964, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a speaker ban law, upon which South Carolina’s bill was later based, to restrict communists and radicals at state-funded institutions. According to North Carolina Representative Uzzell, “the Speaker Ban Law was originally passed more to curb civil rights demonstrations [at UNC] than to stop Communist speakers on state campuses.”¹⁶ The ban did little, however, to regulate students, who continued to hold protests and sit-ins to advocate for civil rights and to demand freedom of speech. The speaker ban also threatened the university’s accreditation and led to a loss of quality professors, thus severely damaging UNC’s reputation as a premiere research institution. The controversy did not abate until the ban was finally repealed in 1969.¹⁷

Although the South Carolina sit-in movement of the 1960s was primarily a black student affair, state leaders severely reprimanded white students who became involved.¹⁸ When USC student Frederick Hart was arrested with other civil rights protesters in 1961, the dean of students, George Tomlin, and Hart’s classmates pressured him to withdraw from the university. Similarly, after USC history graduate students Hayes Mizell and Seldon Smith participated in a lunch counter demonstration, department administrators warned them that “agitators” were not welcome on campus.¹⁹ Politicians, fearful that “outside agitators” fueled liberal student activism, proposed a series of separate bills between 1959 and 1965 to restrict out-of-state students at state-funded institutions.²⁰ In 1965, USC student Paul Masem speculated the underlying motivation for such legislation was “to keep ‘our way of life’ pure” and to protect the state’s youth from outsiders’ “corrupting influence.”²¹

During this unstable period while many southerners responded violently to school integration and Jim Crow’s inevitable decline, South Carolina’s university officials and politicians orchestrated the peaceful integration of the state’s colleges and universities. Appealing to peace and respectability, they hoped that carefully orchestrated integration events would project a positive image of the state and aid

their efforts to attract new businesses.²² Viewed from the inside, however, the affair was much less peaceful. At USC, President Thomas Jones advised faculty that “excessive fraternization should be discouraged since . . . this could cause as much damage as a hostile attitude.”²³ African American students in the 1960s later recalled sensing animosity from white students and feeling loneliness at being on the outskirts of the social scene.²⁴ Whether a publicly peaceful or violent affair, integration of southern universities played a key role in fueling student activism.²⁵

In February 1965, during these mercurial times, a group of students and faculty at Winthrop College in Rock Hill, South Carolina, invited historian Stringfellow Barr to speak on ancient Greek and Roman civilizations.²⁶ Barr was critical of American higher education, particularly its emphasis on job training and limits on academic freedom, preferring the liberal arts tradition. He deviated somewhat from his intended topic when he compared Roman atrocities to American imperialism, advising students “we had better remember that we can destroy ourselves [and] that cities, like men, die.” In a veiled criticism of American involvement in Vietnam, he emphasized America’s shortcomings as a world power, arguing “tragedy has to do with understanding failures” and “the United States has never known defeat.”²⁷

Although students received Barr’s speech well and college president Charles Davis defended him, Barr’s reputation as a radical riled the passions of many South Carolinians. On the day of his speech, an unknown organization circulated pamphlets documenting Barr’s advocacy of civil rights and his objections to the anti-communist paranoia of the HUAC.²⁸ When interviewed, Barr said “he was sure that his [opposition to] the House Committee on Un-American Activities was the only objection ‘some South Carolinians have for me’.”²⁹ Many South Carolinians also objected to Barr’s support of Highlander Folk School in Tennessee. The school, which operated for twenty-nine years as an integrated school, was a center for the civil rights movement, attracting such luminaries as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Rosa Parks, before the Tennessee state legislature closed it in 1961 as a communist-front organization.³⁰ In a letter dated March 1965 to a supportive alumnus, Davis concurred that many citizens objected to Barr because “he lent his influence to the establishment of a school whose chief purpose was to prepare the races for integration.”³¹

A number of South Carolina’s state representatives also censured Barr’s speaking engagement. In imitation of the North Carolina speaker ban law, on 10 March 1965 they proposed a bill and a concurrent resolution in the South Carolina General Assembly to prevent communists and radicals from speaking at state-funded institutions of higher education. The Orangeburg County House delegation proposed bill H.1401 to prohibit “certain persons” from speaking at state-funded institutions.³²

Senator W. Green DesChamps of Lee County proposed a concurrent resolution, S.193, to require that university officials investigate the background of potential speakers before extending an invitation. Arguing “these false prophets like the Pied Piper of Hamelin blow the soft line tune until they have led young minds into the bottomless pit of slavery,” Deschamps concluded that academic freedom was “not a license to indoctrinate the minds of the youth of this State with the subtle and misleading liberal line.”³³ In an interview that same day DesChamps confirmed the catalyst for the resolution was indeed Stringfellow Barr’s lecture at Winthrop.³⁴

The Barr affair was not the first time Winthrop College faced public scrutiny. During his presidency from 1959 to 1973, Charles Davis restructured the educational mission of the college, once a normal school, to put less emphasis on teacher training and more on liberal arts and critical thinking.³⁵ A number of South Carolina’s citizens feared the campus was becoming too receptive to national sentiment favoring civil rights and academic freedom.³⁶ When Betty Friedan, the feminist scholar and author of *The Feminine Mystique*, spoke at Winthrop in the spring of 1963, conservatives objected that Winthrop students, as teachers-in-training, should not question their future roles as mothers, homemakers, and teachers.³⁷ Similarly, the General Assembly of South Carolina censured the Winthrop Lecture Committee in 1961 for selecting Frank P. Graham, the liberal former president of UNC-Chapel Hill and failed Senate candidate, as a speaker. According to Deschamps, Winthrop violated this 1961 resolution in allowing Barr to speak on campus.³⁸

After the news media published reports on Barr’s speech and the proposed speaker ban, a debate over the nature of free speech arose among the state’s citizens. In many ways, the ensuing controversy was a symptom of conflicting visions of the future of the state between segregationists, who wanted to preserve the traditional order, and their more progressive opponents, who were willing to overturn tradition to improve the state’s stagnant economy. Proponents of the legislation used a number of rhetorical methods to persuade leaders that a speaker ban was needed, including appealing to patriotism, denouncing critics as un-American, and warning of the power of radical ideology to brainwash the state’s youth. Their opponents countered that restrictions on academic freedom might damage the image of the state and its universities, making it difficult to attract new businesses and to improve standards of higher education. They extolled students’ need to be exposed to conflicting ideas to realize the purpose of higher education.

Rather than a direct attack on academic freedom, proponents saw a speaker ban as a means to protect the state’s youth from “false and deceitful communist propaganda.”³⁹ Harry S. Weaver, president and general manager of Weaver Broadcasting

Corporation (WOKE) in Charleston, S.C., contended that “youth is not the repository of all wisdom. Its knowledge is limited. It has much to learn. It can be tricked—and communism is the world’s greatest confidence game.”⁴⁰ Opponents saw Stringfellow Barr’s presence at Winthrop College as proof “the un-American’s [*sic*] are getting bolder and more active on South Carolina’s college and university campuses.”⁴¹ Pledging allegiance to “Americanism,” they argued like Bob Jones, Jr., president of the conservative, religious Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, that only speakers with un-American agendas stood to be disenfranchised by a speaker ban law.⁴² In appealing to the sympathies of “patriotic” Americans, opponents suggested anyone against the ban was not a true American.

In 1965, South Carolina’s segregationist leaders found themselves at odds with the state’s moderate citizens, who were receptive to free speech and diversity as a means to project a respectable image and attract new businesses. Senator John West warned that North Carolina’s speaker ban debacle had damaged UNC’s reputation and provided a “rallying point for the far left.”⁴³ Governor Donald Russell and the presidents of Winthrop and USC contended the ban was unnecessary because no danger of communist or radical speakers existed in South Carolina.⁴⁴ Other South Carolinians recognized a ban as antithetical to academic freedom. The editor of the Winthrop student newspaper attacked legislators’ belief that youth, particularly women, needed to be protected from communist ideology and accused them of fearing independent student thought.⁴⁵ An editor at the *Greenwood Index-Journal* appropriated the term “Americanism” as “the right to express—and to hear expressed—viewpoints differing from those commonly held by the majority of the people.”⁴⁶ In so doing, defenders of free speech countered attacks from those seeking to label them as communists or un-Americans.

In April 1965, the debate over the speaker ban disappeared abruptly from the public record, in part due to the controversy Donald Russell caused when he resigned as governor to fill the United States Senate seat of Olin T. Johnston and named Lieutenant Governor Robert McNair as his successor.⁴⁷ The fight for free speech, however, was only beginning at USC in Columbia. Even after integration in 1963, USC held to its historic roots as a racially conservative campus. As the baby boomer generation reached college age, USC’s population rose from 5,661 in 1960 to 9,150 in 1965.⁴⁸ The rising number of students depersonalized student/faculty relations and created the isolated, bureaucratic learning environment characteristic of the 1960s “multiversity.”⁴⁹ The administration feared the growing student population and civil rights tensions would fuel student activism. In 1964, the board of trustees drafted a policy that no participants in activities “generally unacceptable to society” would be

granted admission to USC and took over independent student publications, including the *Gamecock*.⁵⁰

The first organized student effort to protest restrictions on free speech came in the wake of the speaker ban controversy. In April 1965, Brad Poston and other students from the Unitarian Universalist Fellowship invited Carl Braden to speak on campus.⁵¹ They intended Braden's speech, entitled "HUAC, the Klan and Civil Rights," to foster civic debate on racial justice.⁵² A southerner himself, Braden was well known for his support of civil rights at Highlander Folk School and the Southern Conference Education Fund (SCEF). He was also a member of the National Committee to Abolish the HUAC.

Though publicly opposed to a speaker ban law, USC President Thomas Jones demonstrated his willingness to restrict student behavior to prove to state leaders that the administration could police itself. On 26 April 1965, three days before Braden's speech, the administration formulated a policy that "no person who advocates the overthrow of the constitutional government by violence shall be a guest speaker or sponsored in university appearance."⁵³ Jones investigated Braden with the help of two law enforcement officials, J.P. Strom and D.N. Beckman.⁵⁴ Though Braden did not pose a violation to the official speaker policy, Jones spoke to the host organization and later claimed students voluntarily canceled the speech.⁵⁵

The reaction of students to the Braden affair suggests they did not willingly cooperate with campus administrators. After Jones canceled the speech, Braden spoke at the home of USC student Martin Price. In the following days, Price circulated a petition signed by students and faculty alike that demanded the administration make public their policy for censoring speakers.⁵⁶ Price printed the petition in the first edition of an independent student newspaper, *Carolina Free Press*, dedicated to preserving free speech and free press on campus. USC student Harry Booth criticized Jones' claim that students voluntarily canceled the Braden speech because had the group not "'voluntarily' canceled the event, the administration would have taken steps to see that it was canceled anyway."⁵⁷ Another student, Harry S. Eichel, argued that "in order to achieve its purposes, a university must provide a truly liberal atmosphere. . . freedom of speech, press and thought must be encouraged and actually used" and "pressure must not be applied to force anyone into the same ideological mold."⁵⁸ Similarly, Paul Masem, president of the USC Young Democrats, berated the administration's policy to preserve the status quo, to avoid controversy and to perpetuate an environment that suppressed debate of civil rights and foreign policy.⁵⁹

In November 1965, students succeeded in pressuring the administration to publicize the speaker policy in the *Gamecock*. President Jones reasoned the policy was not censorship but was necessary due to lack of meeting space and the growing size of the student body.⁶⁰ In

response, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) released a “Statement on Academic Freedom of Students” that “institutional control of campus facilities should never be used as a device of censorship.”⁶¹ In January 1967, the USC Student Senate concluded the speaker policy “smacks of censorship and thereby limits academic freedom.”⁶²

In 1966, students continued to publish the *Carolina Free Press* and formed the organization AWARE, which was affiliated with the Southern Student Organizing Committee (SSOC), to raise free speech issues on campus.⁶³ In addition to bringing in controversial speakers such as civil rights leader Julian Bond, AWARE was also pivotal in the antiwar movement at USC.⁶⁴ From 1966 to the 1970s, student culture at USC became more volatile. Animosity between students and the administration increased and tensions mounted between liberal and conservative groups on campus. From burning the Confederate flag to storming the Russell House, AWARE was instrumental in keeping the issue of free speech alive on USC’s campus.⁶⁵

Ultimately, the speaker ban bill was never enacted into law. By 1965, segregationist politicians found themselves at odds with the state’s moderate politicians. Leaders such as John West and Donald Russell realized the state must appear favorable towards free speech to move forward economically. Their interest in meeting the economic goals of the state overruled efforts to restrict free speech. They prevented the passage of a speaker ban law and brought the state into the spotlight of racial injustice and integration. Once isolated from outside criticism and influence, South Carolina was poised to transition from a rural to an urban environment if leaders were willing to bow to external pressure.

Events surrounding Carl Braden’s scheduled appearance at USC, however, demonstrated the complicated relationship between the words and actions of opponents of a speaker ban. In print, they defended the value of the open exchange of ideas in a democratic society and saw the purpose of higher education as promoting independent student thought. Nevertheless, university administrators, who were openly opposed to a speaker ban, proved their willingness to restrict free speech from behind the scenes to avoid governmental interference. USC student protests over Braden’s canceled speech sustained the battle for free speech and spurred future students to take up the cause of academic freedom. Their efforts challenged the university’s power structure and ultimately forced the president to make public the policy for restricting speakers. Despite efforts to silence him, Braden still spoke at the home of a USC student, proving ideas cannot be suppressed entirely, only in certain locations.

NOTES

1. *News and Courier* (Charleston, South Carolina), c. March 1965, Stringfellow Barr, Clippings, 1964–1965, Charles Davis Papers, Winthrop University Archives, Rock Hill, South Carolina.

2. For a more detailed discussion of the interrelationship between the multiversity and student activism, see Joseph Scott and Mohamed El-Assal, "Multiversity, University Size, University Quality and Student Protest," *American Sociological Review* 34, no. 5 (Oct. 1969): 702–9.
3. For a broader analysis of the early feminist movement and the impact of McCarthyism on American society and academia, see Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) and idem, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little Brown, 1998).
4. For a discussion of how the segregationist agenda rejuvenated conservative American politics and the religious right, see Dan Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).
5. Jeff Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948–1968* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 60. In 1956, both the House and Senate approved H.R. 2006 to commend the new Citizens Councils of South Carolina and to encourage citizens to form new councils. South Carolina, General Assembly, *Journal of the House* (Columbia: State Printer, 1956). For more information on the GRL and its leader, Stanley F. Morse, see Jeremy Richards, "The Political Life of Stanley Fletcher Morse" (Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 2005).
6. *Charlotte Observer* (North Carolina), 6 August 1957 and *News and Courier*, 7 August 1957, Allen University Faculty Dismissals, Active and Inactive Case Files, George Bell Timmerman, Jr. Papers, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia.
7. "Hungarian Refugee, S.C. Guest, First to Flout States' 'Public Policy,'" *News and Courier*, 15 September 1957, box 28, William Workman Papers, South Carolina Political Collections, University of South Carolina, Columbia.
8. Notes from a press conference with Timmerman, August 1957, box 28, Workman Papers.
9. *Lancaster News* (South Carolina), 10 October 1957, Hungarian students, Active and Inactive Case Files, Timmerman Papers. In response, Allen and Benedict students applied to USC's teaching program because no comparable program existed at an all-black institution. Although no students were admitted, the episode posed a significant threat to the state's segregated school system. Henry H. Lesesne, *A History of the University of South Carolina, 1940–2000* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 129–31.
10. *AAUP Bulletin*, Summer 1960 and 1961, box 28, Workman Papers; Miscellaneous newspaper clippings, Allen University Faculty Dismissals, Active and Inactive Case Files, Timmerman Papers.
11. Joyce Johnston, "Communism vs. Segregation: Evolution of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in South Carolina," *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1993): 25–26.
12. "Not Needed: Negroes ask Solon to Drop Red Probe," unknown newspaper, 20 Feb. 1958, box 28, Workman Papers and Johnston, "Communism vs. Segregation," 26.
13. Edwin Hoffman, address on freedom of speech, Allen University, 14 March 1958, box 28, Workman Papers.

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14. Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare*, 199–200. See also George Lewis, *The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationists, Anti-communism, and Massive Resistance, 1945–1965* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004).
 15. Information on FSM comes from Jo Freeman, *At Berkeley in the '60s: The Education of an Activist, 1961–1965* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) and Robert Cohen and Reginald Zelnik, eds., *The Free Speech Movement: Reflections on Berkeley in the 1960s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
 16. William J. Billingsley, *Communists on Campus: Race, Politics, and the Public University in Sixties North Carolina* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 83.
 17. “North Carolina Speaker Ban,” 19 August 1965, Accreditation, box 1, 1965–1966, Thomas F. Jones Papers, University of South Carolina Archives, Columbia. See also William A. Link, “William Friday and the North Carolina Speaker Ban Crisis, 1963–1968,” *North Carolina Historical Review* 72, no. 2 (April 1992): 198–228.
 18. More USC students participated in counter civil rights demonstrations. When the University of Mississippi exploded into violent protest to prevent racial integration in 1962, 700 USC students sent a telegram to the governor of Mississippi commending his tacit approval of the violence. Lesesne, *A History*, 142.
 19. Lesesne, *A History*, 139–40.
 20. “Winthrop Head Says School Ads Are Standard Practice,” *Charlotte Observer*, 5 September 1959 and “Student Limiting Try Fails,” 17 March 1965, Davis Papers; Charles Davis to William Workman, 12 December 1962 and Thomas Jones to Workman, 3 January 1962, box 28, Workman Papers. Given the escalation of student activism, the debate over out-of-state students likely continued in the 1970s. No documentation on subsequent initiatives was found.
 21. Paul Masem, “A Victory for Truth,” *Carolina Free Press* 1, no. 1 (19 May 1965), 2, box 9, 1964–1965, Jones Papers.
 22. Lesesne, *A History*, 143–47. See also Leslie Wallace Skinner, “Sibling Institutions, Similar Experiences: The Coeducation and Integration Experiences of South Carolina’s Clemson and Winthrop Universities” (Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 2002).
 23. “Report on the Meeting on Security Plans,” 20 August 1963, quoted in Craig Keeney, “Politics and Integration at the University of South Carolina” (Research Methods paper, University of South Carolina, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, 1998), 14.
 24. Lesesne, *A History*, 147–49.
 25. On integration and southern student activism, see Jeffrey Alan Turner, “Conscience and Conflict: Patterns in the History of Student Activism on Southern College Campuses, 1960–1970” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 2000), 15, 89–140.
 26. Stringfellow Barr Press Information, c. February 1965, Stringfellow Barr, folder 553, box 163, Davis Papers; Donald Russell to Mrs. Elizabeth Tobin Mood, 6 March 1965, Winthrop University, Colleges and Universities, 1963–1965, Donald Russell Papers, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia.

27. *Charlotte Observer*, 11 March 1965; *News and Courier*, c. March 1965, Davis Papers.
28. "Barr's Winthrop Speech Stirs Little Controversy," *Charlotte Observer*, 11 March 1965, Davis Papers.
29. *Greenville News* (South Carolina), 16 March 1965, Davis Papers.
30. *News and Courier*, 17 February 1965, Davis Papers.
31. Form letter, 2 and 5 March 1965; Charles Davis to Fred Worsham, 19 February 1965, Davis Papers.
32. South Carolina, General Assembly, 10 March 1965, *Journal of the Senate*, 96th General Assembly, 1st sess., January 12, 1965.
33. South Carolina, General Assembly, 10 March 1965, *Journal of the Senate*.
34. *Charlotte Observer*, 10 March 1965, Davis Papers.
35. "'Spoon Fed' Knowledge on Way Out," *Rock Hill Evening Herald* (South Carolina), 7 October 1959, Davis Papers. Davis also orchestrated Winthrop's voluntary integration in 1964 and transition to co-education in 1970. See Skinner, "Sibling Institutions, Similar Experiences," 51–136.
36. Rock Hill was well known for its racially conservative politics, particularly after the violence that Freedom Riders encountered there in 1961. Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 320.
37. Mrs. Bessie H. Boykin to Charles Davis, 14 February 1965, Davis Papers.
38. Sens. Beasley and Tivon H. 1635, *Journal of the Senate*, 1961 and Billingsley, *Communists on Campus*, ix; "Head of Winthrop Said Defying House Request," *Greenville News*, 14 March 1965; Roy Williams, "Barr Speech Was Compulsory for Students," *News and Courier*, 19 February 1965, Davis Papers.
39. South Carolina American Legion legionnaires, petition to Chairman Breazeale, 30 April 1965, University of South Carolina, Colleges and Universities, 1963–1965, Russell Papers.
40. Harry S. Weaver, WOKE editorial, 2–3 May 1965, box 9, 1964–1965, Jones Papers.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Bob Jones, Jr. to Donald Russell, 20 March 1965, University of South Carolina, Colleges and Universities, 1963–1965, Russell Papers.
43. John West to Julia Post, 8 March 1965, John West Papers, South Carolina Political Collections, University of South Carolina, Columbia. That a handful of conservative state leaders proposed a speaker ban after CICA members vetoed the idea suggests distrust of the committee's liberal bias and the changing political atmosphere. See Russell Merritt, "The Senatorial Election of 1962 and the Rise of Two-Party Politics in South Carolina," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 98, no. 3 (July 1997): 281–301.
44. *Index Journal* (Greenwood, South Carolina), c. March 1965, Davis Papers; *Charlotte Observer*, 11 March 1965, Jones Papers.
45. "The Students' Lament (Dean Smith, Please, 'Don't Be Unkind,')" Editorial, *Johnsonian*, c. March 1965, Winthrop College, Colleges and Universities, 1963–1965, Russell Papers.
46. *Florence Morning News* (South Carolina), 16 March 1965, Davis Papers.

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47. Despite being governor in the turbulent 1960s, McNair improved race relations and shifted the state from a rural, farm-based economy to a more modern urban state. See Philip G. Grose, *South Carolina at the Brink: Robert McNair and the Politics of Civil Rights* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006).
48. USC reached 14,484 by 1970. Lesesne, *A History*, 136–37, 197.
49. On the interrelationship between the multiversity, student activism and civil rights, see Scott and El-Assal, “Multiversity, University Size, University Quality and Student Protest.”
50. Lesesne, *A History*, 194, 198.
51. Brad Poston was also a member of the South Carolina Student Council on Human Relations (SCSCHR), which Selden Smith and Dan Carter helped form in the early 1960s to facilitate integration. Lesesne, *A History*, 139, 144; Hayes Mizell, South Carolina Student Council on Human Relations, 15 December 1965, Hayes Mizell Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia.
52. Advertisement of Braden’s speech, 29 April 1965, with photocopy of Braden’s HUAC file on reverse, 1 October 1965, box 32, Workman Papers.
53. Anonymous memo, 26 April 1965, box 9, 1964–1965, Jones Papers.
54. Thomas Jones to E. Crosby Lewis, 24 June 1965, box 8, 1964–1965; Ashley Halsey, Jr. to Thomas Jones, 29 April 1965, box 3, 1965–1966, Jones Papers. Braden’s name was misspelled and the memo was misfiled in spring 1966.
55. *The State* (Columbia, South Carolina), 30 April 1965, Davis Papers.
56. Lesesne, *A History*, 202.
57. *Gamecock* (University of South Carolina, Columbia), 7 May 1965.
58. Harry S. Eichel, *Gamecock*, 10 January 1965. In spring 1965, the administration dropped a *Gamecock* journalist for being too controversial. *Carolina Free Press*, 5, box 9, Jones Papers.
59. Masem, “A Victory for Truth,” *Carolina Free Press*, 2–3, box 9, Jones Papers.
60. *Gamecock*, 11 November 1965.
61. AAUP “Statement on Academic Freedom of Students,” December 1965, box 1, 1965–1966, Jones Papers.
62. Lesesne, *A History*, 202.
63. While no additional copies were found, Martin Price was listed as editor of the *Carolina Free Press* in USC’s yearbook in 1966–1967. *Carolina Free Press*, 5, box 9, Jones Papers; *Garnet and Black* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, 1966–1967).
64. No fuller name for the student organization AWARE was found. AWARE later allied with Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The UFO Coffeehouse, where Brad Poston worked, also became an antiwar hub until 1970. Brett Bursey, interview with the author, 5 February 2008; Craig Keeney, “Resistance: A History of Anti-Vietnam War Protests in Two Southern Universities, 1966–1970” (MA thesis, University of South Carolina, 2003), 33–84.
65. USC’s board of trustees blamed President Jones for continued student disturbances and forced him to resign in 1974. Lesesne, *A History*, 214–21, 235–37. See also WOKE editorial, “Civil

Turmoil at the University of SC," 26 May 1968, box 28, Workman Papers. As student unrest at USC and other state institutions escalated throughout the decade, CICA was renamed the Security Committee. Instead of targeting its investigations on communist activity, the committee began focusing on student activism at colleges and universities in the state "where the proliferation of mass membership organizations portrays a potential for violence and subversion that endangers the internal security of this State and Nation." State politicians were particularly concerned with African American student protests at South Carolina State University, which culminated in the 1968 Orangeburg Massacre. See "Report of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in South Carolina," 1968, *Journal of the Senate, Report of the Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in South Carolina*, 1970, box 3, Robert McNair Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia; Grose, *South Carolina at the Brink*, 198–240.

“Grant Us a Contract”: Spartanburg as Prelude to the Carolina Regional Transit Strike (1919)

Jeffrey M. Leatherwood

The study of Spartanburg’s July 1919 transit strike, which hitherto has languished in the annals of local history, should now be interpreted as a prelude to a wider campaign to organize Piedmont and Upcountry streetcar workers during subsequent months. Over the Fourth of July weekend, Division 897 of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees (AASERE) in the city elected to strike against South Carolina Power and Light (SC P&L), the operator of the city’s streetcar system. Recognition of Spartanburg’s organized transit workers would establish a foothold within a region widely perceived as being hostile toward organized labor.¹

A new survey of AASERE’s post-war effort to unionize the Piedmont and Upcountry will challenge long-held assessments of southern trade unions. In 1976, Gerald Carpenter sounded the clarion for New South historians, who were “virtually ignoring” urban craft unions in the deluge of textile mill scholarship. Conventional historical consensus had too long assumed that the Carolinas presented a “united front against the alien doctrine of trade unionism.”²

My study of the Spartanburg strike suggests that eventual rejection of labor unions in North and South Carolina was not inevitable. For example, Spartanburg’s two major daily newspapers provided different reactions spanning the spectrum from outright scorn through cautious tolerance, even to positive support. Moreover, Spartanburg’s transit crisis belongs to a larger context, which includes the immediately ensuing Carolina Regional Streetcar Strike of August 1919 centered on Charlotte, N.C. Although a few scholars have focused on the latter dispute, no academic studies have satisfactorily dealt with its larger ramifications. One undergraduate honors essay from 1979 and a handful of commemorative newspaper accounts comprise this body of literature.³ Likewise, South Carolina’s connections to this regional strike have not hitherto been analyzed in a scholarly manner.

Since the decline of urban transit, very few citizens from Piedmont and Upcountry counties are even aware that trolleys once conveyed passengers across Carolina mill towns. That story is easily lost in our current perplexing age of skyrocketing oil prices and traffic gridlock. For example, at its seventy-fifth anniversary (in 1994) the Carolina Regional Streetcar Strike had become so obscure that Amalgamated Transit Union historian Shawn Perry confessed to a Charlotte newspaper that he had been

unaware of the dispute.⁴ While modern trolleys now exist as tourist attractions in many New South towns, the first streetcar workers during the Teens and Twenties arguably faced a thankless and hazardous routine. Many felt that unionism represented their sole chance to improve salaries for low-paying, dangerous jobs.

Separated by a state boundary, the North Carolina Piedmont and the South Carolina Upcountry regions are, nonetheless, comparable. From the time of the First World War this collective region became increasingly linked by corporate and municipal developments. Both regions underwent a textile boom, beginning with South Carolina's pilot mills in Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg counties. These upcountry counties comprised the dominant producers, as evidenced by Greenville's 1915 Southern Textile Exposition.⁵ While development of Piedmont North Carolina lagged behind initially, much of Upcountry South Carolina had recently become subject to the juggernaut city of Charlotte, whose influence had expanded beyond North Carolina's borders at an unprecedented rate. The military buildup of World War I hastened this process, as major Carolina towns began to attract federal contracts for military posts. Army training camps were built in Charlotte (Camp Greene), Greenville (Camp Sevier), Spartanburg (Camp Wadsworth), and Columbia (Fort Jackson), capital of the Palmetto State.⁶

"Boosters" conceived a widespread system of electric railways and streetcar lines to serve these newcomers. While boosters typically were progressive white businessmen and native southerners, some were northern entrepreneurs who once might have been labeled as "Scalawags" or "Carpetbaggers." In more recent decades, however, job-starved southerners had become more accepting of modernity and the attendant influx of outsiders. Columbia's earliest replacement of horse-drawn streetcars began in 1893. By 1919, the city had twenty-five miles of track and 100 streetcars on line. At the same time, the Upcountry cities of Spartanburg and Greenville each had over fifteen track-miles serving as major arteries to the textile mills.⁷

Textile workers living in scattered mill villages rode to their workplaces on these trolley systems, which were owned and maintained by private traction companies. Such enterprises often touted themselves as "public utility" companies, but they were designed solely for profit. Many of these companies, however, fell into receivership by the end of World War I. Speculative businessmen took advantage of this situation. In another development, James B. Duke's Southern Power began to electrify Carolina textile mills in 1916. This effectively made mill owners dependent upon Duke's acquisitive empire. Beginning in 1910, Duke's company also channeled electricity into the Piedmont and Northern Electrical Railway. Nearly one hundred miles of interurban lines connected Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg to Charlotte.⁸

America's gradual involvement in World War I ignited hopes for organized labor. Strongest on the West Coast and the North, AASERE first sought to unionize the southern streetcar lines during these years. In 1916, their efforts in Atlanta proved fruitless. Union organizers received blame for violent confrontations in southern towns that were, in fact, usually fomented by policemen and strikebreakers. After the country's formal entry into hostilities in 1917, newspapers often portrayed unionists as wartime malcontents.⁹

Despite some antiwar protesters, most trade unions, including AASERE, supported U.S. armed intervention in Europe. Woodrow Wilson's appeals for popular governments won strong endorsements from moderate leaders among the American Federation of Labor (AFL). One of Samuel Gompers's staunchest lieutenants, William D. Mahon, served as AASERE international president for decades. Unlike radical labor groups, these streetcar unions strove for greater worker representation under the mantle of industrial democracy.¹⁰ Streetcar workers were also guided by patriotic duty to support the war effort. Some Palmetto natives, like Jesse B. Ashe from York County, even left their streetcar jobs to serve in France. Ashe later returned to work for Charlotte's Southern Public Utilities, where he became an active union supporter.¹¹

Under the Wilson wartime administration, labor grievances were subject to federal arbitration through the National War Labor Board (NWLB). Contrary to some perceptions, South Carolina's state government officially embraced this policy. Governor Richard I. Manning (1915–1919), a political progressive, had brought South Carolina into a brief era of reform following his 1914 election. Elected twice without opposition, Manning overhauled state taxes, outlawed labor by children under fourteen years of age, and set up a Board of Arbitration for local labor disputes. Manning also formally recognized labor unions and broke the power of company stores in his state's textile mill villages.¹²

Unfortunately, many employers throughout the country resisted this progressive spirit. Like organized labor, big business also proved indispensable to the war effort. While union memberships flourished during wartime, new employer associations across the nation moved to discredit or out-manuever union organizers.¹³ Corporate America's grand chance came during 1919. As the war economy wound down, prices skyrocketed, but wages did not rise. With the dissolution of the NWLB in August 1919, corporations did not feel obligated to negotiate with employee representatives. Under the so-called "American Plan," corporations spread their open-shop gospel to the consumers, who were already in the throes of a general political backlash against Wilson.¹⁴

Distracted by world affairs—his negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles and his efforts to create the League of Nations—Wilson proved powerless to halt the rising cost of living after the federal government prematurely chose to eliminate price

controls. By late spring of 1919, the South also faced job losses. This jobless wave hit South Carolina particularly hard, with Charleston reporting about four hundred unemployed industrial workers; in Columbia more than one thousand mill-hands and mechanics were out of work. The *Journal and Carolina Spartan* further speculated that many of these workers were returning “Negro” veterans.¹⁵

It was in this environment that the labor strikes of 1919 took place. They also coincided with the First Red Scare. Organized labor in America became tainted with Bolshevism following the Communist takeover of Russia. In actuality, radicals were too few in number to influence labor leadership, but opponents made no distinctions. Race riots in Chicago and the District of Columbia also heightened hysteria during the “Red Summer.” Conservative newspapers blamed “Reds” for stirring up African-Americans. Even Palmetto progressives, like Governor Manning and rising Congressman James F. Byrnes, were not immune to such fears.¹⁶

During this tense summer, AASERE nevertheless decided to launch their major campaign to unionize the Piedmont and Upcountry transit employees. Several embryonic chapters had already been organized throughout the region. Streetcar workers in the South were especially hard hit by the ongoing economic slump. Wilson had appointed a Street Railway Commission, but its recommendations went largely unheeded by transit corporations. Union recognition now hinged upon boardroom decisions and public opinion. During 1918, the last wartime year, AASERE had made progress in Asheville, North Carolina, and had gained short-lived recognition of the union in the South Carolina’s capital, Columbia.¹⁷ Yet, these isolated victories needed further success in key cities to connect the local unions in a support network similar to the Ohio Valley Trades Association in Wheeling, West Virginia.

Strategically, the city of Spartanburg might appear to have been a sound choice for union organizers. No doubt, many of the city businessmen were expected to oppose AASERE’s presence there. J.C. Hemphill, managing editor of the *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, had openly crowed over labor leader Eugene V. Debs’s imprisonment in April 1919 in Atlanta, and had praised hardliner mayors who forbade unions within city limits. Hemphill placed Seattle’s Ole Hanson and Spartanburg’s John F. Floyd in this category. Touted as being the “City of Success,” Spartanburg had secured wartime contracts for Fort Wadsworth partly due to Mayor Floyd’s efforts as president of the Chamber of Commerce.¹⁸ As the events unfolded, however, Floyd revealed his innate sense of fairness both to the Spartanburg public and to the visiting labor organizers.

AASERE Division 897, organized by C.E. Diltz on 25 June 1919, represented the streetcar men of South Carolina Light, Power, and Railways (SCLP&R). Unlike many Carolina ventures, this mid-sized corporation had managed to remain independent

of Duke's Southern Power, and operated twenty-one miles of streetcar lines between Spartanburg, Glendale, Clifton, and Saxon. Franklin H. Knox, described by Hemphill as a "brass tacks booster," served as both general manager and senior vice-president for SCLP&R. He also backed Spartanburg's public community projects, such as a memorial park for fallen soldiers. Normally well-liked by his employees, Knox could, nonetheless, be paternalistic and contradictory in his public dealings.¹⁹

Predictably, he opposed the unionization of his workers. But not everyone in Spartanburg shared such prevalent anti-union views. While the *Journal and Carolina Spartan* editorialized daily against organized labor, the rival *Spartanburg Herald* proved less hostile. Its editor, Charles O. Hearon, had served as a major wartime booster for Fort Wadsworth. Nevertheless, he also advocated the "mutual advantage" of his newspaper's long-standing relationship with the local Typographical Union. Throughout the Spartanburg strike, Hearon spoke on behalf of the public interest as separate from the particular interests of businessmen or labor unions.²⁰

While hailing Knox as a "considerate gentleman," Hearon also criticized SCLP&R's Spartanburg street railways as "one of the most unsatisfactory services in [this] city." Serving on the city council, Hearon had previously voted against the company's request for higher streetcar fares. Hearon also cited SCLP&R's lack of progressive spirit, of good equipment, and of trained, well-paid men. He further suggested a municipal study of the company's streetcar problems.²¹

By June 1919, SCLP&R's traction services in Spartanburg had become notorious for poor working conditions. D.L. Goble, organizer for the electricians' union, spoke at the Temple of Justice on behalf of streetcar workers as well as electrical employees.²² A native of Dallas, Texas, Goble played a leading role throughout the campaign to mobilize trade unions in the Carolinas. On 16 June, he decried the treatment of SCLP&R's forty car-men, who were "treated worse than prisoners in any state." Goble attributed low worker morale to "speedups" and grueling twelve-hour shifts, for which a car-man received no more than \$24 weekly. Nor was Goble alone in his condemnations. State Senator W.S. Rogers and local solicitor Ira Blackwood gave their support to these statements.²³ This convergence of organized labor and some local opinion suggests that not every South Carolinian opposed unionization as the chief tool of Bolshevism.

As tensions gradually mounted in Spartanburg, AASERE sent Albert E. Jones of Ohio, their 11th international vice-president, as a troubleshooter. However, northern organizers were viewed with suspicion in much of the South. When one also takes into account the Red Scare, the sheer opposition leveled at Jones throughout the Carolinas, especially in Charlotte, North Carolina, should come as no real surprise.²⁴

Spartanburg's transit strike officially began at midnight on 2 July after negotiation between AASERE Division 897 and SCLP&R's Knox fell through. Union demands were not overwhelming, featuring a new wage scale, from 37 cents to 41 cents hourly, depending on one's seniority. Workers also requested nine-hour shifts to replace the grueling "speedup" lasting eleven and a half hours. The major sticking point, however, lay with Knox's staunch refusal to recognize the AASERE local officially. Two weeks before, he even had gone so far as to discharge one employee, R.L. Kitchins, for his organizational role in Division 897. Kitchins's fellow streetcar workers now requested that Kitchins be reinstated at his prior level of seniority.²⁵

Knox told the *Journal and Carolina Spartan* that although he refused to recognize "forced demands" from labor unions, he had considered eliminating "split runs" in favor of two nine-hour shifts per day. However, union members considered this idea as one of Knox's earlier promises that he had never honored. On 3 July, Knox replaced striking motormen with new recruits and transferred personnel from the sheds. Striking workers included long-time employees, such as the foreman and freight manager. Maintenance crewmen were not covered by AASERE, so they were under no expectations to strike. But there were too few remaining skilled men to staff the streetcars in operation for the Fourth of July. Eight more workers defected to Division 897 overnight. While Knox took a brief vacation, only three trolley-men were available for work for SCLP&R. Since Knox could not run the streetcars anyway, he pointedly gave "loyal" workers the day off.²⁶

Division 897 did not take this snub lightly. Jones told the public that his union did not intend to attack business. Instead, they sought to compromise with the company on behalf of workers. He stated that his union's goal was to achieve a "fair living wage" for each one of its members. Along with endorsements from the South Carolina Central Labor Union, Division 897 also received local support from small businesses and townsfolk. Newspapers noted people either walked or got a lift on Independence Day in Spartanburg.²⁷

The two main—and rival—newspapers promptly reacted to the strike. Hemphill of the *Journal and Carolina Spartan* preferred compromise to confrontation, and suggested that shift changes would improve both public safety and employee morale. However, he doubted whether SCLP&R could afford any government-mandated wage hike. The conservative editor vehemently remained opposed to reforms smacking of government oversight or state ownership.²⁸

Hearon's *Spartanburg Herald* interviewed streetcar workers who revealed that Knox had fired several employees who had asked for back pay. Hearon also criticized Mayor Floyd for his perceived indifference to the strike. But Floyd, whose anti-labor

reputation we have already noted, deliberately chose to take neither side in the dispute. Stressing orderly conduct for both strikers and company men, the mayor also noted that if SCLP&R failed to run their streetcars within nine months, the company would violate its franchise with Spartanburg and go out of business. City policemen reported only one incident over the holiday weekend, wherein a strikebreaker swore at two local citizens for calling him a scab. This replacement worker was fined \$5.85.²⁹

The streetcar shortage quickly affected local industry. Impromptu car-pools, known colloquially as “jitneys,” were possible alternatives to trolley service. Unfortunately, these early ride-shares were unable to connect textile workers adequately with their respective mills. Streetcar workers also found support among local textile mill workers and their families in the Piedmont and Upcountry.³⁰ Clashes between strike sympathizers and replacement workers were frequent. Streetcar men often enjoyed moral support not only from textile mill workers, but also from trade unionists and the general public. For example, on 6 July, R.E. Tillotson, an employee of the Southern Railway Company wrote a letter to the *Journal and Carolina Spartan* in reply to an earlier missive by a certain Mr. Robertson defending loyal SCLP&R employees. Frustrated by the company’s refusal to recognize the local streetcar union, Tillotson characterized “Mister Knocks” as the opponent of labor. Tillotson expressed sentiments characteristic of strike sympathizers. Most were either with affiliated unions, as in his case, or they were unorganized workers, such as textile mill hands unable to form unions.³¹ Harmless venting aside, strike sympathizers could nonetheless become a liability to negotiations, especially if they began to antagonize strikebreakers. Even with clear-cut instances where replacement workers instigated violence, protestors were automatically suspect due to innate prejudice and overt propaganda against unions.

On the evening of 10 July, Mayor Floyd made an extraordinary gesture by visiting H.E. Sitton, president of Division 897, who had been convalescing at home with appendicitis. Despite his reputation for being anti-labor, Floyd seems to have understood the need for mediation. Sitton and Floyd scheduled a conference for the next day, with both company and union representatives. Hemphill remarked that the strike had become “more of an annoyance than a real problem.” But he also warned the union that the public grew tired of the dispute. Hearon’s column, entitled “Can’t We End This Strike?” urged strikers to give company president Knox a chance. Since the *Spartanburg Herald* felt that the streetcar union, reliant upon “out of town” leadership, held the weaker position, the newspaper urged the strikers to place the public interest first in priority.³²

On 12 July, Floyd and Knox met with AASERE organizer Jones and local union president Sitton. Knox and SCLP&R refused to recognize the union, but offered a

new wage schedule such as the one he had established for replacement workers over the previous week. Knox also agreed to implement nine-hour workdays, as personnel would permit. But the company would not budge concerning recognition of AASERE, nor would Knox reinstate the discharged worker, R.L. Kitchens. Jones openly praised the mayor for “using his good offices” on behalf of the public trust, and noted that Floyd had caught Knox short on his terms. While the latter had previously promised one set of terms to the mayor as evidence of his trust, Knox’s actual terms during the hearing were substantially different. For one thing, Knox did not address time and a half overtime pay, nor did he offer the same wage scale as indicated before.³³

Jones further commented on Knox’s past record, stating that his promises “looked very rosy, but never materialized.” His fellow workers could not “sell their lives and very existence without the scratch of a pen to protect them.” Jones told Knox that his “personal feelings” alone could not support families, and implored him to “grant us a contract . . . and we will start your cars before the ink is dry.” If Knox persisted in his hostile course, Jones warned, “then [your] men will never operate them again.”³⁴

Despite these forthright words, Knox continued to reject overtures from the mayor to compromise with his striking workers. Nor would the company recognize national labor organizations like the AASERE. Hearon made a very perceptive summation in an editorial following this inconclusive meeting. “In this present controversy,” he observed, “unionism will rise and fall by the fate of the demand that the union be recognized.” Hearon also asserted that organized labor hitherto had failed to make headway in southern states because “individualism . . . pride of family . . . and freedom of action” prevailed in their culture. But while “the average Southerner can take care of himself without organizations,” the *Spartanburg Herald* also speculated whether “increased industry [in the South] may well require better acceptance of organized labor.”³⁵

Spartanburg’s now week-long transit strike subsequently drew the attention of Governor Robert A. Cooper (1919–1922), Manning’s successor. Cooper also favored conciliation, which he promised to oversee personally in Spartanburg if the situation failed to improve. Several citizens’ groups with connections to Cooper had already registered their concerns with the governor’s office. Given the aforementioned disruptions in textile mill production and public commerce, such opinions were not to be idly ignored. Moreover, since South Carolina’s establishment of a conciliation board in 1916, the state legislature had also granted wide subpoena powers to its governor-appointed arbitrators. Cooper’s statements came as a surprise to the major

principals of Spartanburg's transit strike, who quickly resumed their conference on 13 July. In the meantime, Knox proceeded to restore partial streetcar services by using his replacement workforce.³⁶

Knox's replacement workers, unlike those employed during strikes by more prominent corporations, seem to have been a mixture of loyal company men and new hires. SCLP&R could not likely afford professional strikebreakers. Moreover, as one participant in the subsequent Carolina regional strike later testified, a company hiring "outside" strikebreakers could incur the same sectional prejudices as "outside" labor organizers. In 1980, retired Southern Public Utilities (SPU) motorman Loy Cloninger recalled a strike sympathizer who had offered to dynamite the paint shop in Charlotte where SPU strikebreakers were quartered during the later strike. Cloninger believed those replacement workers had been northerners, possibly recruited by James B. Duke or Zebulon V. Taylor.³⁷

On 13 July, three SCLP&R streetcars returned to the lines. Initially, no troubles arose from local strike sympathizers or union men. But ill will grew against AASERE, as reported in the *Greenville Daily News*. One unnamed correspondent attacked Jones as a "rank outsider," who was bent on "making trouble between employer and employe[e]." This correspondent also referred to the organizer's opening speech in Spartanburg, insisting that because Jones "gave [SCP&L] the business," he should be "run out of town as a nuisance." Incidentally, this writer did express his support for a local union, but maintained that it should answer to the community, not the outside union.³⁸

By 14 July, the situation improved enough for the company to add a fourth car to service, even though Knox's new motormen were inexperienced. Rumors of greased tracks and derailed cars proved false, and no acts of violence were as yet reported anywhere in Spartanburg. Meanwhile, negotiations between Knox, Jones, and Floyd continued. Despite inconvenience, Spartanburg's citizens could claim their town was working far better to resolve its labor strikes than Macon, Georgia, whose 180-man streetcar strike paralyzed the entire city. In the *Spartanburg Herald* Hearon advocated his own city government's "square-dealing" efforts to find a compromise between company revenue and worker wages.³⁹

But this civic-minded spirit in Spartanburg did not last. On 15 July, just before six in the evening, the first blows were exchanged aboard SCP&L Streetcar 32. One hothead, Grady LeMaster, attempted physically to remove a replacement conductor from his post. When both men were arrested for causing the affray, the strikebreaker, C.E. Edwards, revealed that he was carrying an allegedly unlawful concealed handgun that had been issued by Superintendent B.A. Buckheister, Knox's second-in-command at SCP&L.⁴⁰

Edwards and LeMaster paid their bonds, \$66.50 and \$15.75 respectively, and went before the mayor to hear his verdicts. Under Spartanburg's existing statutes, mayors evidently could exercise the same powers as a magistrate within city limits. Mayor Floyd upheld the company's right to issue firearms to its workers and fined the instigator LeMaster \$100. According to Floyd, Edwards had the "same right as a constable." However, the mayor did not blame the streetcar union for LeMaster's act.⁴¹

Worse violence occurred that same evening at Pine and Main Streets when one streetcar returned to its barn. Local demonstrators halted the car and demanded to know if the operator or his two bodyguards were union supporters. One of the strikebreakers, J.L. Brown, brandished a firearm, and fisticuffs ensued between the two groups. C.C. Crouch, the motorman on duty, was a fifteen-year employee who had refused to strike. He suffered serious injuries and required hospital treatment. When interviewed later in hospital, Crouch could only vaguely identify his attackers as "union men." Hemphill's editorial on 16 July implored the streetcar union to find and "turn out" Crouch's assailants.⁴²

Back at the scene of the fight, Superintendent Buckheister had arrived and drawn his own concealed handgun. Three Spartanburg policemen, Officers Bailey, Rash, and Alverson, subsequently arrested both Brown and Buckheister on concealed weapons charges. The next day, Buckheister was acquitted on grounds of statute, despite claims from witnesses who saw him draw a handgun as he arrived at the scene. Buckheister insisted that he had openly carried his gun to the scene, as he had expected trouble at the car-barn. He also threatened to charge his accusers with inciting a riot on the previous evening.⁴³

Vandalism escalated during the evening of 15 July. Police cars drove to South Church Street to remove one automobile blocking the trolley line. Edward Wooten was arrested for placing bricks upon the tracks, and later fined. Hundreds of townsfolk also congregated following the incidents, but apart from the exchange of angry words, no further violence ensued. The mayor subsequently stationed a police officer on each operational streetcar. Incidentally, one plainclothesman, Moss Hayes, registered strong objections to Police Chief Hill over this assignment and resigned after 15 years with the Spartanburg police. Hearon's newspaper later castigated the recalcitrant Hayes for "setting a dangerous precedent."⁴⁴

Undoubtedly, these problems convinced Governor Cooper to become personally involved in the local Spartanburg strike. He appointed a mediation committee and mobilized fifty South Carolina reserve troops from Company F of the "Spartan Rifles." Another military reserve company from Greenville remained on stand-by in case of emergency. Despite rumors of steam-plant sabotage, there were no more

incidents. However, streetcar services were suspended until a compromise could be reached.⁴⁵

How did these small tremors of violence affect public opinion toward AASERE? Hearon pleaded for “sanity and resourcefulness” from all sides in the controversy. Furthermore, he warned that the union would lose “public sympathy” if such incidents were to multiply. Perhaps, Hearon reasoned, the newly formed Spartanburg Commercial Association could “take the helm” of arbitration and thus avoid reliance on the governor’s personal intervention.⁴⁶ This suggestion appears consistent with local sentiments that emphasized independence and self-reliance in the face of any outside interference.

On the evening of 17 July, Governor Cooper brought together five labor representatives, five company spokesmen, and twelve state arbitrators of the mediation committee. Jones and Sitton directed the labor contingent, while Knox voiced his company’s concerns. B.E. Geer, president of the Spartanburg Commercial Association, led the arbitrators. While Cooper did not play an active role in the proceedings, he remained as an observer.⁴⁷

Geer’s committee reviewed two proposals, one from each side. Finally, at 11 PM, SCP&L agreed to several points that ended the strike. Knox fully reinstated all striking employees, provided these men swore under oath they had no involvement in the July 15 disorder. This also retroactively covered R.L. Kitchens, the union activist who had been discharged earlier. Knox also promised to establish a review process for employees and a wage schedule matching the union’s earlier demands. Senior employees would earn 42 cents hourly after five years. Furthermore, Knox promised two nine-hour shifts by 15 August, and offered vacation days amounting to seventy-two hours each quarter.⁴⁸

While this did not constitute the company’s open acknowledgment of AASERE, Knox did assure his men that they could join a union as long as they promised to remain loyal to their company and fellow workers. Recognizing these concessions as the best he could possibly obtain for Division 897, Jones agreed to these terms, as did Sitton.⁴⁹ Public reaction to the strike settlement proved reassuring. Despite minor outbreaks of vandalism and hostility, Spartanburg had resolved its transit strike largely on its own terms.

But the city’s two major newspaper editors did not subsequently conceal their dislike of outside interference either from the state government or the American Federation of Labor. Despite the governor’s decisive and careful use of state power, neither newspaper credited him with hastening the resolution of 17 July, nor did they even mention his name. Hearon did congratulate the Spartanburg Commer-

cial Association and praised both Knox and Sitton for their conduct. But neither newspaper gave favorable coverage to AASERE's organizer Jones. Hemphill made an oblique reference to "imported talent" and suggested that local unions could resolve their problems without such "outside sympathizers." But he also acknowledged that Knox's initial hesitance to compromise brought public "ill will" against his company. Greenville's own newspaper issued the call for "compulsory arbitration" in all future strikes. But after two weeks of the "hottest and sloppiest weather [in] the season," Spartanburg could move forward.³⁰

By 19 July, Sitton's streetcar men were back on the job. Newspapers reported some friction on the first day, as old employees were not always returned to their usual positions. Knox promised to uphold the contract he had signed, but also explained that changes would require patience and time.³¹ Shortly thereafter, local papers turned toward rising utility prices and race riots, two reigning news issues of post-war America.

Meanwhile, Spartanburg played host to South Carolina's State Labor Federation on 15 August. Given the relative success in recent labor negotiations, the state organization also invited none other than Samuel L. Gompers of the AFL. Whether the latter actually made it to Spartanburg is unclear, but Governor Cooper attended the meeting at the scene of his unsung efforts to bring resolution to Spartanburg's transit crisis.³²

Emboldened by his unexpected success in Spartanburg, Jones soon traveled to Charlotte to organize hundreds of employees of SPU, a subsidiary of James B. Duke's business empire. Knox's concessions in July had sent shockwaves to neighboring traction companies in Tennessee and the Carolinas. In the case of Charlotte, SPU president Zebulon Taylor took pre-emptive steps to forestall union encroachment into Duke territory. On 1 August, he gave a substantial pay raise to all his streetcar employees in North and South Carolina. His ploy met with mixed results. On 10 August, Greenville SPU workers elected to strike alongside the Charlotte employees, while the Anderson SPU employees openly professed their loyalty to Taylor and Duke.³³

Unfortunately for Jones and AASERE, they would not duplicate their Spartanburg success. SPU had the power of Duke behind them, whereas SCP&L had been more subject to public opinion. Charlotte's major newspapers repeatedly heaped scorn upon Jones, who was provoked into losing his customary calm during a discussion in City Hall. Mayor Frank R. McNinch excluded Jones from further negotiations and thereby stripped the streetcar workers of their chief and most effective advocate.

Charlotte's strike paralyzed several Piedmont and Upcountry towns. Despite pressure from local government and federal adjudicators, Taylor refused to meet with the representatives of AASERE Division 903. Nor would SPU accede to Mayor McNinch's attempted eleventh-hour compromise. On 25 August, Taylor's employment of armed replacements escalated tensions among sympathetic townsfolk and textile mill-workers. That evening, strikebreakers and policemen fired upon a crowd of demonstrators outside Dilworth's car-barn. Five unarmed picketers were slain, while twelve were wounded. No police injuries were reported. After state troops restored order, Mecklenburg County judges exonerated Police Chief Walter B. Orr and dismissed murder charges against strikebreakers. Furthermore, newspapers reports of the violence turned Carolinians against the streetcar union, whose agents were persuasively depicted as Communist agitators.⁵⁴

For a time, South Carolina experienced further transit strikes even after the regional strike ended on 3 September 1919. Despite the tragic setbacks in Charlotte, Palmetto labor unions were still energized by AASERE's success in Spartanburg, and briefly, it seemed as though the streetcar union would gain ground in major South Carolina cities. Charleston was inconvenienced by a brief strike during November 1919. Spartanburg and Columbia experienced strikes in 1920. All three cases resulted in arbitration, with minimal rancor. Over these two years, organized trade unionism in South Carolina even boasted a worker-owned store and a short-lived labor newspaper, albeit one favoring conservatism over confrontation.⁵⁵

Had this pattern of compromise and concession persisted, perhaps trade unionism may have rooted more firmly in South Carolina. But the postwar automobile boom and rising fare rates led to the decline of electric streetcars. Traction companies soon fell into receivership, and cities began to replace them with motorized buses. During the summer of 1919, one Columbia newspaper editor, A.E. Gonzales, suggested another solution to both streetcar strikes and fare hikes: "Why not have roads under government control, over which the car is run under YOUR control?"⁵⁶

Public utility corporations continued to oppose organized labor and sought to influence both town councils and the general public. In 1922, Knox retrenched his efforts to dislodge AASERE from public transportation. As the new president of the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company, he triggered a year-long strike that forced Division 590 to disband. This strike coincided with Columbia's "Palmafaesta," a well-attended car show coordinated by automobile dealers and the state government. Subsequent public disenchantment with electric streetcars weakened support for streetcar unionism in the Carolinas. Hence, the process initiated by Spartanburg's 1919 transit strike had thus come full circle.⁵⁷

NOTES

1. "Amalgamated Association of Street and Electrical Railway Employees" being too lengthy, I will use the union's widely-accepted acronym. It is today known as the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU). South Carolina also once boasted a now-obscure labor newspaper, the *Labor Advocate of Columbia*, with frequent coverage of transportation unions. Beyond textile mill strikes, relatively few secondary sources concentrate on South Carolina labor. See, however, Allen Tullos, *Habits of Industry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
2. Gerald Carpenter, "Public Opinion in the New Orleans Street Railway Strike of 1929–30," in Gary M. Fink and Merl Reed, eds., *Essays in Southern Labor History* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), 191–92.
3. Joe Goodpasture, "Streetcar Riot," from *Charlotte Magazine*, vol. 6, no. 2, February 2001, 11; Richard Maschal, "Forgotten Night of Fear," *The Charlotte Observer*, 23 August 1994, 1E–2E; Steve Snow, "Trolley Holds Deep Memories," *The Charlotte Observer*, 14 January 1987, 10C; Ed Martin, "N.C. Labor Efforts Written in Blood," *The Charlotte News*, 5 September 1983, 1A–3A; Carol Shaw, "A City in Conflict: The 1919 Charlotte Streetcar Strike" (baccalaureate honors thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980); Bill Beck, "Five Deaths Marred 1919 Charlotte Streetcar Strike," *The Charlotte News*, 20 January 1979, 10A.
4. *The Charlotte Observer*, 23 August 1994.
5. Walter Edgar, *South Carolina: a History* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 456–57.
6. Miriam G. Mitchell and Edward S. Perzel, *The Echo of the Bugle Call: Charlotte's Role in World War I* (Charlotte: Heritage Printers, Inc., 1979); Edgar, 477.
7. Edgar, 454–55, 466–67.
8. Herman Wolf to Allen Tullos, [recorded oral interview, no transcription] 15 July 1980 (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Library); Robert F. Durden, *Bold Entrepreneur: A Life of James B. Duke* (Carolina Academic Press: Durham, N.C., 2003), 124–29.
9. Joseph M. Brown to Z.V. Taylor [telegram] 26 August 1919, as printed in *The Charlotte Observer*, 27 August 1919, 3; *Greenville Daily News*, 28 August 1919, 4; Carole E. Scott and Richard D. Guynn, "The Atlanta Streetcar Strikes," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 84 (Fall 2000): 434–59.
10. See Joseph A. McCartin, *Labor's Great War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), and Jeffrey Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997).
11. Jesse B. Ashe to Allen Tullos, [recorded oral interview, no transcription] 13 June 1980 (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Library).
12. Frank L. Grubbs, Jr., *The Struggle for Labor Loyalty* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968); Robert M. Burts, *Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973).
13. See William Millikan, *A Union Against Unions* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2001).

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14. See Gene Smith, *When the Cheering Stopped* (New York: William Morrow, 1971).
 15. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 15 May 1919, 1; 5 June 1919, 1.
 16. William M. Tuttle, Jr., *Race Riot; Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919* (New York: Atheneum, 1970); David Mitchell, 1919: *Red Mirage* (MacMillan Company: New York, 1970); New York Times, 31 August 1917, 4; Edgar, 488.
 17. *Motorman and Conductor*, vol. 27, no. 4 (March 1919), 25.
 18. Jonathan Brooke, *Tent and Trench*, Spartanburg County Historical Association, 2006, chapter two, <http://schistory.net/campwadsworth/contents.html>, accessed 5 February 2008; *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 9 April 1919, 4; 16 May 1919, 4.
 19. *Motorman and Conductor*, vol. 27, no. 8 (July 1919), 12, 18; *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 5 June 1919, 8; 9 June 1919, 5; 3 July 1919; 12 July 1919, 1, 8.
 20. Jonathan Brooke, *Tent and Trench*, chapter two; *Spartanburg Herald*, 4 July 1919, 1, 7.
 21. *Spartanburg Herald*, 4 July 1919, 1, 7.
 22. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 16 June 1919, 2; 17 June 1919, 2.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. *Motorman and Conductor*, vol. 27, no. 11, October 1919, 140.
 25. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 3 July 1919, 1, 7. These proposed wage increases were comparable to those requested from the striking Charlotte workers in August. If anything, Knox's workers were paid less than Southern Public Utilities's streetcar men. The latter worked twelve hour shifts with pay scales between 37 and 42 cents per hour. Charlotte workers asked for nine-hour workdays, guaranteed overtime, and salaries from 41 to 45 cents per hour. Even these terms were modest compared to federal standards. Prior to the Charlotte strike, John H. Pardee (president of the American Electric Railway Association) had recommended wage increases of one hundred percent for striking workers to encourage them to resume city transit. See *The Charlotte Observer*, 10 August 1919, 3; 15 August 1919, 9.
 26. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 3 July 1919, 1, 7; 4 July 1919, 1.
 27. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 4 July 1919, 7.
 28. *Ibid.*, 4.
 29. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 5 July 1919, 1; *Spartanburg Herald*, 6 July 1919, 4.
 30. *Spartanburg Herald*, 6 July 1919, 1, 2. One streetcar union division president, A.A. Gerald of Columbia Division 590, would serve at least two terms in the South Carolina Legislature, where he would support the mill-workers' eight-hour workday campaign in 1922. See *Motorman and Conductor*, vol. 30, no. 11, October 1922, 9.
 31. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 6 July 1919, 4; 7 July 1919, 4. Many protestors in the subsequent Charlotte transit strike were textile workers, while one of the shooting victims, Caldwell Houston, was another Southern Railways worker. See *The Charlotte Observer*, 26 August 1919, 1; *The Charlotte News*, 26 August 1919, 1.
 32. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 11 July 1919, 4; *Spartanburg Herald*, 11 July 1919, 4.

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33. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 12 July 1919, 1, 8. We can assume Knox communicated with other traction companies and utility corporations. He might have been under pressure not to cave in to labor demands, because if SCLP&R made concessions, then other locals would demand the same of other companies. This is borne out by the fact that after SCLP&R settled the strike, Southern Public Utilities raised employee wages in an effort to forestall a similar strike in Charlotte.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Spartanburg Herald*, 13 July 1919, 4.
36. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 13 July 1919, 1, 9; *Spartanburg Herald*, 13 July 1919, 1, 5.
37. Loy C. Cloninger to Allen Tullios, [oral interview] 18 June 1980, transcribed by Jean Houston (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Library), 4, 7. Spartanburg's streetcar men were most likely entirely white. Given the prejudices of the era, much notice would have been made in the press if SCLP&R had employed black replacements. By way of contrast, James B. Duke hired black streetcar and shop-men, primarily to serve Charlotte's Biddleville district. Charlotte's local union even permitted blacks and whites to meet together. But both the SC Federation of Labor and Governor Cooper were cautious about embracing such interracial unionism. Their joint meeting in September 1919 addressed "Negro Unions" in the context of segregation. Few black members were in attendance. See *Labor Advocate of Columbia*, vol. 1, no. 1, 19 September 1919, 1; *The Charlotte News*, 19 January 1984, 1B; J.W. Jenkins, *J.B. Duke: Master Builder* (Spartanburg: Reprint Company, 1929), 244–51.
38. *Greenville Daily News*, 10 July 1919, 1; *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 13 July 1919, 4.
39. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 15 July 1919, 1; *Spartanburg Herald*, 15 July 1919, 4.
40. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 16 July 1919, 1, 8.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 16 July 1919, 1, 4, 8; *Spartanburg Herald*, 16 July 1919, 1, 5.
43. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 16 July 1919, 1, 8; 17 July 1919, 8. Evidently, Buckheister's alleged open carry of a handgun was considered legal.
44. *Ibid.*; *Spartanburg Herald*, 17 July 1919, 4, 8.
45. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 16 July 1919, 1, 8; 17 July 1919, 8; *Spartanburg Herald*, 17 July 1919, 4, 8; *Greenville Daily News*, 17 July 1919, 1.
46. *Spartanburg Herald*, 16 July 1919, 4.
47. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 17 July 1919, 1; 17 July 1919, 8; *Spartanburg Herald*, 17 July 1919, 4, 8.
48. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 18 July 1919, 1, 8; *Spartanburg Herald*, 18 July 1919, 1, 5.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*; *Spartanburg Herald*, 18 July 1919, 1, 5; *Greenville Daily News*, 18 July 1919, 1.
51. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 19 July 1919, 1.
52. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 15 August 1919, 1.
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53. *Journal and Carolina Spartan*, 11 August 1919, 1; *Greenville Daily News*, 13 August 1919, 11.
54. *The Charlotte Observer*, 10 August to 23 November 1919; *Greenville Daily News*, 12 August 1919, 10; 15 August 1919, 10; 17 August 1919, 10.
55. *Motorman and Conductor*, vol. 30, no. 4 to vol. 31, no. 4; *Columbia Record*, 2 January 1920 to 30 March 1922; *Labor Advocate of Columbia*, vol. 1, no. 33, 9 April 1920.
56. *Columbia State*, 16 July 1919, 4.
57. *Columbia Record*, 26 March 1922, 1; Thomas Fetters, *Palmetto Traction* (Forty Fort, PA: Harold E. Cox, 1978), 46–47.

The Evolution of Nineteenth-Century Women's Benevolence Work in South Carolina, Charleston: A Case Study

Vanessa McNamara

Over the course of the nineteenth century, women's benevolence in Charleston, South Carolina, expanded in kind and degree. This evolution, in turn, modified gender identities and roles. Benevolence in the South differed from that in the North because southern women were not interested in changing society. Because of a fast growing industrial society in the North, acceptance for women there to work outside the home came more quickly than it did for women in the South. While northern women's benevolence work started out as purely munificent, it quickly developed into a cause for social reform that ranged from helping prostitutes become respectable citizens to joining abolitionist and temperance movements. Because the South was an agrarian, paternalistic, slave society, women—especially elite white women—had less opportunity for social reform and performed their benevolence work to fulfill traditional moral and social obligations and to help the deserving poor. Additionally, because elite white women benefited greatly from the institution of slavery, they had little or no desire to change society. As a result, women's gender roles were placed specifically in the private sphere, and identities were kept within the household. Southern women were rarely allowed in the public sphere of men and were expected to stay in the private sphere of the home. Benevolence work enabled elite white women in the South to interact with the public sphere while conducting their traditional roles of nurturers. As the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries progressed, women's roles became more public, and because of this, women did in fact change their society.

This work uses Charleston as an example of the evolution of women's benevolence work in the nineteenth-century South. By looking at three main time periods, the antebellum era, the Civil War, and the post-war era, we can see that women evolved through their benevolence work, and that while it was not their intention, they did change society.

In the antebellum era, southern society expected elite white women to be the moral and nurturing benefactresses of the poor. It was their duty, befitting their status in society, to look after those in need. The first benevolent organizations in Charleston were church based. In the wake of the Second Great Awakening, many benevolent organizations started to appear in Charleston. The Irish founded the Hibernian Society; the Germans, the German Friendly Society; the French, the French Benevolent Society;

and there were numerous others. In the early nineteenth century, Charleston's women began to organize their own benevolent societies. The wives of wealthy merchants and planters had the advantage of slave labor to conduct many of their household chores, leaving them time to devote to other pursuits. Benevolence work not only allowed them to fulfill their Christian obligations, but it also allowed them to fulfill their obligations to society. As a member of the upper class, it was a woman's duty to bestow moral goodness on the lower classes, which included laborers, single mothers, and people who had fallen on hard times due to illness, injury, and loss of work. The people helped by Charleston's benevolent societies had to be "deserving" poor, which usually left out prostitutes, drunks, and people who would rather live off benevolence than find work for themselves.¹

Charleston's women started their benevolence work early in the nineteenth century. The first women's benevolent society in Charleston was the Ladies' Benevolent Society. Founded in 1813 and still in existence, it is thought to be the longest working women's benevolence society in the United States. Its purpose was to heal and nurture Charleston's poor. It linked its founding with the suffering and poverty resulting from the War of 1812, when British ships patrolled the coast and blockaded Charleston harbor. Its motto was "I was sick and ye visited me." The Society fulfilled women's desires and duties to society, and it gave them access to the public as well as the private spheres of society.²

The Ladies' Benevolent Society offered its services to the City of Charleston in a number of ways. It provided recipients with supplies such as coffee, sugar, tea, candles, wood, and blankets, and for those who were very ill, it provided a nurse to help with their care. After a week of nursing, if the individuals were recovering, they would be left on their own or to the care of their family. The Ladies' Benevolent Society bought no medicine. If medicine was needed, a physician would be summoned and would administer it. To ensure that cases were legitimate, the Ladies' Benevolent Society requested that applicants acquire a certificate of their illness and send it to the visitor of their ward.³ By all accounts, Charleston's Ladies' Benevolent Society was very well organized and tended to. In fact, it was in such demand that in 1824 a sister society, the Female Charitable Society, was established. The new society focused on the sick poor in the Neck area of Charleston where the largest population of poor citizens lived.

Another benevolent society important to antebellum Charleston was the Ladies' Fuel Society. Founded in 1832, the purpose of the Ladies' Fuel Society was to provide Charleston's poor with fuel to keep them warm during the winter months. These women realized that less fortunate citizens were often in need of warmth during the winter

months and decided they should help relieve them. The Ladies' Fuel Society raised money through member subscriptions of one dollar and collected donations of money and wood for its cause.⁴ Like the Ladies' Benevolent Society, the Ladies' Fuel Society insured that its subjects were in need of its services by requiring that the society's directors bring certificates from those who requested assistance. The standing committee and the officers agreed that they would meet on the first Thursday of each month to examine these certificates and to conduct the society's business. Although every member of the society was allowed to recommend people in need, only directors and officers could examine the certificates. This group decided who would receive assistance and to what extent it would be given. These women extended their services not only to residents on the peninsula of Charleston, but also to those on the Neck. They assigned an officer to each ward throughout the city to oversee the needs in each area. The Ladies Fuel Society was very industrious in raising money for its cause. By April 1838, it was able to deposit \$417 in a trust and insurance company. Though these women had come a long way, they remained dependent on men. When their initial survival seemed in question, they sent an appeal to the citizens of Charleston through petitions in the newspaper. To underscore their non-public standing, however, two men, Reverend D. Cobia and Reverend W. W. Spear, made the petitions on their behalf.⁵ Because the women received so much support, they also issued a thank you to the citizens through the same venue.

Although social norms of the antebellum South limited how women could interact in the public sphere, benevolence provided Charleston's elite women with outlets to express their individuality and self-worth. More importantly, it gave them the organizational skills to conduct some of their most important benevolence work: providing relief during the Civil War.

During the Civil War women went to work not only to support their men, but more importantly because it was their moral and maternal responsibility to make sure that the men were cared for. Women formed aid societies primarily to help soldiers, but the societies also provided spiritual guidance to the women on the home front. With this in mind, Charleston's Ladies Christian Auxiliary led its meetings with prayer. Women sacrificed accordingly during the war by working in aid societies and devoting their time to helping soldiers. This fulfilled their roles as nurturers, and by staying on the home front, women remained moral and virtuous. As Drew Gilpin Faust explains, "The defense of moral order, conventionally allocated to females by nineteenth-century bourgeois ideology, took on increased importance as war's social disruptions threatened ethical and spiritual dislocations as well."⁶

As the moral arbiters of society, women of the elite class saw it their patriotic duty to help the war effort in any way they could. It was their primary job to set the

example for the rest of society. They spent a great deal of time volunteering for women's organizations and benevolent societies, making socks, bandages, and undergarments for soldiers. They also organized balls, concerts, and bazaars to help raise money for Confederate soldiers and regiments.

In Charleston, the organization of women led to the formation of several important relief societies such as the Soldier's Relief Association, the Ladies Christian Auxiliary, and the Ladies Clothing Association. These organizations collected clothing, blankets, and medical supplies to help Confederate soldiers. By participating in aid societies and sewing for soldiers, women were able to actively participate in the war effort. Women also provided household goods and nourishment. These included housekeeping stores, rice, barley, arrow root, flax seed, sugar, brandy, and wine. While materials were bought and donated to societies at the beginning of the war, the prices of basic materials increased, and shortages became frequent. This forced women to donate their own clothes, blankets, and linens. Many women also used extravagant materials such as furs to knit gloves for soldiers. Old party dresses made good undergarments, and blankets were made from carpets.

Charleston was not the only city in South Carolina to develop aid societies. Women in Cheraw formed a committee to send women to assist in a hospital in Florence. The town of Mars Bluff had a Ladies' Aid Society, and Pendleton had a Soldiers' Aid Society.⁷ Columbia made a wayside hospital out of Columbia College, and cities and towns all over South Carolina improvised similarly. Aid societies were an important part of every southern community during the Civil War; however, women took their commitment to helping soldiers one step further. When they were not busy working for their societies, they were at home continuing their sewing and knitting.

The Civil War acted as a major watershed for women's entrance into the field of nursing. Women from all over the South and the North joined the nursing field in some way. During the Civil War, women's nursing took on many forms from hospital matrons to women who visited hospitals and wrote letters for soldiers. Not all of them performed surgery or medically mended soldiers, but they all helped in the healing process. Most South Carolina women who wanted to be nurses had to find positions outside the state, although some did perform nursing duties in wayside hospitals. These hospitals acted as staging areas for wounded soldiers on their way home to heal, and women performed many duties, such as cooking and feeding, dispensing medicine, writing letters, or simply reading to soldiers.⁸

One of South Carolina's most prominent war relief workers was Louisa Cheves McCord. The daughter of a wealthy politician—her father had been president of the

Bank of the United States—McCord gave her blood, sweat, and tears to the cause. At the beginning of the war, she outfitted her son's regiment. She and her daughters constantly worked to sew clothing and provide provisions to soldiers. McCord was also the matron of the wayside hospital that took over Columbia College. Like so many other women, she was not immune to the heartbreak of war because she was wealthy; her only son died at Second Manassas.

South Carolina women, like other elite southern women, worked hard through aid societies to support Confederate men who fought on the front lines, and they nursed the sick and wounded. Yet, when the war ended, they instinctively returned to the antebellum notions of True Womanhood. Even the bold women who left home to become working nurses in Virginia returned home and settled back into their domestic sphere. The Civil War helped women to become independent while remaining in the safety of their traditional sphere of domesticity. Through aid societies and nursing, women became more public and responsible for the maintenance of their society. This gave them more authority and confidence. Despite this, southern women were slow to join their northern sisters when they fought for equality. Instead, they wanted to find some semblance of the patriarchal society they lost during the war and a sense of normalcy that was lost with the end of slavery and Confederate defeat.

To return to this “normalcy,” women would once again organize. Almost immediately after the war they formed Ladies Memorial Associations to remember and honor the Confederacy and the men that gave their lives for it. These organizations popped up in almost every town or area of the South. These organizations would eventually come under the umbrella of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, which would pull women from the private sphere into the public sphere at the national level.

Through ladies' memorial associations, women were able to continue their jobs as nurturers in the public sphere. They became “caretakers of the dead” when they brought home fallen soldiers from distant battlefields, and they molded children's education of the war. Charleston formed its own Ladies' Memorial Association in 1866. The first meeting was held on 14 May and was ordered for the purpose of “organizing an Association to perpetuate the martyrdom of the Confederate dead.” Mrs. Mary Amarithia Snowden was the first president, and she was also the founder of the Soldiers Relief Society during the war. Born into a wealthy Charleston family, she was the widow of a doctor from an old prominent family. As president she was responsible for creating Confederate memory in Charleston. She organized women to commemorate the dead by placing wreaths on every Confederate grave in the area. The placement of the wreaths was accompanied by an elaborate ceremony in

Magnolia Cemetery, on what would later become Charleston's Confederate Memorial Day. The first successful Memorial Day celebration inspired Snowden to take on more memorial projects. She made sure every Confederate grave in local cemeteries had a headstone. Additionally, she personally traveled to Gettysburg to bring home Charleston's fallen soldiers.⁹

During the last years of the nineteenth century, the United Daughters of the Confederacy brought southern women to the pinnacle of the public sphere. Until the formation of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the public role of women was local. The United Daughters of the Confederacy brought women together on a higher level and gave them the opportunity to hold leadership positions on a national scale while still retaining traditional values. While a national organization, the United Daughters of the Confederacy was organized by state "divisions" or "chapters," which enabled it to retain the southern idea of states rights that was so important before the war. The United Daughters of the Confederacy built monuments to the Confederacy and played a significant role in shaping school curriculum and text books regarding southern history and the Civil War. Like membership in wartime relief associations, being a member of the United Daughters of the Confederacy could give a woman social prestige. As John A. Simpson points out in *Edith D. Pope and Her Nashville Friends*, "The organization gained instant recognition as the single most important club for any white woman to seek an affiliation."¹⁰ Indeed, the United Daughters of the Confederacy served as a way for elite women to socialize and become known in society.

Ultimately, ladies' memorial associations generally, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy especially, played a major part in shaping what and how the South thought about the Confederacy and the war and how future generations would conceive the Confederacy and what it meant to be southern. By erecting monuments to Confederate heroes and influencing school curriculum, women played major roles in helping southern society remember the Confederacy and its "Lost Cause." They made sure that no one forgot the glories of the pre-war South.

The gender identities and roles of southern women evolved through the course of the nineteenth century. Southern women became more involved in their community, and, by doing so, they became more involved with the public sphere. They did, however, remain true to their traditional roles as nurturers and moral arbitrators. Most importantly, they changed the society they lived in even though that was not their goal. Because of their benevolence work and events that led them to such work, society became more accepting of their presence in the public sphere. Additionally, they played a major role in shaping generations of southerners and their thoughts and attitudes regarding the Confederacy and the Civil War. Women also passed down the

tradition of benevolence to future generations. In the mid-twentieth century, women helped shape the modernization of Charleston as a tourist destination.

Throughout the nineteenth century, women increasingly navigated the waters of the public sphere. In the antebellum era they formed and led their own benevolent societies, though if they wanted to make public appeals, they had to depend upon the generosity of men. During the Civil War, women were able to step into the public sphere more. Many of the men were away fighting for the cause, and the women found themselves making their own public appeals and even entering professions never before available to them, such as nursing. After the Civil War, women took the responsibility of reshaping their society. This thrust them into the public sphere on a national level. With each passing generation, benevolence gave women a voice. It enabled them to become more independent, and it enabled them to create importance in their lives. Additionally, women's benevolence forced society to see that there was a public place for women. Benevolence still exists in Charleston today. Although much of the caring for the poor is provided by government programs, the Ladies Benevolent Society is still working for the improvement of society.

NOTES

1. The primary sources I examined, such as minute books, did not discuss specifically whom the benevolent societies helped. They simply stressed that the recipients had to be "deserving." A more comprehensive examination of benevolence in nineteenth-century Charleston is Barbara Bellows, *Benevolence Among Slaveholders: Assisting the Poor in Charleston, 1670–1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993). It does not focus on women's benevolence specifically, but it does look at the different types of people—race, class, gender—who received benevolent aid in Charleston.
2. Margaret Simons Middleton, "A Sketch of the Ladies Benevolent Society," printed in the *City of Charleston Yearbook, 1941* (Charleston: Walker, Evans, and Cogswell, Co., 1942), 216–17.
3. *Ibid.*
4. "Ladies Fuel Society of Charleston, South Carolina", Ladies' Fuel Society Records, (1832–1986), South Carolina Historical Society.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Drew Gilpin Faust, "Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the Narratives of War," *Divided Houses*, ed. Catherine Clinton and Nina Silber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 174–75.
7. Mrs. A. T. Smythe, Miss M. B. Poppenheim, and Mrs. Thomas Taylor, eds, *South Carolina Women in the Confederacy* (Columbia, South Carolina: The State Company, 1903) 28–31.
8. There are a number of primary and secondary sources regarding women nurses in the Civil War. The best primary sources are women's diaries, such as Jean V. Berlin, *A Confederate Nurse: The Diary of Ada W. Bacot, 1860–1863* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1994); George Rable, ed, *A Southern Woman's Story: Phoebe Yates Pember* (Columbia, S.C.: University of

South Carolina Press, 2002); and John F. Marszalek, ed. *The Diary of Miss Emma Holmes, 1861–1866* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979). Secondary sources include Marilyn Mayer Culpepper, *Trials and Triumphs: Women of the Civil War* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1991); Drew Gilpin Faust, *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996); George C. Rable, *Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989); and Mary Elizabeth Massy, *Bonnet Brigades* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), to name a few.

9. June Murray Wells, "The Caretaker of the Dead: Mary Amaranthia Yates Snowden of Charleston, S.C.," printed in Mauriel Phillips Joslyn, *Valor and Lace: The Roles of Confederate Women, 1861–1865* (Murfreesboro, TN: Southern Heritage Press, 1996), offers a brief biography of Snowden. Ladies' Memorial Association Records, 1866–1913 (34/116), 1–2, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina.

10. John A. Simpson, *Edith D. Pope and Her Nashville Friends* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2003), 75.

Indian Leadership and Consensus Opinion in the Old Northwest Territory 1783–1795

Sarah E. Miller

On 14 August 1794, Little Turtle, war chief of the Miami and a leader of the Northwest Indian Confederacy, stood under the “Council Elm” along the Maumee River near Roche de Bout and expressed doubts about an impending battle against the Americans. He reflected on the recent Indian victories over United States armed forces led by Josiah Harmar in 1790 and by Arthur St. Clair in 1791, and asserted “we cannot expect the same good fortune to attend to us always.”¹ With concern he continued:

The pale faces come from where the sun rises, and they are many.
They are like the leaves of the trees. When the frost comes they
fall and are blown away, but when the sunshine comes again they
come back more plentiful than ever before.²

When Little Turtle uttered these words, an army of the United States under the leadership of Anthony Wayne had advanced to the main Indian villages at the Glaise—the confluence of the Auglaize and Maumee Rivers—and had established Fort Defiance. To the Indian council Wayne sent Christopher Miller, a recently repatriated Indian captive now in the service of the United States and accompanied by a released Indian prisoner, with a message to the Confederacy tribes. Wayne asserted his desire for peace and offered to return the seized Indian towns if the Confederacy agreed to negotiate, but he also ominously insisted “should war be their choice, that blood be upon their own heads.”³

The Indians assembled at the “Council Elm” represented a traditional Native American decision-making apparatus. Through their leaders each member of the tribes within the Confederacy could voice his own opinion. Decisions were based on consensus. No single leader had absolute authority and each had continually to prove himself in order to maintain respectability within his tribe and in the council. Little Turtle had led the Confederacy in many skirmishes and battles against the United States. While he was one of the leaders of the “hostile” faction hoping to repel the Americans from the lands north and west of the Ohio River and to develop an Indian nation in the Ohio country, on this day Little Turtle believed that fighting Wayne’s army would be disastrous. Despite his reputation as an excellent war chief, his recommendation for negotiation with the Americans was dismissed. Reports of the council

indicate that Little Turtle was rebuked for his “cowardice.” When another speaker asserted that “the Manitou gave us this country and he bids us bloody the trail of our enemies,” the warriors exploded with an exuberant war cry.⁴ Despite having one of the best reputations for understanding warfare and the American army, Little Turtle could not convince the Indian council to negotiate with Wayne rather than fight.

Unlike the hierarchical leadership in the army of the United States, Indian leaders could only suggest courses of action, not issue commands. On many occasions good advice was ignored or overridden. The result on this occasion was disastrous for the Confederacy. Little Turtle acquiesced to the will of the majority and fought with his warriors and his allies at the Battle of Fallen Timbers six days later. Their defeat led to the Treaty of Greenville, which ended Little Turtle’s and the Confederacy’s hopes that the Ohio River would become the border between the Indians and the Americans. This study will argue that the absence of strong unified political leadership hampered responses by the Northwest Indian Confederacy to the encroachment by the United States on their lands, and ultimately played a role in the Indians’ military defeat.⁵

Based on confederacies formed after the French and Indian War and during the American Revolution, the Northwest Indian Confederacy developed after the Treaty of Paris (1783) left the Indians without official allies. During the American Revolution, many Indians, e.g., the Miami, Shawnee, and most of the Iroquois, allied with the British, but after the war they were left alone to deal with the now independent United States. The British had abandoned their allies, not even mentioning them in the treaty. In 1783, an American official met with the Shawnee Indians and bluntly declared “your Fathers the English have made Peace with us for themselves, but forgot you their Children, who Fought with them, and neglected you like Bastards.” This meeting further confirmed rumors among the Indians that the British had lost the war and had abandoned lands south of the Great Lakes. Literate Indians had read excerpts of the Treaty of Paris in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, but the British themselves had said very little about the peace except to instruct the Indians to cease raids on the American settlements.⁶

Once the outcome of the Revolution was generally understood, the Indians in western New York, western Pennsylvania, the Ohio country, and beyond then took it upon themselves to deal with the Americans by forming a Confederacy. In early September 1783, a council of the Northwest Indians—including the eastern tribes (e.g., the Iroquois, Wyandot, and Delaware) and the western tribes (e.g., the Miami, Shawnee, Wabash, Ojibwa, Ottawa, and Pottawattamie who inhabited what is now Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin)—met at Sandusky. Hostility toward the

United States remained high and news of the Treaty of Paris angered the Native Americans. Meeting with British agent Sir John Johnson, the Indians were told that Great Britain “had made peace with the Americans, and had given them the land possessed by the British on this continent,” but not Indian lands.⁷ The Americans, however, believed they had beaten the British and now held sway over the Indians; therefore, the Northwest Territory—from the Ohio River to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi—belonged to the United States.

Despite being, as the Indians declared, “thunderstruck” by the British accommodation of the Americans, the Indians recognized that a unified front of all nations was necessary to establish peace with the Americans. The Iroquois, led by the Mohawk war chief Joseph Brant, addressed the Confederacy with a wampum belt to “bind [their] Heart and minds” together, and declared that all decisions should be determined “by the voice of the whole.”⁸ The tribes consenting to Brant’s proposal established the principle that all actions of the Confederacy would be discussed and a consensus decision would determine Confederacy policy regarding diplomatic negotiations, treaties, or war.

The Sandusky Conference united the Indians of the Northwest Territory. They agreed to work together regarding all meetings with the Americans. The conclusion of a new treaty between the Confederacy and the United States was first set for the summer of 1784 at Fort Stanwix in New York. The late arrival of American commissioners caused the negotiations to be delayed until the fall, and most of the representatives of the western peoples, specifically the Shawnee, Ottawa, and Miami, went home for hunting, as also did the Wyandot and Delaware. During subsequent negotiations at Fort Stanwix in October, the American commissioners asked the Iroquois to propose a boundary which would “prevent future difficulties or disputes.” In considering a boundary between the United States and the Indians, the Iroquois relied on the prior Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768), which provided the Ohio River as the division between the races. To the Iroquois, and to all of the other Indians of the Northwest Territory, this was a fixed, permanent and obvious line.⁹ After threats and coercion, however, the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1784 signed a very different treaty that gave trans-Ohio lands to the United States. A few months later, American commissioners met primarily with the Delaware and Wyandot, two peoples inhabiting what is now western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio, to negotiate the Treaty of Fort McIntosh. After reading aloud the Treaty of Paris that indicated that the British had abandoned their Indian allies, the commissioners read the recently concluded Treaty of Fort Stanwix, which had been signed only by the Iroquois and, in effect, had broken the year-old Northwest Indian Confederacy. The Treaty of Fort McIntosh signed by the

Delaware, Wyandot, and others in January 1785 surrendered these Indians' claims to more lands in eastern and southern Ohio. Only then did the American commissioners recognize the need to meet with the Shawnee who were in physical possession of some of the land in question. After a long delay and several threats, the few Shawnee present at the negotiations at Fort Finney in early 1786 signed away to the United States certain lands north of the Ohio River, namely in southwestern Ohio and southern Indiana.¹⁰

Despite advice from Joseph Brant and the rousing display of unity at the Sandusky council in 1783, the United States had managed to divide the Confederacy with three separate treaties. Representatives of the Northwest Indian Confederacy met again in 1786 to deny the validity of all three treaties. The United States, the Indians claimed, had not complied with the Council of Sandusky's request that representatives of all affected Indian peoples be present to conclude any treaty. The united tribes asked for another treaty conference, which was finally called for 1788 at Fort Harmar.¹¹

In April 1788, the Confederacy met to consult before the meeting at Fort Harmar. The Indians struggled to maintain unity on the issue of a land boundary. The Iroquois were joined by the Wyandot and Delaware in proposing the cession of some land in order to establish a compromised, but fixed, boundary line. This concession was better, they believed, than entering—as Brant expressed it—“headlong into a destructive war.” Also, as the easternmost tribes of the Confederacy, the lands of these three peoples were the most vulnerable. They understood that if they tried to stop the surveyors, their land, villages, and families would be destroyed first.¹² However, the western tribes, particularly the Shawnee, Miami, and Wabash, insisted on the Ohio River boundary. They had not yet been affected by the onslaught of settlers, and thus had the luxury of remaining uncompromising.

When the Wyandot leadership tried to persuade the western Indians to consider a compromise, the latter refused. In a letter to Henry Knox, General Arthur St. Clair described how Little Turtle of the Miami flatly rejected the idea:

[T]he Wyandot presented them [=the western nations] with a large string of wampum, taking hold of one end of it and desiring them to hold fast by the other, which they refused to do; that they then laid it on the shoulder of their principal chief [Little Turtle], recommending to them to be at peace with the Americans, and to do as the Six Nations [of the Iroquois] and the others did, but, without making any answer he turned himself on one side and let it fall to the ground.

In discarding the string of wampum, the western Indians not only rejected the idea of a compromise boundary, but also insulted the Wyandot and others who wanted to negotiate with the Americans. Since a majority of the council preferred not to abandon the Ohio River as a boundary, leadership of the Confederacy passed to the western nations. Little Turtle of the Miami and Blue Jacket of the Shawnee led their tribes and others in resisting the encroachment of Americans into the Ohio country.¹³

Internal discord over how to deal with the Americans had splintered the Confederacy. Angered by the inability of the council to reach a compromise, most of the Iroquois went home. The Shawnee, Miami, and other western nations refused to attend the subsequent talks at Fort Harmar because the American commissioners would not consider an Ohio River boundary. The Treaty of Fort Harmar was concluded in 1789, but it did not truly represent the will of the entire Northwest Indian Confederacy. Many American officials recognized the fact. The few minor chiefs who attended and signed the treaty had only further eroded the hope for a united Indian front. Major Ebenezer Denny described the signing of the treaty, which he witnessed, as “the last act of the farce,” its obvious weakness the lack of adequate Indian representation. Although nearly six hundred Indians attended the treaty signing, St. Clair was informed there was “not a sufficient number to dispose of the Country belonging to so many different Nations—neither were those people authorized to transact business of consequence.” General Josiah Harmar wrote to Major John F. Hamtramck, “You will observe that none of the [w]estern Indians attended.”¹⁴

The Northwest Indian Confederacy, though still divided on the issue of whether to negotiate with the Americans, believed that lack of full representation from the entire Confederacy rendered the Treaty of Fort Harmar, and the others before it, invalid. The United States government decided that since negotiations had not been accepted, a great show of military force was needed to achieve the capitulation of the Indians. This, however, proved overconfident, as armies led by Harmar and St. Clair were handily defeated by united Confederacy forces in the Battles of the Maumee (October 1790) and of the Wabash (November 1791), events that made the Native Americans elated and confident. Despite differences of opinions, the Indians had readily joined together under arms in large numbers to protect their homes, fields and lands.¹⁵

Even in the wake of these two victories, however, it soon became obvious that Indian internal politics, with its central principle of consensus decision-making within the Confederacy, could cause problems. Without an absolute leader, respected war chiefs and esteemed civil chiefs could only individually suggest strategies that then needed to be approved by consensus. When St. Clair’s army no longer posed an

impending threat, the momentum of victory was lost as the Indians needed to meet in council to determine further action. Hence, instead of destroying the remaining United States troops, the Indians—as protocol prescribed—entered council during mid-November 1791 for debate on future actions.¹⁶

Speaking in council, Egushaway, an Ottawa war leader, asserted the necessity of continued armed resistance. He declared that the United States would not back down from its determination to subdue the Indians in the Northwest Territory. Even though the Indians had “feasted the wolves . . . with the carcasses [sic] of [their] enemy,” he urged the Indians not to relax after the victory. His speech against the Americans called the previous treaties “pen and ink witch-craft” filled with threats. He indicated that peace could exist only when the Americans requested it or left Indian country altogether. Unlike what some leaders had suggested, recent Indian victories meant that they should not to be the ones to sue for peace. Egushaway reminded his listeners, “our wise men have always told us never to treat of peace with an enemy advancing and holding his tomahawk over our heads!” The Indians must “act like men and as warriors,” and he proposed an invitation to other nations to join them in a continued war against the Americans.¹⁷

The peace faction then voiced its opinion. Its unrecorded spokesman argued that despite their vague promises, the British had never actually aided the Indians in war. In any future confrontation with the Americans, the Indians could not expect help from the British, and the Indians would need much assistance. He asserted that the United States had a large supply of men, and that even when their soldiers died in battle, more “arise like locust from the earth!” The peace faction argued that although the Indians had prevailed in the two recent battles, the United States army could, and would, return with a huge quantity of men. This debate in council, although fully satisfying Indian etiquette, stalled for many months the momentum of the victories over the Americans. The army of the Confederacy remained inactive while its leaders were divided by debate and unable to capitalize on the devastating victory over St. Clair.¹⁸

When the Americans made peace overtures in 1792, the Confederacy met in council at the polyglot Indian villages of the Glaiize. The council was again divided roughly between the eastern and western factions, but factions existed within each tribe as well. Many warriors of the Shawnee, Cherokee, Mingo, Delaware, Ottawa, and Miami—led by Blue Jacket, Little Turtle, and Buckongahela—demanded the Ohio River boundary. The Iroquois, led by Mohawk chief Joseph Brant and Seneca chief Red Jacket, continuing working to persuade the council to treat with the Americans. Brant even came to council promoting a Muskingum River compromise line. No consensus was reached.¹⁹

As an actual meeting at the Maumee River scheduled for summer 1793 between the Indians and Americans neared, many western Indians again hoped to organize a united front seeking the Ohio River as the boundary. In June, the Confederacy held another council at the Glaize with massive representation from western nations and participation by the southern nations (primarily, but not exclusively, Cherokee) and the Seven Nations of Canada. The Iroquois, who also attended, had previously met among themselves at Niagara and again decided to offer the Muskingum River compromise boundary. To them, like the other eastern nations living on lands surrounded by American settlers, the cession of another portion of land was inconsequential when war would have an immediate and devastating impact on their villages.²⁰

When the Iroquois arrived at the Glaize, however, they discovered that many members of the Shawnee, Delaware, and Miami who hoped to bar Americans from the Ohio country were holding private councils that excluded the Six Nations. The Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Pottawattamie, who often proposed negotiations with the Americans, were also barred from these meetings. The Confederacy council split between the “hard core belligerents,” as historian John Sudge labeled those who remained firm on the Ohio River boundary, and those willing to negotiate and accept a compromise boundary within the Ohio country.²¹

The Indian victories over Harmar and St. Clair emboldened many council participants to claim the Ohio River line established at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768). Those “hard core belligerents” holding secretive private meetings sent a written demand for the Ohio River boundary to the American commissioners without consulting the others. Sudge describes the document as “impolitic, tactless, and unrealistic. It was almost foolish.”²² Although the “hard core belligerents” represented this stipulation as the position of the whole Confederacy, it was not. Upset about his exclusion and the fact that a compromise was never seriously considered, Brant had refused to sign the ultimatum.

The Confederacy lacked a recognized, authoritative leader, and its tradition for free debate and consensus-building led to a confused policy regarding the Americans. Although the western tribes, with such prominent leaders as Blue Jacket and Little Turtle, fiercely believed in the capacity of the Confederacy to retain the Ohio country, Brant and Red Jacket, two formidable Iroquois warriors, challenged the necessity for demanding the Ohio River as the boundary. Despite the Confederacy’s shared concerns, each tribe, or faction thereof, also looked out for its own best interest. Obviously the Confederacy was splintered and the Americans recognized it.²³

When no agreement was reached between the Confederacy and the Americans, Wayne and his army continued his advance deep into the Ohio country. Then

another breach in Indian unity occurred in January 1794, when Confederacy leaders authorized four Delaware Indians to confer with Wayne at Fort Greenville for the release of prisoners. The Delaware emissaries, who were influenced by the peace faction within their tribe, in addition offered to make peace with the Americans. When the delegation returned with Wayne's requirement for peace, the Confederacy chiefs were outraged, but protocol required the issue to be brought to council. The Shawnee insisted on resistance and most of the Ottawa, Pottawatomie, Ojibwa followed their lead. Peace factions split the Miami and Delaware. Nonetheless, a large majority affirmed the Shawnee position, and so the Confederacy made no further attempt to negotiate with Wayne about peace.²⁴

As the American army continued to advance toward the Indian villages, the Confederacy reached a consensus to take a stand against the incursion. In June 1794, they decided to attack the American supply lines, the most vulnerable aspect of the army. Moving south from the Glaize and Maumee Rapids, warriors from throughout the Northwest Territory planned to rendezvous with the core Confederacy forces at a place called Old Fallen Timbers.²⁵ The Iroquois did not participate.

The arrival of warriors from the Ottawa, Ojibwa and Pottawattamie not only bolstered the Confederacy's manpower, but also altered the dynamics of command. The Shawnee, with the support of the Miami and Wyandot, had resolved to circle around Forts Recovery and Greenville to cut off the supply line leading to the main army. The leading war chiefs, including Blue Jacket and Little Turtle, encouraged this. However, when the war chiefs met in council a different decision was reached, for the Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Pottawattamie favored attacking the nearest target, Fort Recovery. Despite resistance in council from several tribes, these three nations prevailed. This outcome likely would have been altered if the Delaware led by Buckongahela had arrived on time, but they were late because the warriors were drunk in Detroit.²⁶

Accepting the consensus decision, the Confederacy advanced to Fort Recovery early on the morning of 30 June. As the supply convoy returning to Fort Greenville advanced about one half mile from the fort, the Indians attacked. It was an easy target. Several hundred packhorses and mules and many soldiers fell victim to the Indians. Exhilaration over the victorious attack on the convoy prompted many warriors, primarily the young men of the Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Pottawattamie, to pursue the survivors back to the fort. Although seasoned warriors, especially the war chiefs, recognized the futility of an attack on the fort, they went along with this majority action. Protected within Fort Recovery, the soldiers could easily fire upon the Indians visible in the cleared areas around the fort. The attackers ultimately failed to take the fort.²⁷

With the withdrawal from Fort Recovery, the factions of the Confederacy turned on each other. The Shawnee blamed the Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Pottawattamie for the ill-fated attack. The accused groups blamed the rest of the Confederacy for failing to support them. The angry Ottawa, Ojibwa and Pottawattamie warriors split from the main body of the Confederacy and headed home. Feeling they had honored their war belts in the recent fight, other tribes also left the Confederacy forces. Historian Isabel Kelsay describes the situation thus: “the slow attrition of numbers continued for weeks. Like an unquenchable bleeding from a mortal wound which foretells the end, the Indians were already defeated by their own customs.”²⁸ After the repulse of the Indian attack on Fort Recovery, Wayne’s troops advanced to the Glaiize. It was then, as noted at the outset of this study, that Little Turtle expressed doubts about continuing to fight the Americans at a disadvantage. The decision to fight at Fallen Timbers on 20 August 1794 led to the rout of the Indian Confederacy’s warriors by Wayne’s army and eventually resulted in the Treaty of Greenville (1795) and the Indians’ loss of much of the Ohio country.

Indian leadership in the Northwest Territory existed as a balance of respect and individuality. No leader had absolute authority and each had continually to prove himself in order to maintain respectability. There are no easy explanations for the decline of the Northwest Indian Confederacy, and it is obvious that prominent leaders sometimes presented reasonable, viable, and valuable policy advice in dealing with the Americans. Native American political practices sometimes limited the influence of able and experienced leaders in favor of a consensus of less experienced chiefs and warriors. This study suggests that policy-making structures and procedures among the Northwest Indians, which historians hitherto have assessed positively as expressions of trans-tribal unity, can also be deemed a crucial disadvantage in the Confederacy’s ultimate failure in its confrontation with the United States.

NOTES

1. The quotation is from Bert Anson, *The Miami Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 129. See also John Sudgen, *Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 167–68; Isabell Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant 1743–1807: Man of Two Worlds*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 510.
2. Randolph C. Downes, *The Conquest*, Lucas County Historical Series (Toledo: The Historical Society of Northwestern Ohio, 1948), 57.
3. *American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, from the First session of first to the third session of the Thirteenth Congress: commencing March 3, 1789 and ending March 3, 1815: Indian Affairs* (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 1:490.

4. Downes, *The Conquest*, 1:59.
5. Studies of the Northwest Territory during the Early National Period have traditionally focused on the military tactics or the national politics of the United States; see, for example, Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy 1783–1812* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967; reprint University of Oklahoma Press, 1995) and Wiley Sword, *President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790–1795* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985). Recent scholarship, however, has more closely examined Native American interaction with the United States and the conflict over control of land. In this connection see Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, Gregory Evan Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations and the British Empire* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), and Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). My own research has focused on the complexity and fluidity of Indian leadership, and draws especially on the scholarship of Gregory Evans Dowd and John Sugden.
6. Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 174; *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection* (Lansing: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 1874–1915), 20:127–28; John D. Barnhart and Dorothy L. Riker, *Indiana to 1816: The Colonial Period* (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau and Indiana Historical Society, 1971), note on 239.
7. Charles Elihu Slocum, *The Ohio Country between the Years 1783 and 1815. Including Military Operations that Twice Saved to the United States the Country West of the Alleghany Mountains after the Revolutionary War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, the Knickerbocker Press, 1910), 22–23.
8. Randolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795* (University of Pittsburgh Press 1940; reprint, London: Baker and Taylor International, 1989), 279–80. The conceptual framework for this newly established unity derived in part from the model of the Iroquois Confederacy. See William Fenton, *The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*; Daniel Richter and James H. Merrill, eds. *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America 1600–1800* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987); Daniel Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 1969).
9. Neville B. Craig, *The Olden Time: A monthly publication devoted to the Preservation of Documents and other Authentic Information in relation to the Early Explorations and the Settlement and Improvement of the Country around the Head of the Ohio* (Pittsburgh: Wright and Charlton, 1848; reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1976), 2:414, 417, 422.
10. For more information on the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort McIntosh, and Fort Finney see Downes, *Council Fires*, 288–302, and Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy 1783–1812* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967; reprint Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 16–24.
11. Additional information on these Indian Treaties can also be found in Downes, *Council Fires*, 299–309, and Horsman, *Expansion*, 42–49.

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12. Downes, *Council Fires*, 302–04; William F. Stone, *Life of Brant* (New York: A. V. Blake, 1866, reprint New York: Kraus, 1969), 2:278; William Henry Smith, ed., *The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Service of Arthur St. Clair: Soldier of the Revolutionary War, President of the Continental Congress, and Governor of the North-Western Territory* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), 1:44.
 13. For St. Clair's letter, see Downes, *Council Fires*, 304. See also Ebenezer Denny, *Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny: An Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars with an Introductory Memoir*, Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution Series (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 233; Smith, 1:102–03, 107; Downes, *The Conquest*, 37–38.
 14. Denny, *Military Journal*, 334; Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 425–26; Downes, *The Conquest*, 39; for Harmar's letter, see Gale Thornbrough, ed., *Outpost on the Wabash: Letters of Brigadier General Josiah Harmar and Major John Francis Hamtramck* (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1957), 152; for St. Clair's remark, see Luke Justin Kiefer, "Gentleman, Rogues, and Savages: United States-Native American Relations in the Old Northwest Territory, 1783–1812" (M.A. thesis, The Ohio State University, 1996), 31.
 15. For accounts of the battles see Sword, *President Washington's Indian War*, 79–207, and Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 99–127.
 16. Colin C. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British Indian Relations, 1783–1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 16.
 17. *Minutes of Debate in Council on the banks of the Ottawa River (Commonly Called the Miami of the Lake) November, 1791* (Philadelphia: William Young, 1792), 6, 11, 13, 18, 19.
 18. *Minutes of Debate in Council*, 20–22.
 19. Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 133; Earnest A. Cruikshank, ed., *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe* (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923–1931), 5:7; *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection*, 24:456.
 20. Stone, *Life of Brant*, 2:339; Reginald Horsman, *Matthew Elliott: British Indian Agent*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 74, 89.
 21. Joseph Brant's Journal in Cruikshank, *Correspondence of Simcoe*, 2:5–7; Sword, *President Washington's Indian War*, 42; Horsman, *Matthew Elliott*, 79, 80.
 22. Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 153; Horsman, *Matthew Elliott*, 84; Cruikshank, *Correspondence of Simcoe*, 2:7–12.
 23. Horsman, *Matthew Elliott*, 86–87; Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 502; Larry L. Nelson, *A Man of Distinction among Them: Alexander McKee and The Ohio Country Frontier 1754–1799* (Kent: Kent State University, 1999), 164–65; Colin G. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet*, 73.
 24. Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 157–58.
 25. Nelson, *A Man of Distinction*, 169. This Old Fallen Timbers is near Lake St. Mary's or Grand Lake; it is not the location of the subsequent Battle of Fallen Timbers.
 26. Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 164.
 27. For more details on the attack of Fort Recovery, see Sword, *President Washington's War*, 272–86, and Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 159–71.
 28. Sugden, *Blue Jacket*, 167–68; Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 510.
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Changing Times: Occupational Change and Temporal Perception among Old Order Amish

Julie Anna Phillips

Elkhart and LaGrange Counties in Indiana, and Lancaster County in Pennsylvania feature large Amish populations whose old-fashioned way of life attracts thousands of curious tourists annually. These Old Order Amish settlements appear to be pure anachronisms in a fast-paced, technologically-savvy age.¹ Nevertheless, a closer look at Amish culture demonstrates that these communities are far from static. Contrary to popular belief, the Amish do not structure their lifestyle according to a strict principle of resistance to modernity. Rather, Amish elders carefully evaluate each proposed change for its practicality and support of the Amish way of life. After extended visits to several Amish farms, historian Thomas Gallagher noted that while he was surprised by the collection of “many seemingly anachronistic items,” the Amish were not at all bothered by the odd assemblage. Furthermore, the addition of modern equipment to a farm does not guarantee that it will be used for all of its potential purposes: Amish culture dictates its proper usage as well. For instance, a farmer may use a tractor in the barn, but never in the fields. While the “English,” or non-Amish, puzzle over this “riddle of Amish culture,” the Amish struggle to maintain a balance of tradition and progress, of cautious stability and necessary change.² A recent shift in occupational patterns from agriculture to industry and business is transforming the temporal outlook of Amish society and, consequently, Amish culture itself. The following study, which is by no means an exhaustive analysis of Amish culture, will explore the progression of this occupational shift and focus specifically on its effect on the Amish perception of time.

Amish culture is traditionally agrarian. The farm is an ideal place for maintaining separation from the world and drawing closer to God through His creation.³ In fact, agriculture is so fundamental to Amish culture that “those who cannot obtain a farm may find it hard to remain Amish.”⁴ During the mid-twentieth century, however, the Amish found that maintaining their agricultural base was growing increasingly difficult.⁵ Children of traditionally large Amish families could not find enough farmland to purchase. With increased industrialization and suburbanization, land prices skyrocketed while the availability of land diminished. In addition, the farming economy lacked the stability necessary for a beginning farmer. The need for land was

accentuated as the Amish population continued to grow. The Amish valued large families, steadily averaging about seven children per family throughout the twentieth century. Furthermore, most Amish chose to remain Amish rather than leave their community for the “world,” and the majority of Amish young people joined the church upon arriving at a suitable age of decision. Amish communities retained as much as 93 percent of their membership, and as members continued to raise large families, their numbers increased exponentially. In the meantime, land prices per acre rose from \$300 to \$400 in the 1940s to \$4,500 in the 1980s, and the cost of equipment and livestock increased as well.⁶

In an attempt to preserve their agrarian culture, Amish farmers migrated to more land-rich settlements, compromised with more advanced technology to increase their productivity, or experimented with highly marketable organic products.⁷ When these efforts were not sufficient, many Amish left their farms for alternative work. While most non-farm laborers stated their intentions to “work off” only long enough to earn the funds to buy a farm, others decided to abandon agriculture permanently.⁸ Whether by choice or necessity, the percentage of Amish farming families decreased dramatically. By 2002, the percentage of men under the age of 65 who still farmed had dropped to 44 percent in Lancaster County and less than 20 percent in Elkhart and LaGrange counties.⁹

Prohibited from entering factory work by church leaders, Amish settlements in Lancaster County chose entrepreneurship as the chief alternative to non-farm work. A primary Amish objection to factory work is that it forces the father to be absent from the home for a large part of the day, potentially preventing him from actively participating in crucial aspects of family life or training his children for a trade. A family business, while not as ideal as a family farm, does allow family members to work together and train their children to work diligently.¹⁰ Many of these businesses developed from work already a part of Amish life, including carpentry, woodworking, baked goods, and crafts. For some Amish, creating a new business simply required expanding small-scale sales in which they had engaged for years. Others ventured into this world of supply and demand for the first time. Within a short time, Amish entrepreneurs demonstrated remarkable success in their endeavors.¹¹

By contrast to the Lancaster County Amish, factory work emerged as an acceptable alternative to farming in the Amish settlements of Elkhart-LaGrange. During the 1960s, Amish leaders there hesitantly allowed Amish men to work at a nearby Mennonite-owned factory, since the Mennonites were willing to accommodate the requirements of the Amish culture and religious schedule.¹² As the move proved successful, the number of Amish factory workers increased rapidly. By 1988, factory workers comprised 43 percent of this Amish population.¹³

Simultaneous with the move from an agrarian lifestyle to factory or business work, the Amish perception of time has undergone slow but significant changes. For the Amish, the fast pace of modern society reflects the “worldliness” rejected in Scripture. Even the “world” recognizes that “speed is . . . the emblem of the postmodern age,” and Amish culture scrupulously avoids it.¹⁴ One Amish girl described farm life this way:

I live in the smaller world, loving the quiet life, but distantly can hear the clamor from the outside world. At times I might pause to envy what looks like an easier life, filled with every luxury, knowing that in the world things are moving at a faster speed. Always my world calls me back as I realize that within my way of life lies the peaceful beauty of unchanged time.¹⁵

Accordingly, Amish life purposely adopts a slower pace. “Anyone stepping into Amish society suddenly feels time expand and relax,” Donald Kraybill observes. Amish activities, from transportation to schedules, “create a temporal order with a slower, more deliberate rhythm.”¹⁶

For example, the use of the horse enforces Amish “slow time.” But even this practice is waning. A buggy moves at a five to eight miles-an-hour pace, and each trip requires extra time to hitch and unhitch the horse.¹⁷ While the Amish have “uniformly spurned car ownership in the first quarter of the twentieth century” and continue to use horses and carriage for road travel, there has been a “rising practice” of hiring vehicles for business travel. Many Amish hitch rides with co-workers or ride bicycles to commute to non-farm jobs.¹⁸ But when Amish use motor vehicles for “leisure trips that can hardly pass for business purposes,” their leaders face difficult decisions for defining the boundaries of automobile use.¹⁹

The increased use of advanced technology also affects Amish “slow” time. In the midst of technological changes during the early 1900s, the Amish firmly opposed new technology as fostering individualism and dehumanizing work relations.²⁰ Over the years, however, Amish communities have accepted many technological improvements. Most Amish leaders permit their members to rent or use advanced equipment as long as they do not own it. Carpentry shops and repair shops may own battery-operated or air-powered machinery that speed up work. Some Amish businesses hire a non-Amish person for computer work, and many Amish offices feature a battery-operated calculator, fax machine, and photocopier.²¹ Others push for acceptance of cell phones to cut communication time and distance short.²²

An increased awareness of rationalized time accompanies occupational change in Amish communities. Typical of most farming communities, agrarian Amish measure

time according to task, season, and lunar-solar phenomena.²³ Farmers, notes E. P. Thompson, follow “‘natural’ work-rhythms” that accompany close association with animals, land, and weather. They possess a task-oriented perception of time in which the task to be accomplished takes precedence over the time required to accomplish it. The work day expands and contracts as tasks increase or decrease in number, intensity, and urgency.²⁴ Each season requires different tasks, such as planting, slaughtering animals, and harvesting. Since they do not use electricity, Amish families do the majority of their work during daylight.²⁵

Of course, agrarian Amish do not ignore clock time. Punctuality is a virtue in their own culture. Various daily activities, such as milking or mealtimes, take place at specified hours, as do school and preaching service times.²⁶ Nevertheless, agrarian Amish do not demonstrate a particular dependence on clock time. Fabienne Randaxhe notes:

They thus avoid being intimately and continually bound to the regular and inescapable unwinding of time in hours, minutes and seconds. These short-length divisions, hardly relevant in Amish thought, are a source of misunderstandings with outsiders.²⁷

Thus, to the Amish farmer an excessive attention to clock time is a characteristic of the “world,” not of Amish culture. To accentuate this separation, many Amish even follow standard time, refusing to adjust their clocks to modern daylight saving time.²⁸

In the Elkhart-LaGrange settlements, the rigid clock time of the factory forced Amish to measure time, not by task, but by hours and minutes.²⁹ By punching a time clock, workers declare their agreement to labor for a specified period of time: no more, no less. The factory clock also regulates lunch breaks, limiting them not only to a particular point in the day, but also for a specified period of time. Similarly, Amish businesses have abandoned agrarian time schedules to “follow typical business routines with fixed hours.”³⁰ Shops open for specific hours during the day and occasionally during the evenings. Instead of following the traditional agrarian habit of spontaneous visits, businessmen schedule appointments for exact times. In addition, their regular interaction with the public forces many Amish to comply with daylight saving time.

Amish calendar time is also affected by occupational change. Because the Amish religious and social calendars differ from the secular calendar, Amish struggle to reconcile them. The Amish social calendar generally adheres to agrarian rhythms and tradition. Weddings, for instance, are traditionally held on weekdays in the fall, when many companies are in the midst of pre-Christmas rush orders. Furthermore,

the Amish religious calendar counts certain dates, such as Pentecost Monday and Ascension Day, as holidays, while ignoring some secular holidays, such as Independence Day.³¹

Amish involved in industrial work usually search carefully for an employer who will accommodate the Amish calendars. In any event, part of an Amish community's choice of occupation lies in the unique characteristics of that community's culture. The Amish of the Elkhart-LaGrange community found factory work a viable option not only because factory owners were willing to make adjustments for the Amish calendar, but also because the Amish in these settlements "have a slimmer ritual calendar than their fellow church members in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and thus can more easily accommodate industrial production schedules without compromising churchly duties."³²

The Lancaster County Amish have found self-enterprise a superior option to industrial work in terms of scheduling work around their cultural calendars. Businessmen can "control the terms and conditions of their work, [so] they are able to flex with traditional patterns and to honor Amish holy days. Being able to control their time and their ethnic calendar has permitted a smoother transition from farm to business."³³ The Amish calendar still conflicts with common business schedules, such as tourist season, but Amish business owners are able to negotiate such schedule conflicts with their employees more easily than many factories.

The Amish belief in keeping the Sabbath day holy—that is, not working more than the minimum required labor on Sunday—conflicts with the weekly schedule of the secular workplace. The Amish week contains six days of labor and one Sabbath day of rest, but their worship schedule is bi-weekly. Amish communities meet to worship every other Sunday, with families rotating the responsibility of hosting the gathering. Some Amish families attend services at a neighboring community during their "off" Sunday.³⁴ In most cases, secular businesses and factories consider Sundays to be regular workdays. The Amish refusal to work on Sundays occasionally causes misunderstandings between a non-Amish employer and Amish employee, or between an Amish businessman and his non-Amish customers.³⁵

Another result of the occupational shift is the changing perception of time ownership. The Amish farmer follows the traditional Christian idea that "time is primarily theological time" in that it belongs primarily to God.³⁶ Daylight, the movement of the stars, weather, and seasons determine man's tasks, and man controls none of these.³⁷ In contrast, the factory worker and businessman work according to man-made clock time rather than the rhythms of nature. If time can be measured, it can be in some sense manipulated and controlled. Using the mechanism of the clock,

man can seemingly bring the forces of nature under his control with “an imposed, artificially contrived schedule.”³⁸ Consequently, clock-driven occupations result in a greater sense of personal time ownership.

The idea of time ownership manifests itself most clearly in the ownership of timepieces. The only clocks in traditional Amish communities had been located in private homes, which generally each possessed only one wall clock in the main living area.³⁹ Now, however, Amish offices and homes may contain several battery-operated clocks at convenient locations, and even some carriages feature clocks and speedometers.⁴⁰ Some Amish own pocket watches, but they are not permitted to own wristwatches, since they are considered jewelry. Unbaptized Amish youth often demonstrate their rebellion by wearing wristwatches, signaling that they are “in sync” with modern society.⁴¹

A changing perception of leisure time also resulted from the changing occupations in the Amish community. A task-oriented farming community demonstrates little “demarcation between ‘work’ and ‘life,’” and farmers find “no great sense of conflict between labour and ‘passing the time of day.’”⁴² Unless enough workers are available to rotate responsibilities, a farmer takes his leisure between chores and seasonal tasks. To an extent, his schedule is flexible enough to accommodate community events, but the flexibility extends only between necessary morning and evening chores.⁴³ Furthermore, a farmer can never “get away” from his job. If the cows need medical treatment, the farmer takes care of the problem regardless of the time of day or night.⁴⁴ In addition, farming demands long hours, usually sixteen-hour days. Amish farmers work seven days per week all year without a vacation, except for doing minimal labor on the Sabbath.

The schedule for a factory or business, in contrast, creates a clearer division between work and leisure and allows for more leisure time as a whole. Factory workers labor according to a strict schedule, and the beginning and end of a work day is clearly delineated. After punching out for the day, a factory worker’s time is his own. Many Amish deplore the fact that Amish youth have adopted this separation between work and leisure. One Amish writer laments,

Where does the blame really lie when young people work away from home and are taught that anyone who has worked eight hours has put in a day and is entitled to take it easy during the hours that are left? Most times there would be something useful these young people could be doing.⁴⁵

Agrarian ideas of leisure are closely tied to work. When a tourist asked how the Amish entertained themselves, Amishman Eli Stoltzfus replied, “We farm.” He explained

further that the sight of fertile soil, frisky horses, and Amish children at work is true entertainment. Farming Amish often spend their leisure time simply working, and many favorite social events—quilting bees, barn raisings, and auctions, for example—are work activities.⁴⁶

In contrast, non-farming Amish have gradually accepted modern views of leisure that have evolved from the hegemony of clock time. “Free time,” Barbara Adam asserts, is “derived from commodified work time . . . a *not-work* time” that exists only within the context of clock-driven labor.⁴⁷ Popular non-work activities such as fishing, shopping, eating in restaurants, and traveling have now become commonplace in the Amish community. Kraybill notes that “more [Amish] people now use the word ‘vacation’ to describe their extended travels,” thus signaling a “subtle but significant shift in Amish conceptions of time.” A vacation signifies a freedom from work time and emphasizes personal possession of time, concepts which inherently contradict the Amish work ethic and emphasis on communal values.⁴⁸

An increased awareness of clock time and business practices in the Amish community have resulted in a greater perception of the monetary value of time. Traditional agrarian culture relies more on weather and an intelligent use of available resources than on time to bring sufficient produce for subsistence and reasonable profit. Amish farmers assist each other *gratis* with small and large tasks, and Amish children work on the family farm without pay.⁴⁹ Thus Amish farmers frequently see profit in larger and better crops for their livestock, but less often in significant monetary gain. One of them succinctly describes the connection between the spiritual realm of salvation and earthly farming tasks thus: “those who do God’s work will get God’s pay.”⁵⁰

In factories and businesses, however, income ties directly to time. The factory worker receives wages according to the exact number of hours and minutes he labors. “Surplus value and profit cannot be established without reference to time.”⁵¹ Consequently, the labor he does must be quick and efficient, using the time to its fullest value in order to bring the greatest profit.⁵² One Amish factory worker admitted his difficulty in keeping his temper when “so many people work together in the same spot, trying to get things done . . . and they try to rush me.”⁵³

Amish businessmen have also absorbed the idea of time as money. Some shops stay open extra evening hours to accommodate additional customers, apparently earning sufficient revenue to justify the costs of kerosene lamplight or, in a rented building, electrical bills. These businessmen demonstrate a clear understanding of the close relationship between time and money. For example, after a two-hour interview with reporters, one Amish businessman demanded “a small contribution for my time now, seeing as I spent so long with you and haven’t gotten any work done.”

Interestingly, this carpenter-businessman was a former dairy farmer who had been led—providentially, according to his interpretation—to “another occupation.”⁵⁴ Kraybill and Nolt note how another Amish shopkeeper carefully “calculated that if eight shop workers waste several seconds with each move, it adds up to a \$5,760 yearly loss for the owner”—teaching a clear principle that to save time is to save money. The new “world of Amish entrepreneurs is driven by calculation, competition, specialization, and individuation—it is[,] in short, a modern world.”⁵⁵ One step at a time, the traditionally “pre-modern” Amish community is adopting the fast, rationalized time consciousness of the modern “world.”

Researchers of Amish culture have studied the occupational shift and its effects on the Amish lifestyle, but few have examined the effect of this shift on Amish time perception in particular. This paper, admittedly limited in its scope, has explored in greater depth the relationship between and change in work and time consciousness in Amish culture. But a broader investigation still remains to be done regarding various other aspects of Amish culture affected by work and time, for example, the pace of learning in Amish schools and the length and character of worship services.

The rationale for the Amish way of life could best be summarized in one Biblical passage: “Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you” (II Corinthians 6:17).⁵⁶ The Amish cite multiple scriptural passages supporting a strict division between God’s people (=the Amish) and the “world” (=the non-Amish). As their lifestyle reflects this dichotomy, so does their perception of time. In a culture that seeks to isolate itself from contemporary Gentiles, time functions as the ultimate separator. Nevertheless, as the Amish form closer ties to the outside world through changing occupations, their perception of time evolves ever closer to the culture from which they seek to withdraw.⁵⁷

NOTES

1. The term “Amish” in this discussion refers specifically to the Old Order Amish, who originated from the Anabaptist movement led by Menno Simons in sixteenth century Europe. Subsequently, when Jakob Ammon failed to convince the Mennonites (as these Anabaptists were called) to enforce stricter church discipline, he broke from the group in 1693 with his followers, who became known as Amish. In 1736, Amish began emigrating to and settling in Pennsylvania. They eventually spread to other American locations, primarily the Midwest. By the mid-nineteenth century, North American Amish had divided into two branches: the traditional Old Order Amish and the more liberal Amish Mennonites. Old Order Amish are distinct from Mennonite groups in their emphasis on a simple, plain lifestyle bereft of many modern practices and conveniences, on rejection of higher education, and on the use of what are considered “old-fashioned” styles of dress, transportation, and technology. Today, there are four major groups of Amish: Old

Order Amish, the New Order Amish, the Beachy Amish, and the Amish Mennonites. Old Order Amish, the most conservative group, comprise almost 90 percent of these combined branches. The largest concentrations of Old Order Amish in America today are located in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio. The following works are suggested for further study of the history of the Amish and of the characteristics of Old Order Amish: John A. Hostetler, *Amish Society*, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Donald B. Kraybill, *The Riddle of Amish Culture*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Donald B. Kraybill and Carl F. Bowman, *On the Backroad to Heaven* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Stephen M. Nolt, *A History of the Amish* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 1992).

2. Further study of the relationship of Amish culture to modernity may be found in the following readings: Thomas Edward Gallagher Jr., "Clinging to the Past or Preparing for the Future? The Structure of Selective Modernization Among Old Order Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania" (PhD diss., Temple University, 1981), 184; David Walbert, *Garden Spot* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32; Marc A. Olshan, "Modernity, the Folk Society, and the Old Order Amish," in Donald B. Kraybill and Marc A. Olshan, eds., *The Amish Struggle with Modernity* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 190; James A. Cates, "Facing Away: Mental Health Treatment with the Old Order Amish," *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 59, no. 4 (2005): 371 (<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search?vid=1&hid=109&sid=00ec7605-2339-4ff6-ae78-1cdef16ab36%40sessionmgr109>); Kraybill, *The Riddle of Amish Culture*, 1.

3. Fabienne Randaxhe, "Temporalités en Regard: Le Vieil Ordre Amish entre *Slow et Fast Time*," *Annales* 57, no. 2 (2002): 257; Thomas J. Meyers, "Lunch Pails and Factories," in Donald B. Kraybill and Marc A. Olshan, eds., *The Amish Struggle with Modernity* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 169.

4. For the quoted passage see Eugene P. Ericksen, Julia A. Ericksen, and John A. Hostetler, "The Cultivation of the Soil as a Moral Directive: Population Growth, Family Ties, and the Maintenance of the Community Among the Old Order Amish," *Rural Sociology* 45, no.1 (1980): 50; see also Donald B. Kraybill and Steven M. Nolt, *Amish Enterprise: From Plows to Profits*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 21.

5. "The Changing Farming Economy," in Brad Igou, ed., *The Amish in Their Own Words: Amish Writings from 25 Years of Family Life Magazine* (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1999), 122–23. The anonymous writer discusses the changes in modern agriculture and its effect on the Amish way of life. He points out the difficulties posed for Amish farmers, but offers no solution to their problems.

6. Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 23; Ericksen, Ericksen, and Hostetler, "Cultivation of the Soil," 58; Thomas J. Meyers, "Population Growth and Its Consequences in the Elkhart-LaGrange Old Order Amish Settlement," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 65, no. 3 (1991): 23, 60, 310–13.

7. Walbert, *Garden Spot*, 32; Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 227; Ed Tenner, "Plain Technology," *Technology Review* (July 2005): 75 (<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/results?vid=2&hid=119&sid=c649613b-c616-46e8-940b-316a2a47d7ce%40sessionmgr103>); "Go Organic, Young Man," *Economist*, 18 August 2001, 23 (<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search?vid=1&hid=122&sid=8508e0eb-dd3c-4308-bf14-c5f6af0fc315%40sessionmgr102>)

8. Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 57.

9. Nolt, *A History of the Amish*, 322. Families whose members work off the farm frequently try to provide a taste of the agricultural experience by raising a few farm animals and large gardens, and many encourage their children to work on nearby farms.
10. Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 28.
11. Carleen Hawn, "A Second Parting of the Red Sea," *Forbes*, 9 March 1998, 140, 144 (<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search?vid=1&hid=122&sid=8508ecob-dd3c-4308-bf14-c5f6af0fc315%40sessionmgr102>).
12. Dorothy O. Pratt, *Shipshewana: An Indiana Amish Community* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 135.
13. Meyers, "Population Growth," 315.
14. Gabriella Paolucci, "The Changing Dynamics of Working Time," *Time & Society* 5 (June 1996): 163; Randaxhe, "Temporalités en Regard," 261. Randaxhe states, "L'équation est simple: plus on se déplace rapidement, plus on est proche du monde." ("The equation is simple: the faster one moves, the closer one is to the world.")
15. Mary Miller, "Our Farm," in John A. Hostetler, ed., *Amish Roots: A Treasury of History, Wisdom, and Love* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 273.
16. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 50.
17. Ruth Irene Garrett with Rick Farrant, *Crossing Over: One Woman's Exodus from Amish Life* (Allen, TX: Thomas More, 2001), 44. Horses also require more extensive care than automobiles, as they must be regularly fed, shoed, brushed, and given veterinary care.
18. Meyers, "Population Growth," 318.
19. Donald B. Kraybill, "War Against Progress: Coping with Social Change," in Donald B. Kraybill and Marc A. Olshan, eds., *The Amish Struggle with Modernity* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 36–37.
20. Nolt, *History of the Amish*, 260.
21. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 195; Randaxhe, "Temporalités en Regard," 266–67.
22. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 196; Diane Zimmerman Umble, "Amish on the Line: The Telephone Debates," in Donald B. Kraybill and Marc A. Olshan, eds., *The Amish Struggle with Modernity* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 106–07. Business owners create the strongest pressure for acceptance of phones in the Amish community. Umble notes (106) that many "Amish entrepreneurs argue that access to the telephone is now a necessity for running a business." It is not unusual to see a portable phone in an Amish office or a small telephone booth outside an Amish business. Some Amish businessmen post specified times during which they take calls from customers and negotiate business transactions, but many take or make calls during all business hours. Cell phones are also growing in popularity. Not all Amish favor phone usage. While some find it an effective time-saving tool, others consider it just another source of interruptions to their work day.
23. Pratt, *Shipshewana*, 15.
24. E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," *Past and Present* 38 (December 1967): 60.

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25. Hostetler, *Amish Society*, 136–38.
 26. *Ibid.*, 180–81, 208.
 27. Randaxhe, “Temporalités en Regard,” 260. Trans. by author. “Ils évitent ainsi d’être intimement en continûment reliés au déroulement régulier et inéluctable du temps en heures, minutes et secondes. Ces divisions en durées courtes, peu pertinent dans la pensée amish, sont source de malentendus avec les personnes extérieures.”
 28. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 51.
 29. Randaxhe, “Temporalités en Regard,” 266.
 30. For this and the following three sentences, see Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 51.
 31. Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 95, 102–03, 232.
 32. *Ibid.*, 232.
 33. For this and the following sentence, see *ibid.*, 103.
 34. An interesting potential study would be an exploration how, if at all, this bi-weekly rhythm of worship affects the Amish view of the traditional seven-day week.
 35. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 125; Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 100–102.
 36. Jacques Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 30.
 37. Randaxhe, “Temporalités en Regard,” 257.
 38. Tim Ingold, “Work, Time and Industry,” *Time & Society* 4 (February 1995): 9.
 39. Randaxhe, “Temporalités en Regard,” 260.
 40. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 79.
 41. Randaxhe, “Temporalités en Regard,” 259. Randaxhe comments, “Porter une montre-bracelet, c’est symboliquement incarner l’heure officielle et se revendiquer en phase avec la société extérieure, contre le non-conformiste Amish.” (“To wear a wristwatch is symbolically to represent the official time and to claim oneself in sync with the outside society against the non-conformist Amish.”)
 42. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” 60.
 43. Barbara Adam, *Timewatch: The Social Analysis of Time* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 86.
 44. Hostetler, *Amish Society*, 161.
 45. Kraybill, *Riddle of Amish Culture*, 261. For the quotation see Gallagher Jr., “Clinging to the Past,” 288.
 46. Eli Stoltzfus, “Tourists Often Ask Me,” in John A. Hostetler, *Amish Roots: A Treasury of History, Wisdom, and Love* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 175; Meyers, “Lunch Pails and Factories,” 176.
 47. Adam, *Timewatch*, 96.
 48. Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 23, 105, 239. Not all Amish experience this new leisure. Some entrepreneurs have found that their business requires them to be even busier than they had been on the farm.

49. Steven Stoll, "Postmodern Farming, Quietly Flourishing," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 21 June 2002, B9 (<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search?vid=1&hid=21&sid=70cb9ab3-1ee6-473b-92ed-2854906a0234%40sessionmgr9>).
50. "Some Thoughts on Our Spiritual Life," in John A. Hostetler, ed., *Amish Roots: A Treasury of History, Wisdom, and Lore* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 272.
51. Adams, *Timewatch*, 89.
52. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism," 61.
53. Meyers, "Lunch Pails and Factories," 173.
54. Hawn, "Second Parting," 138.
55. Kraybill and Nolt, *Amish Enterprise*, 222.
56. Gallagher Jr., "Clinging to the Past," 178.
57. Jana M. Hawley and Jean A. Hamilton, "Retail Entrepreneurial Values in a Bicultural Community: Cultural and Economic Contentions and Negotiation," *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 25 no. 6 (1996): 650 (<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search?vid=1&hid=122&sid=8508ee0b-dd3c-4308-bf14-c5f6af0fc315%40sessionmgr102>); Donald B. Kraybill, "Introduction: The Struggle to Be Separate," in Donald B. Kraybill and Marc A. Olshan, eds., *The Amish Struggle with Modernity* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 17.

George Croft Williams and Early Social Work in South Carolina

Elaine Townsend

In June 1922, members of the Board of Trustees at the University of South Carolina were considering the merits of a potential new professor named George Croft Williams. They wrote, "He probably has a greater knowledge of the social condition of the people of South Carolina than any other man."¹ Previously, the *State* newspaper wrote of Williams, "He is regarded as one of the leaders of progressive thought on social and economic questions, and has had unusual experience along these lines: his success in dealing with social problems has been such as to command the approval and win the cooperation of many of the leading business and professional men of the city."² "Croft" Williams was well regarded even as he challenged the well-off inhabitants of his native state to care about what happened to its long neglected citizens. A quietly persistent man who kept his humor intact, Williams was one of the leaders of social reform in South Carolina in the 1920s and 1930s. He served as an Episcopal priest, a state-appointed board member, and the first director of sociology and social work at the University of South Carolina. George Croft Williams left a legacy well worth remembering.

Williams was born in Aiken, South Carolina, on 16 December 1876. He was the son of William White Williams, who was an attorney and a judge of probate, and Margaret Russell (Durr) Williams. He studied philosophy and English at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, and graduated from Virginia Theological Seminary in 1900. In 1903, he married Margaret Elizabeth Porter of Blacksburg, South Carolina. Between 1900 and 1913, he served churches in Kentucky, Georgia, and Maryland. In 1914, he returned to South Carolina where he was rector of St. John's Chapel in Charleston for four years. The Reverend, by that time, and Mrs. Williams were the parents of three children: Martha, William, and Carrie.

In 1918, Williams took a two-year break from the church to work for the state government. In that year, he took a position as the general secretary for the South Carolina Board of Charities and Corrections (SCBCC). The Board was charged with inspecting the conditions of all public and private institutions of "eleemosynary, charitable, correctional, or reformatory character" in the state.³ The Board was also responsible for summarizing its findings in an annual report to the South Carolina General Assembly. It was the first entity in South Carolina to

provide oversight to all counties in the state. To that end, the SCBCC was created in 1915 following an exhaustive five-year campaign by the South Carolina Conference of Social Work. Williams joined the conference in 1918 and remained an active member until his retirement.

The annual reports of the SCBCC from Williams' tenure reveal a state slowly emerging from old, and often exploitive, systems of providing for its less fortunate. Almshouses, for example, long considered archaic by more progressive states, existed in all forty-six counties of the state before Williams' term began. Based on the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601, which shamed the poor for their circumstances, almshouses provided a subsistence existence for destitute citizens. Williams found that wards of many almshouses were housed in filthy conditions without regard to gender, age, or mental ability. He and his colleagues contributed to the closing of at least five almshouses and assisted in the relocating of inhabitants to appropriate settings. The Board lobbied for the establishment of an Industrial School for Negro Girls, a State Training School for the Feeble-Minded, and a Governor's Commission on Child Welfare.

In 1922, Williams represented the SCBCC at the National Conference of Charities and Corrections in Providence, Rhode Island. At the conference he spoke on the important attributes of an institutional inspector. His comments reflect the encouraging, realistic, and forthright qualities that endeared Williams to many in his home state:

If one has a bold yet constructive vision for betterment of an institution he should by all means let his vision be known. Most managing agencies appreciate constructive plans, and the public usually listens to anything making for progress. However, there should be sureness there. Woe be to him that lays out a bold plan, and then quavers when criticism begins to gnaw at it. 'Tear it down and build another' is often the only thing to say, and when the time comes one might as well look cheerful, gird up his loins, and out with it.⁴

Williams' position on the SCBCC gave him a powerful voice in the effort to bring the methods of providing social services up to date in South Carolina. Although he was well into middle age, Williams shared a progressive outlook with a small number of South Carolinians. His gift for oratory, his stature as a priest, and his ability to connect with people of all walks of life tended to put resisters at ease and to open usually resistant minds to change.

Williams' work with the Board brought him into close contact with South Carolina social workers. He frequently attended the annual State Conference of Social Work and became an officer in 1920. Attendees of the conference often included the governor, professional and volunteer social workers, pastors, academics, agency heads, and clubwomen. Anyone with an interest in the social progress of South Carolina was welcome to attend.

In 1923, Williams was asked to address the conference on the state's entrance into "modern social work." First, Williams stressed the importance of educating the public about social work. He understood and emphasized how important it was for members of the public to understand the wide range of services social workers provided and the contributions social workers made. He emphasized that social workers must take on the role of "educator" to the public:

The public is the great responsible agent in social affairs. People must be told, they must be driven away from their easy-going listlessness into an appreciation of the real state of affairs and what might be done. I do not hesitate to state this in dogmatic form: The public supports social work in direct ratio to the education of the citizenry in social need and social therapy.⁵

In his speech, Williams also demonstrated insight into the necessity of professional training for social workers:

Before this we were either in the clutches of unthinking emotionalism or we followed the age-long methods of our fathers. Now the social worker is an explorer into causes. He must order his search, he must diagnose, he must give treatment according to the ailment. All this needs a scientific spirit and a method born of long study and wide experience. The world's work will always have many volunteers, and these will do a great task, but the leadership in the reshaping of society must come from the professional workers and thinkers. What we insist on having is knowledge and money, not tears and old clothes. Out of this scientific spirit has come every worthy advance in social work that South Carolina has seen in recent years.⁶

In the ten years since its founding in 1909, the South Carolina Conference of Social Workers successfully lobbied for the establishment of the Board of Charities and Corrections and the South Carolina Department of Public Welfare. The Conference now had a new goal. The establishment of a School of Social Work at the University of South Carolina had long been a part of the Conference agenda. With

the realization of the earlier goals, it was moved to the top of the list. Croft Williams believed that professional training for social workers was essential. He shared the vision of providing such an education in his home state, and soon, he would be in a position to make the goal a reality.

In 1922, Williams was called to serve as rector of St. John's Episcopal Church in Columbia. He had a productive eight-year tenure there, and his pastoral work was infused with a spirit of social service. "He coordinated the Social Gospel and the Spiritual Gospel," as one parishioner put it.⁷ Williams equated an improved social order with a democratic society. He felt that "Christians are challenged to show how the teachings of their religion may avail to a reconstruction that will make a democratic world filled with lasting peace."⁸

While serving at St. John's, Williams began to experience the symptoms of Ataxia, a congenital disease that attacks the nervous system and is similar to Parkinson's disease. His ability to speak and write clearly slowly began to fail. In 1930, upon his resignation, a parishioner commented, "if his frail body could have kept pace with his strong mind, he might have become a great bishop of the church."⁹ Despite his illness, Williams was able to serve the small church of St. John's in the rural community of Congaree, South Carolina, until 1945.

It was also in 1922 that Croft Williams became an assistant professor at the University of South Carolina. He had begun teaching courses intermittently for his friend Josiah Morse, the head of the psychology and philosophy department. Eventually, a full time position was made for Williams. Morse, who was the first professor of the Jewish faith at the university, was known throughout the South for his progressive teachings on interracial cooperation and other social issues.¹⁰ Williams and Morse had great respect for one another. They often joined into discussions at Gittman's Bookstore on Main Street in Columbia and publicly supported one another on controversial issues.¹¹

Three years after his arrival on campus, Williams made his first foray into social work education. He directed a one-week social work institute which was associated with the summer school. A total of twenty-two students—twenty-one female and one male—attended. Sessions on social case work, social hygiene, rural economics, and sociology were offered. The institute was promoted by members of the State Conference of Social Work. Although they hoped it would be an annual offering and would lead to the founding of a permanent School of Social Work, it is the only such institute on record. While the reason for the discontinuation is undocumented, it seems likely that the moderate turnout indicated too little interest in social work education to support a full program.

In 1927, Williams was given charge of the new Department of Sociology. Not unlike other departments in their infancy, he was its only professor. What prompted

the trustees to establish the new department in that year is unclear. Hollis notes that "President Mitchell urged the trustees to create a separate department in [sociology] in 1911."¹² Records do not indicate why the trustees waited so long, but what is clear is that Williams offered classes in both sociology and social work from the department's beginning.

In 1928, Williams published his first book, *Social Problems of South Carolina*. It was among the first releases by the newly formed University of South Carolina Press. Williams may have written the book, in part, to use as a text for the class he taught by the same name. The book, which achieved moderate success, addressed poverty, crime, mental illness, public health, and "inter-racial relations."

In the last year of the 1920s, the nation was shocked by the collapse of the stock market. In South Carolina, where the economic conditions were already tentative, the situation became desperate. By 1933, the state had the lowest per capita income in the nation.¹³ Many citizens lost their savings in bank failures, and in some counties the unemployment rate reached 30 percent. There were even documented cases of death by starvation in the state.¹⁴ At the University of South Carolina, professors and staff were grateful to have jobs even though they were sometimes paid in script. As the 1932 presidential election neared, many pinned their hopes on the governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to stabilize the country.

President Roosevelt's New Deal was a series of legislative responses to the emergency caused by the Great Depression. In his first hundred days, Roosevelt devised programs to give people jobs, get them fed, and save the banking system from failing completely. South Carolinians, though often suspicious of the federal government, were generally receptive. Historian Walter Edgar wrote, "Given the scope of economic distress in South Carolina, almost all New Deal legislation had an impact on the lives of its citizens."¹⁵

At the core of Roosevelt's staff were several well regarded social workers. Among them were Will W. Alexander (co-founder of the Commission for Interracial Cooperation), Frances Perkins (the first woman to serve on a presidential cabinet), and a brash young reformer named Harry Hopkins. It was Hopkins whom Roosevelt appointed to direct the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). The FERA was charged with distributing grants for food, clothing, and other essentials to citizens across the nation. Hopkins realized that professionally trained social workers were needed badly to get this work done. He released funds to local universities specifically earmarked for the training of social workers. In the spring of 1934, George Croft Williams saw the opportunity to begin the University of South Carolina's School of Social Work with these funds. Through FERA's Social Service Training Program, the chance to realize the

long held vision of creating a School of Social Work in South Carolina materialized. Although the need for trained social workers in the state had grown in the previous decades, now, in the wake of the Great Depression, it was dire. The leader, the money, and—as would be evident—the students were finally in place to train those social workers in South Carolina.

In April 1934, Williams wrote a letter to University of South Carolina President Leonard Baker informing him that he would like to pursue FERA funds to start a School of Social Work.¹⁶ Baker agreed as long as the program did not require university funds. The new School of Social Work began as a part of the summer school program that June. A press release by J. A. Stoddard, the summer school director, announced the school:

The rapid increase in social work has brought an urgent demand for social workers. Yet few of these can be found in South Carolina and they receive their training in institutions of other states. It is well recognized that while the general problems of our social order are nation-wide, there are unique [problems] in our state. Besides, we should not expect to have other communities set up schools to train our citizens for work among their own people. The School of Social Work will be set up to cope with this situation.¹⁷

In the first year, the new school provided social work education to 443 students in six, six-week cycles.¹⁸ Attendees were a mix of FERA students, senior undergraduates and post graduates from all over the state. The FERA students numbered 299. Eighty-five were university students (undergraduates), and 59 were listed as independent.¹⁹ The students attended two classes, which met Monday through Friday, for one and one half hours each. They were awarded three semester hours for each completed course. Students were either awarded a certificate stating the number of hours they attended or had the option to continue and fulfill the requirements leading to a Master of Social Service degree.

The students ranged widely in age. As the FERA students were already working, they tended to be older than the students who had just completed a bachelor's degree or who were still undergraduates. Even today one oral historian, who attended the School in 1935, laughs about the age differences:

I recall people who were already employed by the Department of Public Welfare came to Carolina. They came to the University for a semester and studied. They were in our classes. . . . They were people who were adults. We were voting for something on the campus. They

were eligible to vote. We were voting for something on campus like May Queen or President of the student body. Well, we corralled all those adults and took them to vote. That was kind of funny when they appeared to vote for the May Queen.²⁰

On 2 August 1934, Croft Williams wrote to President Baker expressing his pleasure at the success of the first six weeks: "We had a great session of the School of Social Work this summer, and everybody is enthusiastic about it. All were impressed with the ease of manner and kindness of the University." Williams' regard for his friend Baker is revealed in his invitation to the family property on the May River in Bluffton, South Carolina, at the end of the letter, "I trust that you will have a delightful summer, and that you can find your way down to Palmetto Beach. If you could come down to see me I should give you a fine time boating, bathing, and fishing."²¹

On 2 June 1936, the president's annual report to the university's board of trustees included an entry from the dean of the university, F.W. Bradley, which read:

In recognition of the pressing need of a trained personnel for the numerous agencies of social service now supported by state and federal government, the University cooperated with the F.E.R.A. in 1934 establishing a School of Social Work. The university provided its staff of Sociology at no additional expense, and the F.E.R.A. has since then employed two extra instructors and furnished the necessary books, material, and equipment. The financial aid of the F.E.R.A. will not be continued, and, therefore, the question arises of the continuance of this school which is rendering a valuable service. This is the only school of its kind in this section of the south, and it is now in position, by reason of full equipment purchased, to continue this service, provided the University budget for next year will be sufficient to pay the salaries of two additional instructors. The additional instructors would entail an expense of approximately \$3500. If possible this School should be made a permanent organization of the university.²²

Despite the dean's opinion, the trustees decided to close the school in May, 1936. Letters of protest to new President J. Rion McKissick, individual trustees, and members of the General Assembly arrived quickly. The words regarding education of the public about social work that Croft Williams had spoken about in his 1923 speech had apparently taken hold. President McKissick spent part of the summer of 1936 responding to numerous letters protesting the closing. The following is a sampling of those letters:

There are quite a large number of people here in Aiken who are anxious that this work be started again. They feel that the school has rendered some very useful work to the state. I believe that it has accomplished much good and filled a place very badly needed. I would very much like to see this work continued. *John May from the South Carolina House of Representatives July 24, 1936*

Rumors are current that the Trustees of the University are considering discontinuance of its School of Social Work. Such reports really disturb my thoughts. I hope sincerely there is no cause for alarm. It would seem a pity that we should be compelled to go abroad to find in other states persons who have had training for such service. *A. T. Jamison, Superintendent of Connie Maxwell Orphanage August 13, 1936*

I believe that social work is going to be more or less a part of our routine in the years to come. I think that it is here to stay. A school of instruction is necessary to its proper administration. *John Williams of the SC Senate Judiciary Committee July 23, 1936*

With the fine start which has been made I believe that the school will make ultimately a fine contribution to the community and the state. No other institution in the State is prepared to do...what the university has begun. *Henry D. Phillips, Rector of Trinity Church Columbia August 20, 1936*

[South Carolina] needs a school of social work to send out scientifically trained leaders ... to motive a desire for service in changing the position of the State from first or second place in mortality, illiteracy, low income, etc. to a location more commensurate with her past glory which ultimately may be reflected in a more exalted future. *Members of the University of South Carolina Alumni Association June 5, 1936*²³

President McKissick replied by sending dozens of letters containing some version of the following, which he sent to Miss Martha Aiken on 17 August 1936:

The University has no endowment. All the money for its support is received from the Legislature and from student fees. The law of this State prohibits us from running a deficit. The university can

only spend what it has. It cannot smite a rock and have money pour forth. In short, the university does not have money enough to carry on the School of Social Work.

Late in the summer of 1936, Croft Williams was able to procure a \$3000 grant from the Federal Educational Program for Social Services to keep the school going. Because the grant was finalized so close to the beginning of the term, enrollment dropped off sharply. In the fall of 1936, the university's School of Social Work opened with twenty-one students and three professors. The School of Social Work, however, was added to the university's annual budget with little fanfare in 1937, presumably to avoid a protest.

George Croft Williams continued to direct the university's School of Social Work until his retirement in 1945 at age sixty-nine. He released his second book, *A Social Interpretation of South Carolina*, in 1946. A promotional piece for the book sums up the rare gift Williams had to address the state's difficulties in a non-threatening manner. It contends, "His candid analysis of South Carolina's shortcomings spring from his deep love for the state and her people and constitute the guidance of a friend rather than the carping of a critic."²⁴

George Croft Williams was persistent and dedicated in combating the social ills of South Carolina. In his endeavors as a priest, author, and teacher he left present day fighters for social justice a model of inspiration and fortitude. He left a legacy well worth remembering.

NOTES

1. *Report of Organization Committee for Session 1921-1922*, University of South Carolina (South Carolina College) Board of Trustees microfilm, reel 209E, Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
2. "G. Croft Williams will be in charge," *The State*, 10 October, 1918, 10.
3. *Fourth Annual Report of the State Board of Charities and Correction of South Carolina 1918 to the Governor* (Columbia, SC: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1919), 2.
4. National Conference on Social Work, *Official Proceedings of the Annual Meeting: 1922* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922), 453-54. This Conference was formerly known as the National Conference of Charities and Corrections.
5. "South Carolina Enters Modern Social Work," *Quarterly Bulletin of the State Board of Public Welfare IV* (Columbia, SC: State Board of Public Welfare, 1923), 27.
6. *Ibid.*, 24-25.
7. Lewis A. Emerson, *The First Fifty Years A History of St. John's Shandon Episcopal Church* (Columbia, SC: St. John's Episcopal Church, 1965), 26.

8. "Social Service Mission Tomorrow," *The State*, 20 April 1918, 12.
9. Emerson, 26.
10. Belinda Gergel and Richard Gergel, *In pursuit of the tree of life: A history of the early Jews of Columbia, South Carolina, and the Tree of Life Congregation* (Columbia, SC: Tree of Life Congregation, 1996); Marion A. Wright and Arnold Shankman, *Human rights odyssey* (Durham, NC: Moore Publishing, 1978).
11. Caroline Mauldin Hendricks interviewed by Elaine Townsend, 26 June 2007, tape recording and transcript in the author's possession.
12. D. W. Hollis, *University of South Carolina: College to University* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1956), 215.
13. Jack I. Hayes, *South Carolina and the New Deal* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), xi.
14. Walter Edgar, *South Carolina: A History* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 500.
15. *Ibid.*, 501.
16. George Croft Williams to Leonard T. Baker, 13 April 1934, in the G. Croft Williams file, Leonard T. Baker Presidential Papers 1934–1935, box 3.
17. "Offers New Class in Summer School," *The State*, 7 May 1934, 2.
18. G.C. Williams, Newsletter, 23 May, 1935, in the Social Work, School of file, Leonard T. Baker Presidential Papers 1935–1936, box 1.
19. Enrollment in School of Social Work University of South Carolina, in the Social Work, School of file, Leonard T. Baker Presidential Papers 1935–1936, box 1, no date.
20. Anonymous, interviewed by Elaine Townsend, 7 June, 2007. Tape recording and transcript in the author's possession.
21. G. Croft Williams to Leonard T. Baker 2 August 1934, in the Williams, G. Croft file, Leonard T. Baker Presidential Papers 1934–1935, box 3.
22. Leonard T. Baker to University of South Carolina Board of Trustees, 2 June 1936, in the F.W. Bradley, Dean of the University file, Leonard T. Baker Presidential Papers 1936–1937, box 3.
23. Each of these letters is contained in the Social Work, School of file, J. Rion McKissick Presidential Papers 1936–1937, box 1.
24. Many thanks to Dr. Edward B. Borden, grandson of George Croft Williams, for the gift of this pamphlet to the author.

Minutes of the Seventy-seventh Annual Meeting
1 March 2008

SOUTH CAROLINA ARCHIVES AND HISTORY CENTER

8:30 a. m. – 9:30 a.m. Registration

SESSION I 9:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.

A. Another Look at the Icons of Nineteenth Century South Carolina: New Perspectives on Calhoun, Hampton, and Tillman

Chair and Commentator: Hyman Rubin, III (Columbia College)

Liberty and Union: John C. Calhoun and the Preservation of the Union. Lewie Reece (Anderson University)

“My Children on the Field”: Wade Hampton, Biography, and the Roots of the Lost Cause. Rod Andrew, Jr. (Clemson University)

The One-Eyed King: The Reforms of Ben Tillman as the Reason for the Absence of Populism in South Carolina. Kevin Krause (Clemson University)

B. Getting Around in South Carolina: Oceans, Rivers and Streets

Chair and Commentator: W. Eric Emerson (Charleston Library Society)

“The Most Bold and Daring Act of the Age”: A History of the U.S.S. Philadelphia, 1798-1804. Abby Garland (Bob Jones University)

Operating by Charters: The Legal Regulation of Ferries in South Carolina from 1790 to 1898. Edward Salo (Brockington and Associations, Inc.)

Between the Wheels: The Eclipse of the Electric Streetcar in the Post-War New South. Jeffrey M. Leatherwood (West Virginia University)

C. Changes to the Social Order in South Carolina

Chair and Commentator: Marcia Synnott (University of South Carolina)

Let No Man Put Asunder: South Carolina’s Law of Divorce, 1895-1950. Kellen Funk (Bob Jones University)

Offending Decent People: Murder, Masculinity and the (Homosexual) Menace in Cold War Era Charleston. Santi Thompson (University of South Carolina)

George Croft Williams and South Carolina Social Work, 1918-1934. Elaine Townsend (University of South Carolina)

SESSION II 11:00 a.m. – 12:15 p.m.

A. Blacks, Whites and Reds: Politics in 20th Century South Carolina

Chair: Kevin Witherspoon (Lander University)

Commentator: Cherisse Jones-Branch (Arkansas State University)

Archibald Rutledge's "Negro Problem:" Plantation Nostalgia and Civil Rights in the South Carolina Lowcountry. Jason Morgan Ward (Yale University)

Straddling the Fence: Politics and Ambiguity on the Eve of "Brown." John White (College of Charleston)

The 1965 South Carolina Red Scare: Anti-Communism, Free Speech and Student Activism in the Palmetto State. Areli A. Keeney (University of South Carolina)

B. Benevolence and Evangelism in Lowcountry South Carolina

Chair and Commentator: A. V. Huff, Jr. (Furman University)

Death and Community in the Late-Colonial Lowcountry: A View from the Journal of Archibald Simpson, Peter N. Moore (Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi)

The Evolution of Women's Benevolence in Nineteenth Century South Carolina. Vanessa McNamara (College of Charleston)

C. Time Consciousness in Historical Perspective

Chair: Brenda Schoolfield (Bob Jones University)

Commentator: Cheryl Wells (University of Wyoming)

Changing Times: Occupational Change and Temporal Perception among Old Order Amish. Julie Phillips (Bob Jones University)

Arguing Time: A Look at Two Philosophic Views of Time in the Clarke-Leibniz Debate. David Woodworth (Bob Jones University)

"Six Days Shalt Thou Labor": Work, Sabbath Observance, and Cultural Conversion in John Eliot's Mission to the Indians. Lincoln Austin Mullen (Bob Jones University)

Luncheon, Keynote Address, and Business Meeting 12:30 p.m. – 2:00 p. m.

Rodger Stroup introduced Philip G. Grose, Jr., research fellow at the Institute for Southern Studies at the University of South Carolina and a member of the staffs of South Carolina governors Robert E. McNair and John C. West. Grose is the author of *South Carolina at the Brink: Robert McNair and the Politics of Civil Rights*. He presented *Bob McNair and Lyndon Johnson: The New Deal Legacy*, an interesting account of the relationship between Governor McNair and President Johnson and their impact on the politics of Civil Rights in South Carolina during the tumultuous 1960s.

Additional business

Following the address, Joyce Wood called the annual business meeting to order. The minutes from the 2007 annual meeting were approved unanimously as printed in the *Proceedings*.

Rodger Stroup presented the treasurer's report. He indicated that the association finished 2007 in the red. The small loss was expected, and resulted from expenses related to the Association's 2007 meeting at Coastal Carolina University. At the same time, the association was able to save a considerable amount in the publication of the *Proceedings*. The treasurer's report was approved unanimously.

Stroup introduced a resolution to honor Dean Hollis and Louis B. Jones for their long and outstanding service to the association.

Stroup announced Lara Koser as the winner of the 2007 Hollis Price.

The nominating committee presented the following slate of officers and board members:

President: E.E. "Wink" Prince (Coastal Carolina University)

Vice President: Andrew Myers (University of South Carolina Upstate)

Secretary: Lars Seiler (Spring Valley High School)

Treasurer: Rodger Stroup (South Carolina Department of Archives and History)

At Large: W. Eric Emerson (Charleston Library Society)

The report of the nominating committee was approved by acclamation.

Announcements

The 2009 meeting of the Association will be organized by Andrew Myers, hosted by University of South Carolina Upstate, and held on Saturday, 7 March 2009 at the Campus Life Center.

Stephen Lowe called for submissions from the meeting's presenters to the *Proceedings*.

Copies of Philip Grose's biography of Governor Robert E. McNair were available in the Archives & History Center gift shop during the meeting, and the author arranged to sign copies after the luncheon.

SESSION III 2:15 p. m. – 3:30 p.m.

A. Widowed South Carolina Nineteenth Century Plantation Managers

Chair and Commentator: Dorothy Pratt (University of South Carolina)

Like Mother, Like Daughter: Harriott Pinckney Horry of Hampton Plantation, 1748-1830. Constance Schulz (University of South Carolina)

Martha Rutledge Kinloch Singleton of Kensington Plantation: Profile of a South Carolina Widow. Lindsay Crawford (University of South Carolina)

B. A New Look at Military Leadership: Generals and Indian Chiefs

Chair and Commentator: Tyler Boulware (West Virginia University)

Indian Leadership in the Early American Republic. Sarah E. Miller (University of South Carolina, Salkehatchie)

In Defense of Thomas Sumter. Tom Powers (University of South Carolina, Sumter)

Charleston's Controversial General: Roswell S. Ripley. Jennifer Zoebelein (College of Charleston/The Citadel)

A Notice to Contributors Concerning Style

The editorial committee invites submission of manuscripts from authors of papers presented at the annual meeting. On the recommendation of reviewers and editors, manuscripts may be published in *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association*.

In general, manuscripts should not exceed 4500 words (about eighteen double-spaced pages) including endnotes. As soon as possible after the annual meeting, authors should submit two paper copies and one electronic copy to the editors for review. The electronic copy should be submitted as an e-mail attachment in Word for Windows or WordPerfect for Windows format. E-mail addresses for the editors follow this note. The electronic text should be flush left and double-spaced, with as little special formatting as possible. Do not paginate the electronic version of the paper. All copies should use 12-point type in the Times New Roman font. Place your name and affiliation, along with both electronic and postal contact information, on a separate page. The title of the paper should be at the top of the first page of the text, in bold type. Please use margins of one inch throughout your paper and space only once between sentences. Indent five spaces without quotation marks all quotations five or more lines in length.

Documentation should be provided in endnotes, not at the foot of each page. At the end of the text of your paper double-space, then type the word "NOTES" centered between the margins. List endnotes in Arabic numerical sequence, each number followed by a period and space, and then the text of the endnote. Endnotes should be flush left and single-spaced. If your word-processing program demands the raised footnote numeral, it will be acceptable. Foreign words and titles of books or journals should be italicized. For the rest, *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* adheres in matters of general usage to the fourteenth or fifteenth editions of *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

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